sentence violation in Montana

2007C.R., and the Youth Court err by imposing a sentence in violation of its previous order, which incorporated the sentencing stipulation? ¶12 We have recognized that “a plea agreement presupposes fundamental fairness in the securing of the agreement between the defendant and the prosecutor ....” Rardon I, ¶ 14 (citing State v. Schoonover, 1999 MT 7, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 54, ¶ 12 , 973 P.2d 230, ¶ 12 ).

2007C.R., and the Youth Court err by imposing a sentence in violation of its previous order, which incorporated the sentencing stipulation? ¶12 We have recognized that “a plea agreement presupposes fundamental fairness in the securing of the agreement between the defendant and the prosecutor ....” Rardon I, ¶ 14 (citing State v. Schoonover, 1999 MT 7, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 54, ¶ 12 , 973 P.2d 230, ¶ 12 ).

2021State v. Otto, 2017 MT 212, ¶ 11 , 388 Mont. 391 , 401 P.3d 193 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2021State v. Otto, 2017 MT 212, ¶ 11 , 388 Mont. 391 , 401 P.3d 193 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2020Contrarily, the State asserts Wright’s sentence was within the statutory parameters and therefore legal, and the District Court did not improperly consider any information or misinformation. ¶5 “We review a criminal sentence de novo for legality and compliance with statutory mandates.” State v. Youpee, 2018 MT 102, ¶ 4 , 391 Mont. 246 , 416 P.3d 1050 (citations omitted).

2020Contrarily, the State asserts Wright’s sentence was within the statutory parameters and therefore legal, and the District Court did not improperly consider any information or misinformation. ¶5 “We review a criminal sentence de novo for legality and compliance with statutory mandates.” State v. Youpee, 2018 MT 102, ¶ 4 , 391 Mont. 246 , 416 P.3d 1050 (citations omitted).

2015In a single sentence of analysis, we concluded “that blockage of plaintiffs’ access to the river by the gate was a continuing tort, [sic] because it was easily abated.” Shors, 221 Mont. at 397 , 720 P.2d at 243-44 . ¶118 Even if the limited analysis in Shors, although questionable, is susceptible to the Court’s interpretation that abatement is the sole inquiry under the continuing tort doctrine, I would not permit Shors to control here.

2015In a single sentence of analysis, we concluded “that blockage of plaintiffs’ access to the river by the gate was a continuing tort, [sic] because it was easily abated.” Shors, 221 Mont. at 397 , 720 P.2d at 243-44 . ¶118 Even if the limited analysis in Shors, although questionable, is susceptible to the Court’s interpretation that abatement is the sole inquiry under the continuing tort doctrine, I would not permit Shors to control here.

2014State v. Raugust, 2000 MT 146, ¶ 19 , 300 Mont. 54 , 3 P.3d 115 . ¶19 To the extent Beaudet alleges the District Court exceeded its statutory authority, we may review the legality of the sentence under the exception stated in Lenihan.

2014State v. Raugust, 2000 MT 146, ¶ 19 , 300 Mont. 54 , 3 P.3d 115 . ¶19 To the extent Beaudet alleges the District Court exceeded its statutory authority, we may review the legality of the sentence under the exception stated in Lenihan.

2008State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 5 , 335 Mont. 344, ¶ 5 , 151 P.3d 892, ¶ 5 .

2008State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 5 , 335 Mont. 344, ¶ 5 , 151 P.3d 892, ¶ 5 .

2007We reject the State’s argument that we should not consider this issue. ¶8 The State also suggests, in one paragraph, that whether Ellis has established “standing to bring his equal protection challenge should be considered.” It cites to State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶ 28 , 325 Mont. 317, ¶ 28 , 106 P.3d 521, ¶ 28 , and State v. Thaut, 2004 MT 359, ¶¶ 16-23 , 324 Mont. 460, ¶¶ 16-23 , 103 P.3d 1012, ¶¶ 16-23 , for the usual standing requirement that a party must clearly allege past, present or threatened injury to property or to a civil right, and the alleged injury must be distinguishable from the

2007We reject the State’s argument that we should not consider this issue. ¶8 The State also suggests, in one paragraph, that whether Ellis has established “standing to bring his equal protection challenge should be considered.” It cites to State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶ 28 , 325 Mont. 317, ¶ 28 , 106 P.3d 521, ¶ 28 , and State v. Thaut, 2004 MT 359, ¶¶ 16-23 , 324 Mont. 460, ¶¶ 16-23 , 103 P.3d 1012, ¶¶ 16-23 , for the usual standing requirement that a party must clearly allege past, present or threatened injury to property or to a civil right, and the alleged injury must be distinguishable from the

2007We reject the State’s argument that we should not consider this issue. ¶8 The State also suggests, in one paragraph, that whether Ellis has established “standing to bring his equal protection challenge should be considered.” It cites to State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶ 28 , 325 Mont. 317, ¶ 28 , 106 P.3d 521, ¶ 28 , and State v. Thaut, 2004 MT 359, ¶¶ 16-23 , 324 Mont. 460, ¶¶ 16-23 , 103 P.3d 1012, ¶¶ 16-23 , for the usual standing requirement that a party must clearly allege past, present or threatened injury to property or to a civil right, and the alleged injury must be distinguishable from the

2007We reject the State’s argument that we should not consider this issue. ¶8 The State also suggests, in one paragraph, that whether Ellis has established “standing to bring his equal protection challenge should be considered.” It cites to State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶ 28 , 325 Mont. 317, ¶ 28 , 106 P.3d 521, ¶ 28 , and State v. Thaut, 2004 MT 359, ¶¶ 16-23 , 324 Mont. 460, ¶¶ 16-23 , 103 P.3d 1012, ¶¶ 16-23 , for the usual standing requirement that a party must clearly allege past, present or threatened injury to property or to a civil right, and the alleged injury must be distinguishable from the

1996In Rivera , the defendant was convicted of DUI and the justice court included in the defendant’s sentence a requirement that she attend a DUI school and complete “treatment as necessary.” Rivera, 767 P.2d at 337 .

1970The Court emphasized the prejudice that would result from an absence of counsel at the sentence hearing following a guilty plea and stated at page 160, 78 S.Ct. at page 194 : “The right to counsel is not a right confined to representation during the trial on its merits.” In a still later case, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 , the Court said: “The services of counsel at the deferred sentencing stage are necessary to insure that certain rights, such as that of appeal, are seasonably asserted and to afford the defendant the substantial assistance which might be neeees

1970The Court emphasized the prejudice that would result from an absence of counsel at the sentence hearing following a guilty plea and stated at page 160, 78 S.Ct. at page 194 : “The right to counsel is not a right confined to representation during the trial on its merits.” In a still later case, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 , the Court said: “The services of counsel at the deferred sentencing stage are necessary to insure that certain rights, such as that of appeal, are seasonably asserted and to afford the defendant the substantial assistance which might be neeees

1970The Court emphasized the prejudice that would result from an absence of counsel at the sentence hearing following a guilty plea and stated at page 160, 78 S.Ct. at page 194 : “The right to counsel is not a right confined to representation during the trial on its merits.” In a still later case, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 , the Court said: “The services of counsel at the deferred sentencing stage are necessary to insure that certain rights, such as that of appeal, are seasonably asserted and to afford the defendant the substantial assistance which might be neeees

1968In Love v. Mon-O-Co Oil Corp., 133 Mont. 56 , 319 P.2d 1056 (1958), this Court affirmed the rule laid down in Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469 , 146 P.2d 151 (1944), and held that: “This performance exception, however, applies only to such actions as are based upon contracts which plainly show, either (a) by their express terms or (b) by necesseary implication therefrom, that the contracting parties, at the time of contracting, did mutually agree upon a particular county *524 other than that of defendant’s residence wherein they intended that their contract was to be performed.” It is

1968In Love v. Mon-O-Co Oil Corp., 133 Mont. 56 , 319 P.2d 1056 (1958), this Court affirmed the rule laid down in Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469 , 146 P.2d 151 (1944), and held that: “This performance exception, however, applies only to such actions as are based upon contracts which plainly show, either (a) by their express terms or (b) by necesseary implication therefrom, that the contracting parties, at the time of contracting, did mutually agree upon a particular county *524 other than that of defendant’s residence wherein they intended that their contract was to be performed.” It is

1968In Love v. Mon-O-Co Oil Corp., 133 Mont. 56 , 319 P.2d 1056 (1958), this Court affirmed the rule laid down in Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469 , 146 P.2d 151 (1944), and held that: “This performance exception, however, applies only to such actions as are based upon contracts which plainly show, either (a) by their express terms or (b) by necesseary implication therefrom, that the contracting parties, at the time of contracting, did mutually agree upon a particular county *524 other than that of defendant’s residence wherein they intended that their contract was to be performed.” It is

1968In Love v. Mon-O-Co Oil Corp., 133 Mont. 56 , 319 P.2d 1056 (1958), this Court affirmed the rule laid down in Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469 , 146 P.2d 151 (1944), and held that: “This performance exception, however, applies only to such actions as are based upon contracts which plainly show, either (a) by their express terms or (b) by necesseary implication therefrom, that the contracting parties, at the time of contracting, did mutually agree upon a particular county *524 other than that of defendant’s residence wherein they intended that their contract was to be performed.” It is

1923Griffith v. State, 94 Neb. 55, 61 .