14 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Yarboughred2 sentences2021See 100 N.J. 627 (1985). 2017In order to comply with the mandates of Zuber, the trial judge will also have to more closely adhere to the mandates of State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2018The statement of reasons should not rely on 5 A cursory search reveals less draconian sentences for more serious crimes: see State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) (fifteen years with an eighty-five percent parole bar for armed robbery with a concurrent term of seven years with a five - year parole bar for the certain persons offense pursuant to a plea agreement); State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 582 (2014) (fourteen years with an eighty-five percent parole bar for armed robbery after a jury trial); Lopez, 417 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Heslipgreen1 sentence2018"In ascertaining such intention we are not limited to the literal interpretation of the words used by the judge in imposing sentence – we may properly use all means at our disposal including, but not limited to, a review of the transcript of the sentence hearing." State v. Heslip, 99 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2018The statement of reasons should not rely on 5 A cursory search reveals less draconian sentences for more serious crimes: see State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) (fifteen years with an eighty-five percent parole bar for armed robbery with a concurrent term of seven years with a five - year parole bar for the certain persons offense pursuant to a plea agreement); State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 582 (2014) (fourteen years with an eighty-five percent parole bar for armed robbery after a jury trial); Lopez, 417 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kelvin Williams (071306)green1 sentence2018The statement of reasons should not rely on 5 A cursory search reveals less draconian sentences for more serious crimes: see State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) (fifteen years with an eighty-five percent parole bar for armed robbery with a concurrent term of seven years with a five - year parole bar for the certain persons offense pursuant to a plea agreement); State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 582 (2014) (fourteen years with an eighty-five percent parole bar for armed robbery after a jury trial); Lopez, 417 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baylassgreen1 sentence2017See State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 176 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Natalegreen2 sentences2006Therefore, as directed by Natale II, a new sentence hearing... [is mandated] based on the record at the prior sentencing." Natale II, supra, 184 N.J. at 495, 878 A. 2d 724 . 2006Therefore, as directed by Natale II, a new sentence hearing... [is mandated] based on the record at the prior sentencing." Natale II, supra, 184 N.J. at 495, 878 A. 2d 724 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dentogreen1 sentence1968See State v. Dento, supra ; Scarponi v. United States supra ; Bius v. United States, 286 F. 2 d 652 (10 Cir. 1961); Smith v. Wilkinson, 275 F. 2 d 251 (5 Cir. 1960); Ong v. Hunter, 196 F. 2 d 256 (10 Cir. 1952). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Supervisors v. Vicksburg Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences1961It is absurd to believe that the Legislature intended that each use of the word "or" should mean "and" in the cited portion of this statute, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-7, particularly when the prefatory word is "whether." "In a legal sense, `whether' is defined as meaning which of two or several; which of two alternatives expressed by a sentence or the clause of a sentence, and followed by `or.' * * * the word `whether,' neither in common parlance nor in legal phraseology, has ever had the force of a videlicet." Board of Supervisors, Warren County v. Vicksburg Hospital, 173 Miss. 805 , 163 So. 382, 386 ( 1961It is absurd to believe that the Legislature intended that each use of the word "or" should mean "and" in the cited portion of this statute, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-7, particularly when the prefatory word is "whether." "In a legal sense, `whether' is defined as meaning which of two or several; which of two alternatives expressed by a sentence or the clause of a sentence, and followed by `or.' * * * the word `whether,' neither in common parlance nor in legal phraseology, has ever had the force of a videlicet." Board of Supervisors, Warren County v. Vicksburg Hospital, 173 Miss. 805 , 163 So. 382, 386 ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State in Interest of ST
green
2 sentences2010Ibid. 2010Ibid. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Afanador
green
1 sentence2021Afanador, 151 N.J. at 51 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Zuber
green
1 sentence2017PER CURIAM We vacate the sentence imposed on defendant Darien Weston, and remand for a new sentence hearing to be conducted pursuant to State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Heslop
green
1 sentence1994Post at 332-335, 639 A. 2d at 1107-1109 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ekelund v. Secretary of Commerce
green
1 sentence1978A Merchant Marine disciplinary hearing was held to be "civil" in nature as a matter of policy (following United States v. Janis, supra ) even though state police officers had arguably violated a cadet's Fourth Amendment rights in Ekelund v. Sec. of Commerce, 418 F. Supp. 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Zagarino v. West
green
1 sentence1978The rule has also been held inapplicable to a subsequent sentence hearing, United States v. Schipani, 435 F. 2d 26 (2 Cir.1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 983 , 91 S.Ct. 1198 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1971), and to a collateral habeas corpus review of a conviction, Zagarino v. West, 422 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), because the evidence was deemed reliable and necessary to an adequate review of a criminal proceeding even though held inadmissible in a prior criminal proceeding. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Joseph F. Schipani
green
1 sentence1978The rule has also been held inapplicable to a subsequent sentence hearing, United States v. Schipani, 435 F. 2d 26 (2 Cir.1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 983 , 91 S.Ct. 1198 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1971), and to a collateral habeas corpus review of a conviction, Zagarino v. West, 422 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), because the evidence was deemed reliable and necessary to an adequate review of a criminal proceeding even though held inadmissible in a prior criminal proceeding. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Board of Trustees of the Social Security Fund of the Distillery, Rectifying, Wine & Allied Workers International Union v. Farrell
green
1 sentence1978The rule has also been held inapplicable to a subsequent sentence hearing, United States v. Schipani, 435 F. 2d 26 (2 Cir.1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 983 , 91 S.Ct. 1198 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1971), and to a collateral habeas corpus review of a conviction, Zagarino v. West, 422 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), because the evidence was deemed reliable and necessary to an adequate review of a criminal proceeding even though held inadmissible in a prior criminal proceeding. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Schipani v. United States
green
1 sentence1978The rule has also been held inapplicable to a subsequent sentence hearing, United States v. Schipani, 435 F. 2d 26 (2 Cir.1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 983 , 91 S.Ct. 1198 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1971), and to a collateral habeas corpus review of a conviction, Zagarino v. West, 422 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), because the evidence was deemed reliable and necessary to an adequate review of a criminal proceeding even though held inadmissible in a prior criminal proceeding. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Gunzer v. Town of New Fairfield
green
1 sentence1961"Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.) defines `or' as a coordinating particle that marks an alternative.' It can only be construed as used in the sense of `and' when the legislative intent to do so is clear and unmistakeable." Gunzer v. Town of New Fairfield, 19 Conn. Sup. 231 , 111 A. 2 d 30, 32 ( Super. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
McIntosh v. United States
green
1 sentence1951In McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F. 2d 95 ( C.C.A. 6 th 1949), certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 926 , 69 S.Ct. 645 , 93 L.Ed. 1087 , it was determined that the illegality referred to in Federal Rule 35 authorizing the correcting of an illegal sentence is one disclosed by the record, such as a sentence in excess of statutory provision, or in some other way contrary to applicable statute, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to *166 determine whether the sentence was in violation of some constitutional right not put in issue in the case. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Turner County v. Miller
green
1 sentence1951In McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F. 2d 95 ( C.C.A. 6 th 1949), certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 926 , 69 S.Ct. 645 , 93 L.Ed. 1087 , it was determined that the illegality referred to in Federal Rule 35 authorizing the correcting of an illegal sentence is one disclosed by the record, such as a sentence in excess of statutory provision, or in some other way contrary to applicable statute, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to *166 determine whether the sentence was in violation of some constitutional right not put in issue in the case. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
McIntosh v. Pescor
green
2 sentences1951In McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F. 2d 95 ( C.C.A. 6 th 1949), certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 926 , 69 S.Ct. 645 , 93 L.Ed. 1087 , it was determined that the illegality referred to in Federal Rule 35 authorizing the correcting of an illegal sentence is one disclosed by the record, such as a sentence in excess of statutory provision, or in some other way contrary to applicable statute, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to *166 determine whether the sentence was in violation of some constitutional right not put in issue in the case. 1951In McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F. 2d 95 ( C.C.A. 6 th 1949), certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 926 , 69 S.Ct. 645 , 93 L.Ed. 1087 , it was determined that the illegality referred to in Federal Rule 35 authorizing the correcting of an illegal sentence is one disclosed by the record, such as a sentence in excess of statutory provision, or in some other way contrary to applicable statute, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to *166 determine whether the sentence was in violation of some constitutional right not put in issue in the case. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.