permit requirement in Illinois

2005This court would be placed in the absurd position of having to decide the merits of a case in order to determine whether the case was ripe for adjudication. [5] The implication that it was unfair to require AFI either to incur the expense of obtaining a permit or to "risk[ ] serious penalties by continuing and waiting for the ax of Agency prosecution to fall" ( 215 Ill.2d at 233 , 294 Ill.Dec. at 40 , 830 N.E.2d at 452 ) is ameliorated by noting that even if the "ax" had indeed fallen, and the Agency had succeeded in proving that AFI had violated the permit requirement, AFI still would have ha

2005This court would be placed in the absurd position of having to decide the merits of a case in order to determine whether the case was ripe for adjudication. [5] The implication that it was unfair to require AFI either to incur the expense of obtaining a permit or to "risk[ ] serious penalties by continuing and waiting for the ax of Agency prosecution to fall" ( 215 Ill.2d at 233 , 294 Ill.Dec. at 40 , 830 N.E.2d at 452 ) is ameliorated by noting that even if the "ax" had indeed fallen, and the Agency had succeeded in proving that AFI had violated the permit requirement, AFI still would have ha

1996Dimmitt, 985 F.2d at 1568 .

1996Dimmitt, 985 F.2d at 1568 .

1927App. 334 , the court said, the doctrine of estoppel in pais “does not apply where the city official has exceeded his authority in issuing a permit in violation of a city ordinance.” Citing Burton Co. v. City of Chicago, 236 Ill. 383 ; Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 Ill. 91 .

1910Burton Co. v. City of Chicago, 236 Ill. 383 ; Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 id. 91.

2012Id. ¶ 38 However, this case is distinguishable from Cities Service.

1994App. 3d 655 , 491 N.E.2d 1251 , is "instructive.” The State contends that Park’s failure to comply with the permit requirements was not a mere "paper” or "minor” violation and cites the following language from the Standard Scrap case: "[T]he violation of a permit requirement goes directly to the heart of the State’s enforcement program and ability to protect against environmental damage.

1994The permit program is a method through which the State of Illinois can control emitters of contaminants into the atmosphere, as well as emissions that may result in the presence of contaminants in the environment.” (Standard Scrap, 142 Ill.

1989App. 3d 560 , 315 N.E.2d 619 .) The imposition of the maximum penalty here for a permit violation where there has been no finding that Trilla was a polluter would appear unwarranted on this record.

1989App. 3d 830 , 516 N.E. 2d 955 .) The cases of Celotex and CIPS, however, stand for the proposition that a permit applicant may challenge the validity of a Board regulation at a permit hearing.

1989Both parties state that the cases of Joliet Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1987), 163 Ill.

1986Ed. 2d 162 , 89 S. Ct. 935 , the court held that a city ordinance which established a permit requirement for parades, processions, and demonstrations violated the first amendment because it did not include narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.

1986(County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency (1981), 98 Ill.

1983App. 3d 787 , 423 N.E.2d 510 , on which the State relies, it is apparent from the record that the statute’s permit requirement was not complied with in this case.

1981The EPA thus argues on appeal that White Fence was required, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies (see Landfill; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 360 , 326 N.E.2d 737 ), to pursue a section 31(b) “enforcement action” before seeking relief in the courts.

1981App. 3d 815 , 379 N.E.2d 349 .) The Board’s Rule 208 provides that a permit is not a defense to a violation of the Act.

1979Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 1 , we held that an ordinance dealing with noise emission exceeded the home rule powers of that municipality.

1979Co. (1976), 65 Ill.2d 1 , we held that an ordinance dealing with noise emission exceeded the home rule powers of that municipality.

1979On the contrary, in Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 256 , the court specifically held that the city’s permit requirement did not extend to a regional sewage treatment plant and in City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry.

1979On the contrary, in Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 63 Ill.2d 256 , the court specifically held that the city's permit requirement did not extend to a regional sewage treatment plant and in City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry.

1976This conclusion finds support in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F.Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), which enumerated important functions of the permit program other than as evidence of compliance with specific effluent standards. 1 Viewing the NPDES as the successor to the permit prográm under the Rivers and Harbors Act ( 33 U.S.C. §407 (1970)) also supports our conclusion that a permit is necessary for one to discharge lawfully under the FWPCA.

1975Defendant concedes that under normal circumstances, timeliness would so require; but under these circumstances where plaintiff’s conduct occurred during closing arguments, the function of the normal timeliness requirement (namely, to avoid a second trial) could not have been achieved, so that the normal requirement (see La Belle v. Brown (1964), 46 Ill.App.2d 87 , 196 N.E. 2d 389 (abstract opinion)) ought not to apply; and raising the matter for the first time in the motion for a new trial was still timely, so that it was not error for the trial court to permit defense counsel to do so and to

1975Defendant concedes that under normal circumstances, timeliness would so require; but under these circumstances where plaintiff’s conduct occurred during closing arguments, the function of the normal timeliness requirement (namely, to avoid a second trial) could not have been achieved, so that the normal requirement (see La Belle v. Brown (1964), 46 Ill.App.2d 87 , 196 N.E. 2d 389 (abstract opinion)) ought not to apply; and raising the matter for the first time in the motion for a new trial was still timely, so that it was not error for the trial court to permit defense counsel to do so and to

1975(Wise v. City of Chicago, 183 Ill.App. 215 ; Meltzer v. City of Chicago, 152 Ill.App. 334 .) Had Bridges issued a certificate based on the plans submitted, he would have exceeded his authority since the plans were not in conformity with the ordinance.

1975(Wise v. City of Chicago, 183 Ill.App. 215 ; Meltzer v. City of Chicago, 152 Ill.App. 334 .) Had Bridges issued a certificate based on the plans submitted, he would have exceeded his authority since the plans were not in conformity with the ordinance.

1958(See Deer Park Civic Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill.

1958(See Deer Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1952See Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 110 Conn. 130 , 147 Atl. 513 ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324 , 288 N. W. 145 ; Brett v. Building Com’r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N. E. 269 ; Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895 , 39 N. W. (2d) 828 ; Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 246 App. Div. 555 , 282 N. Y.

1927App. 334 , the court said, the doctrine of estoppel in pais “does not apply where the city official has exceeded his authority in issuing a permit in violation of a city ordinance.” Citing Burton Co. v. City of Chicago, 236 Ill. 383 ; Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 Ill. 91 .