sentence requirement in Texas

2006The Supreme Court, reversing, held that: (1) forfeitures, i.e., payments in kind, are “fines” subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment if they constitute punishment for an offense; (2) forfeiture of currency under the subject statute is a form of punishment; it is an additional sanction available when imposing a sentence for violation of the criminal statute imposed at the culmination of criminal proceedings and cannot be imposed on an “innocent owner”; and (3) modern statutory forfeiture provisions are “fines” for Eighth Amendment purposes, if they constitute, even in part, punishme

2006The Supreme Court, reversing, held that: (1) forfeitures, i.e., payments in kind, are “fines” subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment if they constitute punishment for an offense; (2) forfeiture of currency under the subject statute is a form of punishment; it is an additional sanction available when imposing a sentence for violation of the criminal statute imposed at the culmination of criminal proceedings and cannot be imposed on an “innocent owner”; and (3) modern statutory forfeiture provisions are “fines” for Eighth Amendment purposes, if they constitute, even in part, punishme

2001In support of the motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that, in compliance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the record has been diligently reviewed and that in the opinion of counsel, the record reflects no reversible error or grounds upon which an arguably meritorious appeal can be predicated.

2001In support of the motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that, in compliance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the record has been diligently reviewed and that in the opinion of counsel, the record reflects no reversible error or grounds upon which an arguably meritorious appeal can be predicated.

1991The wife urges us to follow In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill.App.3d 595 , 124 Ill.Dec. 184 , 528 N.E.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 5 133 Ill.2d 437 , 141 Ill.Dec. 448 , 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990), and R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39 , 670 P.2d 923 (Ct.App.1983), in which courts faced with comparable written-consent statutes held that a husband can be estopped to deny the child support obligation. 6 Several courts have imposed child support obligations in artificial insemination cases where there was no statute requiring written consent.

1991The wife urges us to follow In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill.App.3d 595 , 124 Ill.Dec. 184 , 528 N.E.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 5 133 Ill.2d 437 , 141 Ill.Dec. 448 , 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990), and R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39 , 670 P.2d 923 (Ct.App.1983), in which courts faced with comparable written-consent statutes held that a husband can be estopped to deny the child support obligation. 6 Several courts have imposed child support obligations in artificial insemination cases where there was no statute requiring written consent.

1991The wife urges us to follow In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill.App.3d 595 , 124 Ill.Dec. 184 , 528 N.E.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 5 133 Ill.2d 437 , 141 Ill.Dec. 448 , 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990), and R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39 , 670 P.2d 923 (Ct.App.1983), in which courts faced with comparable written-consent statutes held that a husband can be estopped to deny the child support obligation. 6 Several courts have imposed child support obligations in artificial insemination cases where there was no statute requiring written consent.

1991The wife urges us to follow In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill.App.3d 595 , 124 Ill.Dec. 184 , 528 N.E.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 5 133 Ill.2d 437 , 141 Ill.Dec. 448 , 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990), and R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39 , 670 P.2d 923 (Ct.App.1983), in which courts faced with comparable written-consent statutes held that a husband can be estopped to deny the child support obligation. 6 Several courts have imposed child support obligations in artificial insemination cases where there was no statute requiring written consent.

1991The wife urges us to follow In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill.App.3d 595 , 124 Ill.Dec. 184 , 528 N.E.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 5 133 Ill.2d 437 , 141 Ill.Dec. 448 , 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990), and R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39 , 670 P.2d 923 (Ct.App.1983), in which courts faced with comparable written-consent statutes held that a husband can be estopped to deny the child support obligation. 6 Several courts have imposed child support obligations in artificial insemination cases where there was no statute requiring written consent.

1991The wife urges us to follow In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill.App.3d 595 , 124 Ill.Dec. 184 , 528 N.E.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 5 133 Ill.2d 437 , 141 Ill.Dec. 448 , 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990), and R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39 , 670 P.2d 923 (Ct.App.1983), in which courts faced with comparable written-consent statutes held that a husband can be estopped to deny the child support obligation. 6 Several courts have imposed child support obligations in artificial insemination cases where there was no statute requiring written consent.

2023Accordingly, viewing the entire record and weighing all the evidence, we are unable to conclude that the jury’s finding “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” See Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176 ; see also Mar.

2019Although the proviso “provided that” is not preferred because its meaning can be unclear, “[u]sually, a proviso containing th[os]e words . . . before a sentence or clause[] states an exception to the preceding sentence or clause.” Woods v. VanDevender, 296 S.W.3d 275 , 282 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. denied).

2018See Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d at 512 ; Sierra, 501 S.W.3d at 183 .

2015The jurisdiction over claims against the State in a case where Founders also referred to sovereign immunity in terms of the State had filed suit); IT--Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 861 personal jurisdiction.

2015Id. at 372-373 .

2013Appellant acknowledges that his sentence is within the statutory range but asserts that the sentence is nevertheless disproportionate and asks us to review the sentence under the test announced in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S. Ct. 3001 , 77 L.

2013Appellant acknowledges that his sentence is within the statutory range but asserts that the sentence is nevertheless disproportionate and asks us to review the sentence under the test announced in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S. Ct. 3001 , 77 L.

2013In Miller, the court of criminal appeals held that the defendant’s appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise a point of error on appeal that would have required the appellate court to vacate the sentence imposed and remand the case for a new trial. 330 S.W.3d at 622 .

2002Id. 2 Young directs our attention to the following sentence in the instruction at issue: “The same ten or more of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the entire verdict.” She contends that this instruction did not accurately state the law “because there is no Texas case which states that you must terminate all parental rights or none.” The instruction at issue is based on rule 292, which provides “[a] verdict may be rendered in any cause by the concurrence, as to each and all answers made, of the same ten members of an original jury of twelve . . . .” Tex. R.