sentence violation in Pennsylvania

2026Finally, “a sentence for a violation of the terms of probation can be imposed after the expiration of the probationary period if the revocation is based on a violation which occurred within the probationary period” “and the sentence [is] imposed within a reasonable time after the expiration of the probationary period.” Id. at 137 .

2020See Commonwealth v. Wright, 116 A.3d 133, 137 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that a sentence for a violation of the terms of probation can be imposed after the expiration of the probationary period if the revocation is based on a violation which occurred -8- J-A27017-19 within the probationary period).2 Thus, Appellant’s assertion of prejudice is meritless.

2025Indeed, where a sentencing court has the benefit of a presentence investigation report and imposes a sentence in the standard range, an appellate court cannot consider the sentence “excessive or unreasonable[,]” “absent more.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 .

2025This Court has long observed that when a sentence is in the standard guideline range, “Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing - 22 - J-S09020-24 Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Berrios, 297 A.3d 798, 809 (Pa. Super. 2023).

2025See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2023See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2012In a preserved-issue, direct appeal context, if the aggrieved party contemporaneously objects to a failure to comply with the Rule, as it is supposed to, and the court responds by still refusing to state the reasons for the sentence in violation of the Rule, it is proper for the appellate court to remand for a new sentencing procedure Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 134, 150-151 , 923 A.2d 1119, 1129 (2007).

2012In a preserved-issue, direct appeal context, if the aggrieved party contemporaneously objects to a failure to comply with the Rule, as it is supposed to, and the court responds by still refusing to state the reasons for the sentence in violation of the Rule, it is proper for the appellate court to remand for a new sentencing procedure Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 134, 150-151 , 923 A.2d 1119, 1129 (2007).

2016(See Trial Ct. Op., at 7; Commonwealth’s Brief, at 15); see also Lamonda, supra at 372 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law _______________________ (Footnote Continued) applicable Sexual Abuse of Children Enhancement related to [the] number of images possessed by the offender or the nature and character of the abuse depicted: (1) When applying enhancement based on the number of images possessed by the offender.

2016See Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted) (noting that a discretionary aspect of a sentence claim is waived when not raised in a post- sentence motion before the trial court), appeal denied, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2013).

2015Generally, where the sentence is in the standard range, as in the case sub judice, “a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2014Generally, where the sentence is in the standard range, as in the case sub judice, “a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.”3 See Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013).

1988See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550 , 317 A.2d 250 (1974); Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152 , 299 A.2d 640 (1973); Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 274 , 278 A.2d 170 (1971); Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201 , 275 A.2d 78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208 , 275 A.2d 81 (1971).

1988See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550 , 317 A.2d 250 (1974); Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152 , 299 A.2d 640 (1973); Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 274 , 278 A.2d 170 (1971); Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201 , 275 A.2d 78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208 , 275 A.2d 81 (1971).

2004“Consequently, it follows that, unless the particular facts of the case in question are distinguishable from the typical case of that same offense, a sentence in the standard range would be called for.” Id. ¶ 16 While voluntary manslaughter is a serious offense that produces tragic consequences, these general factors were taken into account when the guidelines were fashioned.

2004This point is aptly demonstrated by the sentence that followed the one quoted from Gause above, “[cjonse-quently, it follows that, unless the particular facts of the case in question are distinguishable from the typical case of that same offense, a sentence in the standard range would be called for.” Id. ¶ 15 If the sentencing court, under the guise of exercising its discretion, imposes a sentence that deviates significantly from the guideline recommendations without a demonstration that the case under consideration is compellingly different from the “typical” case of the same offense, Or with

2024Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. 1994), appeal granted, 659 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1995), appeal dismissed as 67 5 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1996).

2023While she recognizes that the court acknowledged the January 2021 Probation Sentence during the December 2021 hearing, Appellant emphasizes that “[o]ral statements made by the judge in passing sentence, but not incorporated in the written sentence signed by [the sentencing judge], are not part of the judgment of sentence.” -4- J-A14018-23 Appellant’s Br. at 6 (quoting Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235 , 1239 (Pa. Super. 1994)).

2024See Commonwealth v. Mouzan, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002) (stating that an appellant will only be granted review of his discretionary sentencing claim where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently raises a substantial question).

2017Mouzon, 812 A.2d at 620 n.3. "[A] trial court judge has wide discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a sentence in the aggravated range." Hardy, 939 A.2d at 980 (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005)).

2022Id. at 866-67 .

2022Id. at 866-67.

2022See Sturgis v. Doe, 26 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

2021Sturgis, 26 A.3d at 1225 .

2019The Commonwealth submits that this case is akin to Uderra because, "[w]hen viewing the penalty phase record as a whole, it is clear that the jury's role in sentencing was properly described by the [c]ourt." Consolidated Reply Brief for Appellant and Brief for Cross-Appellee, at 64-65 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal , 521 Pa. 188 , 555 A.2d 846 , 856 (1989) (addressing a Caldwell claim upon review of the sentence hearing record "in its entirety") ).

2019The Commonwealth submits that this case is akin to Uderra because, "[w]hen viewing the penalty phase record as a whole, it is clear that the jury's role in sentencing was properly described by the [c]ourt." Consolidated Reply Brief for Appellant and Brief for Cross-Appellee, at 64-65 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal , 521 Pa. 188 , 555 A.2d 846 , 856 (1989) (addressing a Caldwell claim upon review of the sentence hearing record "in its entirety") ).

2019He further alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor informed the jury that its task was to "recommend" a sentence of death to the court and the trial court acquiesced in that sentiment, thereby diminishing the jury's sense of responsibility in determining the sentence in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320 , 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (holding that "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining

2019He further alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor informed the jury that its task was to "recommend" a sentence of death to the court and the trial court acquiesced in that sentiment, thereby diminishing the jury's sense of responsibility in determining the sentence in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320 , 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (holding that "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining

2026Id. at 358–59 ([citing] Commonwealth v. Benchoff, 700 A.2d 1289, 1294 (Pa. Super. 1997) [(stating “[i]f this Court determines that a sentence must be corrected, we are empowered to either amend the sentence directly or to remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.”)]).

2026It is well-established that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

2026See id. at 4; Pasture, 107 A.3d at 28 (stating court’s resentencing statement of reasons does not require lengthy discourse).

2025Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2025Importantly, “the court is not required to impose the minimum possible confinement.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 241 A.3d 1160, 1178 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).