permit requirement in California

1977Any such person shall be deemed to have such vested rights, if prior to November 8, 1972, he has in good faith and in reliance upon the building permit diligently commenced construction and performed substantial work on the development and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessaiy therefor.” Our Supreme Court has construed the “On or after February 1, 1973” preamble phrase in the permit requirement of section 27400 as permitting development to proceed without a Coastal Act permit where, pursuant to a building permit issued prior to February 1, 1973, the developer had pe

1976Act. 1 In San Diego Coast Regional Com. v. See The Sea, Limited (1973) 9 Cal.3d 888 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 513 P.2d 129 ], this court held that a builder who had obtained a building permit and performed substantial work thereunder prior to February 1, 1973, was exempt from the permit requirement of the Act.

1997The source of the high court's concern in the overbreadth cases, however, and the foundation of the doctrine itself, is the perceived danger to the constitutionally protected interests of those who, because they are not before the court, lack a judicial forum in which to litigate claims that a statute "sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech" ( Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 97 [ 60 S.Ct. at p. 742 ]), and thus "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of [such] third parties" ( City Council v. Ta

1997The source of the high court's concern in the overbreadth cases, however, and the foundation of the doctrine itself, is the perceived danger to the constitutionally protected interests of those who, because they are not before the court, lack a judicial forum in which to litigate claims that a statute "sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech" ( Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 97 [ 60 S.Ct. at p. 742 ]), and thus "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of [such] third parties" ( City Council v. Ta

1988(Nash v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 101.) 8 Although we characterize the eviction limitations set forth in section 1806, subdivision (i) as substantive rather than procedural, we do not decide whether the permit requirement contained in subdivision (i) of section 1806 imposes a procedural barrier on landlords seeking to utilize summary eviction procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure, in violation of Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 151-152 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 ], Respondent landlords do not contend that the permit requirement imposes a pr

1988(Nash v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 101.) 8 Although we characterize the eviction limitations set forth in section 1806, subdivision (i) as substantive rather than procedural, we do not decide whether the permit requirement contained in subdivision (i) of section 1806 imposes a procedural barrier on landlords seeking to utilize summary eviction procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure, in violation of Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 151-152 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 ], Respondent landlords do not contend that the permit requirement imposes a pr

1974(See Rand Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 585, 588 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 698 ]; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, supra, 30 Cal.2d 610, 619 .)” *842 Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement of the parties does not provide for “exclusive possession of the premises against all the world, including the owner,” as prescribed in Kaiser Co. v. Reid, supra, is not supported by Archer, supra. Here, Sea-Land has exclusive possession against all the world, including the owner, whenever Sea-Land has a “business need” for the property.

1974(See Rand Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 585, 588 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 698 ]; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, supra, 30 Cal.2d 610, 619 .)” *842 Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement of the parties does not provide for “exclusive possession of the premises against all the world, including the owner,” as prescribed in Kaiser Co. v. Reid, supra, is not supported by Archer, supra. Here, Sea-Land has exclusive possession against all the world, including the owner, whenever Sea-Land has a “business need” for the property.

2019Equal Protection "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." ( Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432 , 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 .) Plaintiffs contend the ordinance violates the equal protection clause because it *264 treats minors more favorably than adults, in that there are two exceptions to the permit requirement which apply only to minors: min

2019Equal Protection "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." ( Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432 , 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 .) Plaintiffs contend the ordinance violates the equal protection clause because it *264 treats minors more favorably than adults, in that there are two exceptions to the permit requirement which apply only to minors: min

1994The court reiterated the well-established proposition that if compensation is available when property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional. ( 474 U.S. at p. 128 [ 88 L.Ed.2d at p. 427 ].) However, the court pointed out, the permit requirement itself did not take any land, and, if a permit were to be denied with the result that no economically feasible use could be made of the property, federal law provided a means of obtaining compensation for any taking that might occur.

1994The court reiterated the well-established proposition that if compensation is available when property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional. ( 474 U.S. at p. 128 [ 88 L.Ed.2d at p. 427 ].) However, the court pointed out, the permit requirement itself did not take any land, and, if a permit were to be denied with the result that no economically feasible use could be made of the property, federal law provided a means of obtaining compensation for any taking that might occur.

2017(See Vandermost v. Bowen (2012) 53 Cal.4th 421 , 452, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 269 P.3d 446 ( Vandermost ) [" 'the ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy.' "].) 15 Appellants also *258 argue their challenge to the permit requirement is ripe because "neither the County nor the [Coastal] Commission could deny a request for a permit to exercise [the right to ex

2017(See Vandermost v. Bowen (2012) 53 Cal.4th 421 , 452, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 269 P.3d 446 ( Vandermost ) [" 'the ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy.' "].) 15 Appellants also *258 argue their challenge to the permit requirement is ripe because "neither the County nor the [Coastal] Commission could deny a request for a permit to exercise [the right to ex

1993(S huttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 152 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 162, 168 , 89 S.Ct. 935 ] [hereafter Shuttlesworth].) In the words of a recent United States Supreme Court decision, this means that “[t]he [Long Beach] ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing . . . parades, or assemblies in ‘the archetype of a traditional public forum’ [citation], is a prior restraint on speech. [Citations.] Although there is a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint [citations], the Court has *325 recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of publi

1993(S huttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 152 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 162, 168 , 89 S.Ct. 935 ] [hereafter Shuttlesworth].) In the words of a recent United States Supreme Court decision, this means that “[t]he [Long Beach] ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing . . . parades, or assemblies in ‘the archetype of a traditional public forum’ [citation], is a prior restraint on speech. [Citations.] Although there is a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint [citations], the Court has *325 recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of publi

1986See also, Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 799 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 553 P.2d 546 ].) (1) A developer who claims exemption from the permit requirement of the act on grounds that he has a vested right to continue his development is required to seek confirmation of his vested right claim by a regional commission and may not first assert the claim in defense to an action by the regional commission to enjoin further development. ( South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon, supra, 18 Cal.3d 832 ; State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237

1986See also, Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 799 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 553 P.2d 546 ].) (1) A developer who claims exemption from the permit requirement of the act on grounds that he has a vested right to continue his development is required to seek confirmation of his vested right claim by a regional commission and may not first assert the claim in defense to an action by the regional commission to enjoin further development. ( South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon, supra, 18 Cal.3d 832 ; State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237

1950It will not he assumed, said the court, that the council, board, or officer to whom such a power is given will act arbitrarily, or otherwise than in the exercise of a sound discretion, concluding with this statement: “If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the requirement of the section of the charter above quoted, and been either whimsically or arbitrarily refused such permit, he might then, as is shown in Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, supra, have had recourse to the courts for relief from such unjust and arbitrary action.” ( 187 Cal. at p. 647 .) Hence, it seems clear that the city

1945As this court said in In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [ 203 P. 398 ], quoting from In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 562 [ 38 P. 981 , 27 L.R.A. 529 ] and Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 437 [ 166 P. 348 ]: " 'Laws are not made upon the theory of the total depravity of those who are elected to administer them; and the presumption is that municipal officers will not use these small powers villainously or for purposes of oppression or mischief.' If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the requirement of the section of the charter above quoted, and been either whimsically or arbi

1945As this court said in In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [ 203 P. 398 ], quoting from In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 562 [ 38 P. 981 , 27 L.R.A. 529 ] and Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 437 [ 166 P. 348 ]: " 'Laws are not made upon the theory of the total depravity of those who are elected to administer them; and the presumption is that municipal officers will not use these small powers villainously or for purposes of oppression or mischief.' If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the requirement of the section of the charter above quoted, and been either whimsically or arbi

1945As this court said in In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [ 203 P. 398 ], quoting from In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 562 [ 38 P. 981 , 27 L.R.A. 529 ] and Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 437 [ 166 P. 348 ]: " 'Laws are not made upon the theory of the total depravity of those who are elected to administer them; and the presumption is that municipal officers will not use these small powers villainously or for purposes of oppression or mischief.' If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the requirement of the section of the charter above quoted, and been either whimsically or arbi

2016It goes without saying we have not considered such improper authority.” (People v. Wallace (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1105, fn. 9 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 618 ].) Turning now to the substance of Luna’s claim of preemption, we find no merit in the assertion that City’s permit requirement for medical marijuana dispensaries is preempted by federal law.

2016It goes without saying we have not considered such improper authority.” (People v. Wallace (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1105, fn. 9 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 618 ].) Turning now to the substance of Luna’s claim of preemption, we find no merit in the assertion that City’s permit requirement for medical marijuana dispensaries is preempted by federal law.

2016We disagree. “ ‘As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process requires an actual justiciable controversy as to which the complainant has a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is about to suffer an injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented to the adjudicator. [Citations.] To have standing, a party must be beneficially interested in the controversy; that is, he or she must have “some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserv

2016We disagree. “ ‘As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process requires an actual justiciable controversy as to which the complainant has a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is about to suffer an injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented to the adjudicator. [Citations.] To have standing, a party must be beneficially interested in the controversy; that is, he or she must have “some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserv

2016“Conflict preemption exists when ‘simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible,’ ” creating a “positive conflict with federal law.” (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 758-759 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 ] (Qualified Patients).) The city’s permit requirement would be preempted under obstacle preemption principles if it “ ‘ “ ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 760.) “[O]bstacle preemption only applies if the state enactment undermines or confli

2016“Conflict preemption exists when ‘simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible,’ ” creating a “positive conflict with federal law.” (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 758-759 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 ] (Qualified Patients).) The city’s permit requirement would be preempted under obstacle preemption principles if it “ ‘ “ ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 760.) “[O]bstacle preemption only applies if the state enactment undermines or confli

2015(See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 428 [" 'Although completely excluding evidence of an accused's defense 19 theoretically could rise to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused's due process right to present a defense.' "].) With respect to Duclos's contention that the trial court violated his right to due process in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of his commission of uncharged crimes while preventing Duclos from presenting additional evidence of his suffering from seizures, we are not persuaded that principles o

2015(See People v. Arno (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 505, 514, fn. 2 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 624 ].) As we shall explain, the time-honored rule of ejusdem generis requires that in the context of construing Health and Safety Code section 42300, subdivision (a) a state park is not a “contrivance.” Thus, the trial court erroneously ruled that a local air pollution control district has the power to regulate air emissions emanating from a state park by a permit requirement.

2015(See People v. Arno (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 505, 514, fn. 2 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 624 ].) As we shall explain, the time-honored rule of ejusdem generis requires that in the context of construing Health and Safety Code section 42300, subdivision (a) a state park is not a “contrivance.” Thus, the trial court erroneously ruled that a local air pollution control district has the power to regulate air emissions emanating from a state park by a permit requirement.