sentence rule in Florida

2012See also State v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.2004) (explaining that, pursuant to section 921.16(1), because the trial court did not specify that a sentence was concurrent, a sentence for violation of probation was automatically structured to run consecutive to the sentence on an unrelated new offense committed while defendant was on probation).

2009See also State *448 v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.2004) (explaining that, pursuant to section 921.16(1), because the trial court did not specify that a sentence was concurrent, a sentence for violation of probation was automatically structured to run consecutive to the sentence on an unrelated new offense committed while defendant was on probation).

2001In State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998), the Florida Supreme Court held that jail credit issues are cognizable under rule 3.800(a), determining that “[a] sentence which does not grant proper credit for time served is an illegal sentence which may be corrected at any time.” Id. at 432 (quoting Hopping v. State, 650 So.2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).

2001In State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998), the Florida Supreme Court held that jail credit issues are cognizable under rule 3.800(a), determining that “[a] sentence which does not grant proper credit for time served is an illegal sentence which may be corrected at any time.” Id. at 432 (quoting Hopping v. State, 650 So.2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).

1999See Daniels v. State, 491 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla.1986) (explaining that where a defendant does not receive concurrent sentences on multiple charges, the defendant is not entitled to have jail time credit pyramided by receiving credit on each sentence); Knight v. State, 517 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (explaining that defendant who was sentenced on substantive charge and who was also sentenced for violating his probation, with the sentence for violation of probation to run consecutively to the sentence on the substantive charge, was not entitled to jail credit on each of his consecutive sente

1995Daniels, 491 So.2d at 544-45 .

2016Cf. Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838, 841 (Fla.1989) (holding that under the old sentencing guidelines, even when a conviction on a new law offense was obtained prior to sentencing on the probation violation, factors related to the violation could not be used as grounds for a departure on the sentence for the violation).

1989He concedes that the 3½ year period of imprisonment for this, his first violation of probation, is not a departure sentence under the law, but he contends that, since the 372-year period of incarceration is the maximum allowed under Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla.1989), the 5-year period of probation after serving the imprisonment is an unauthorized excessive sentence because a further violation of probation could result in the imposition of further imprisonment in excess of the 372 years.

2011When a trial court imposes a new split sentence following a violation of probation, the law requires that the court “‘give credit for any time previously served on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions (including jail and prison credit) and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.’” Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995) (quoting Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also, Smith v. State, 941 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“When imposing a sentence for a violati

2006See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1994); Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1995) (holding that upon revocation of probation, a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control, probation, and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum); Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("[i]f the trial court includes probation as part of a sentence upon revocation of probation, the trial court must give credit for any time previously served on probation

2011When a trial court imposes a new split sentence following a violation of probation, the law requires that the court “‘give credit for any time previously served on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions (including jail and prison credit) and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.’” Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995) (quoting Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also, Smith v. State, 941 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“When imposing a sentence for a violati

2006See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1994); Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1995) (holding that upon revocation of probation, a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control, probation, and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum); Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("[i]f the trial court includes probation as part of a sentence upon revocation of probation, the trial court must give credit for any time previously served on probation

2015As- the Florida Supreme Court has observed, the “concurrent Sentence doctrine provides that in 'the ease of multiple concurrent sentences, an appellate court need not address challenges to every conviction where another conviction with a concurrent sentence of equal or greater length has been affirmed on appeal.” Jordan v. State, 143 So.3d 335, 388 (Fla.2014) (citing Himbayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 , 63 S.Ct. 1375 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943)) (affirming the conviction on one count one and holding it was unnecessary to consider challenges to the conviction on the second count because th

2014Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562, 569 (Fla.2008).

2014Miller v. State, 788 So.2d 330, 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2013This automatic fact-finding resulted in imprisonment without a determination of Vincent’s ability to pay in violation of his right to due process and equal protection of the law as well as the prohibition against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt.” 7 (citations omitted)); State v. Fowlie, 138 N.H. 234 , 636 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1994) (reversing a sentencing order where the trial court “based its decision to impose the sentence on a presumption of ability to pay restitution at the time of the original sentence, rather than on the defendant’s actual ability to pay at any time during the existen

2013This automatic fact-finding resulted in imprisonment without a determination of Vincent’s ability to pay in violation of his right to due process and equal protection of the law as well as the prohibition against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt.” 7 (citations omitted)); State v. Fowlie, 138 N.H. 234 , 636 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1994) (reversing a sentencing order where the trial court “based its decision to impose the sentence on a presumption of ability to pay restitution at the time of the original sentence, rather than on the defendant’s actual ability to pay at any time during the existen

2012Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(A) permits a criminal defendant to file a direct appeal from “a final judgment adjudicating guilt.” The jurisdictional time limit for filing such an appeal is set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(3), which provides that a notice of appeal must be filed “at any time between rendition of a final judgment and 30 days following rendition of a written order imposing sentence.” See also Fox v. District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 553 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla.1989) (holding that “the relevant rules and requirements of justice manda

2011When a trial court imposes a new split sentence following a violation of probation, the law requires that the court “‘give credit for any time previously served on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions (including jail and prison credit) and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.’” Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995) (quoting Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also, Smith v. State, 941 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“When imposing a sentence for a violati

2011The State properly concedes error. “ ‘A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements.’” Armstrong v. State, 985 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Garcia v. State, 722 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)).

2011The State properly concedes error. “ ‘A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements.’” Armstrong v. State, 985 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Garcia v. State, 722 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)).

2010See Sims v. State, 998 So.2d 494, 504 (Fla.2008) (“In Florida, a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a sentencing error.”); State v. Montague, 682 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Fla.1996) (“[Ojnly sentencing errors ‘apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous objection in order to be preserved for review.’ ” (quoting Taylor v. State, 601 So.2d 540, 541 (Fla.1992))); Forehand v. State, 537 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla.1989) (“[A] contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve the appeal of either an illegal sentence or an unauthorized departure from the senten

2010See Sims v. State, 998 So.2d 494, 504 (Fla.2008) (“In Florida, a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a sentencing error.”); State v. Montague, 682 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Fla.1996) (“[Ojnly sentencing errors ‘apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous objection in order to be preserved for review.’ ” (quoting Taylor v. State, 601 So.2d 540, 541 (Fla.1992))); Forehand v. State, 537 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla.1989) (“[A] contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve the appeal of either an illegal sentence or an unauthorized departure from the senten

2010See Wilson v. State, 895 So.2d 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reversing because the court lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence for a violation of probation where defendant was not placed on probation at the original sentencing and his sentence had already been completed).

2010See Sims v. State, 998 So.2d 494, 504 (Fla.2008) (“In Florida, a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a sentencing error.”); State v. Montague, 682 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Fla.1996) (“[Ojnly sentencing errors ‘apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous objection in order to be preserved for review.’ ” (quoting Taylor v. State, 601 So.2d 540, 541 (Fla.1992))); Forehand v. State, 537 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla.1989) (“[A] contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve the appeal of either an illegal sentence or an unauthorized departure from the senten

2010See Sims v. State, 998 So.2d 494, 504 (Fla.2008) (“In Florida, a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a sentencing error.”); State v. Montague, 682 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Fla.1996) (“[Ojnly sentencing errors ‘apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous objection in order to be preserved for review.’ ” (quoting Taylor v. State, 601 So.2d 540, 541 (Fla.1992))); Forehand v. State, 537 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla.1989) (“[A] contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve the appeal of either an illegal sentence or an unauthorized departure from the senten

2008See State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 112 (Fla.2005) (for a sentencing calculation to constitute harmless error the record must conclusively show[] that the same sentence would have been imposed using a correct scoresheet).