sentence instruction in California

2015She says interpreting Howard to mandate execution of that sentence “would require the court to recognize as lawful a sentence that the Legislature [by specifying the appropriate sentence for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a)] has clearly designated as unauthorized.” It is true, “ ‘[w]hen a court pronounces a sentence which is unauthorized by the [applicable] [c]ode, that sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed whenever the mistake is appropriately brought to the attention of the court.’ [Citation.] ‘When an illegal sentence is vacated, the cour

2015She says interpreting Howard to mandate execution of that sentence “would require the court to recognize as lawful a sentence that the Legislature [by specifying the appropriate sentence for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a)] has clearly designated as unauthorized.” It is true, “ ‘[w]hen a court pronounces a sentence which is unauthorized by the [applicable] [c]ode, that sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed whenever the mistake is appropriately brought to the attention of the court.’ [Citation.] ‘When an illegal sentence is vacated, the cour

2018The appellate court was "disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of a sentence error has required the formal appellate process." ( Fares , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 957 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 .) After wondering whether "there [was] a better way of going about this sort of corrective jurisprudence than by including it in a formal appeal, especially when it is the only ground of appeal[,]" *316 the court determined that "[t]here is!" ( Id. at p. 958, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 .) "The most expeditious and, we contend, the appropriate method of correction of errors of this kind is to move for

2018The appellate court was "disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of a sentence error has required the formal appellate process." ( Fares , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 957 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 .) After wondering whether "there [was] a better way of going about this sort of corrective jurisprudence than by including it in a formal appeal, especially when it is the only ground of appeal[,]" *316 the court determined that "[t]here is!" ( Id. at p. 958, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 .) "The most expeditious and, we contend, the appropriate method of correction of errors of this kind is to move for

2023(People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248 , 255–256.) The Legislature created this pathway “ ‘to conserve judicial resources and [allow litigants to] efficiently present claims in a single forum.’ ” (Id. at p. 256; cf. People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 957 [“We are disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of a sentence error has required the formal appellate process”].) Because the purpose of the rule is to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of appellate resources, it “only applies in cases where the erroneous imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharge

2023(People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248 , 255–256.) The Legislature created this pathway “ ‘to conserve judicial resources and [allow litigants to] efficiently present claims in a single forum.’ ” (Id. at p. 256; cf. People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 957 [“We are disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of a sentence error has required the formal appellate process”].) Because the purpose of the rule is to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of appellate resources, it precludes an appeal without first seeking correction in the trial court “only . . . in cases where the errone

2020Instead, “ ‘[t]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 ; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202 .) F. Analysis Defendant argues the definition of great bodily injury given in the CALCRIM instructions was misleading and ambiguous compared to those previously stated in the CALJIC instructions.

2007(Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1016.) So read, CALCRIM No. 220 correctly instructed the jury.

2013Any person in defendant's position would reasonably know that such a general waiver of appeal rights obviously included error occurring up to the time of the waiver; however, in our view, it is not reasonable to conclude that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal any unforeseen or unknown future error . . . ." (Id. at p. 1662.) In Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 68 , the plea agreement specified the sentence and required a waiver of appellate rights that specifically extended to any right to appeal such sentence.

2013Any person in defendant's position would reasonably know that such a general waiver of appeal rights obviously included error occurring up to the time of the waiver; however, in our view, it is not reasonable to conclude that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal any unforeseen or unknown future error . . . ." (Id. at p. 1662.) In Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 68 , the plea agreement specified the sentence and required a waiver of appellate rights that specifically extended to any right to appeal such sentence.

1980(People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 557 P.2d 995 ]; People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) The court used and considered the probation report and referred to it during the sentence hearing.

1980(People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 557 P.2d 995 ]; People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) The court used and considered the probation report and referred to it during the sentence hearing.

2026As our Supreme Court has succinctly stated many times, “ ‘[i]n the context of first degree murder, “ ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245 (Salazar) holding modified on another ground by People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 ; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216 [same]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 645 [same]; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419 [“ ‘ “premeditation” means thought over in advance’ ”].) According to Merriam-Webster, the primary definition of “decide” is: “To make a final choice or jud

2026(People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614 , 667–668 [“ ‘prior quarrels’ ” between defendant and homicide victim].) “While a single sentence in an instruction ‘may or may not be confusing, depending upon the context in which the sentence lies,’ an instructional error ‘ “ ‘cannot be predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt taken from the instructions.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457 , 465–466.) “ ‘We look to the instructions as a whole and the entire record of trial, including the arguments of counsel.’ ” (Id. at p. 465; see People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th

2026As our Supreme Court has succinctly stated many times, “ ‘[i]n the context of first degree murder, “ ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245 (Salazar) holding modified on another ground by People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 ; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216 [same]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 645 [same]; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419 [“ ‘ “premeditation” means thought over in advance’ ”].) According to Merriam-Webster, the primary definition of “decide” is: “To make a final choice or jud

2026As our Supreme Court has succinctly stated many times, “ ‘[i]n the context of first degree murder, “ ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245 (Salazar) holding modified on another ground by People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 ; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216 [same]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 645 [same]; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419 [“ ‘ “premeditation” means thought over in advance’ ”].) According to Merriam-Webster, the primary definition of “decide” is: “To make a final choice or jud

2026(People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 427, 429 .) That purpose is still relevant where, as here, an inmate might one day be paroled.

2026As our Supreme Court has succinctly stated many times, “ ‘[i]n the context of first degree murder, “ ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245 (Salazar) holding modified on another ground by People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 ; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216 [same]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 645 [same]; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419 [“ ‘ “premeditation” means thought over in advance’ ”].) According to Merriam-Webster, the primary definition of “decide” is: “To make a final choice or jud

2025As previously noted, the court added a sentence to the instruction that stated: “In other words, to find any of the four alleged special circumstances to be true, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human being or had the specific intent to aid and abet another in killing even though some other person actually did the killing.” Reading the sentence in isolation, Amos posits that it does not bar resentencing, because it shows only that the jury found he harbored an intent to kill, which does not “ ‘itself conclusively 15 establish that a petition

2024Although the defendant in Nguyen did not object to imposition of the five-year sentence enhancement, the court concluded he had not forfeited his objection to the sentence because the violation of section 1170.1, subdivision (e), resulted in an unauthorized sentence. ( Nguyen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 271–272.) Contrary to the People’s contention, McDarment, likewise, did not forfeit his challenge to the sentence by failing to object in the trial court because a defendant does not forfeit a claim of sentencing error where the sentence “ ‘violates mandatory provisions governing the length o

2024(Cf. People v. Zuniga (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1178 , 1185–1186 [certificate required] with People v. Loera (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 992, 998 [certificate not required].) Because we conclude that defendant is estopped from challenging the stay of the deadly weapon enhancement, we need not decide which side of this split to adopt. 4. section 654 involves an assessment of facts rather than an inherently illegal sentence like the stayed enhancement here.

2024Although the defendant in Nguyen did not object to imposition of the five-year sentence enhancement, the court concluded he had not forfeited his objection to the sentence because the violation of section 1170.1, subdivision (e), resulted in an unauthorized sentence. ( Nguyen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 271–272.) Contrary to the People’s contention, McDarment, likewise, did not forfeit his challenge to the sentence by failing to object in the trial court because a defendant does not forfeit a claim of sentencing error where the sentence “ ‘violates mandatory provisions governing the length o

2023(Paysinger, at p. 31.) We agree with Paysinger that the first sentence of CALCRIM No. 372 does not suggest that evidence of flight is sufficient to show guilt, “and in any event the final sentence of the instruction positively refutes any such suggestion.” (Paysinger, at p. 31; see Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 455 [quoting and adopting Paysinger’s analysis].) This conclusion likewise disposes of defendant’s related argument that CALCRIM No. 372 conflicts with section 1127c by inviting the jury to treat evidence of flight as sufficient in itself to prove guilt.

2023(Paysinger, at p. 31.) We agree with Paysinger that the first sentence of CALCRIM No. 372 does not suggest that evidence of flight is sufficient to show guilt, “and in any event the final sentence of the instruction positively refutes any such suggestion.” (Paysinger, at p. 31; see Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 455 [quoting and adopting Paysinger’s analysis].) This conclusion likewise disposes of defendant’s related argument that CALCRIM No. 372 conflicts with section 1127c by inviting the jury to treat evidence of flight as sufficient in itself to prove guilt.

2022(Nor in May, for that matter, where the appellate court expressly said so (see May, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 839 [failure to state reasons held harmless, and distinguishing other appellate decisions, because “there is no danger that the court may have made improper dual use of facts” in imposing sentence]).) “A reviewing court is entitled to presume the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion in imposing sentence absent evidence to the contrary” (People v. Montano (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 118, 121 , italics added), yet here the court’s clear error in one respect at sentencing (i.e.,

2022(Nor in May, for that matter, where the appellate court expressly said so (see May, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 839 [failure to state reasons held harmless, and distinguishing other appellate decisions, because “there is no danger that the court may have made improper dual use of facts” in imposing sentence]).) “A reviewing court is entitled to presume the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion in imposing sentence absent evidence to the contrary” (People v. Montano (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 118, 121 , italics added), yet here the court’s clear error in one respect at sentencing (i.e.,