permit error in Vermont

2026See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling [was] ultra vires”) (citing Levy v. Town of St.

2011See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (citing Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58 (1992); Levy, 152 Vt. at 142 (1989)) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling was ultra vires.”); see also In re Tekram Partners, 2005 VT 92, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 628 (stating that courts have “‘strictly 14 enforced’ [the] exclusivity-of-remedy provision to ensure timely review of all zoning disputes, thereby assuring parties of fin

2011See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (citing Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58 (1992); Levy, 152 Vt. at 142 (1989)) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling was ultra vires.”); see also In re Tekram Partners, 2005 VT 92, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 628 (stating that courts have “‘strictly 14 enforced’ [the] exclusivity-of-remedy provision to ensure timely review of all zoning disputes, thereby assuring parties of fin

2010See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling was ultra vires.” (citing Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 356 (1992); Levy v. Town of St.

2022Cf. Fenwick v. City of Burlington, 167 Vt. 425, 435 (1997) (“If the zoning violation is substantial and involves conscious wrongdoing, the City is entitled to an injunction, including a mandatory injunction to remove an offending structure, as a matter of course.”); see also In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 552 (1998) (upholding Environmental Court’s order to remove a home addition built without a permit and in violation of the applicable setbacks).

2005The Commissioner went on to acknowledge that “[i]n these situations, the recipient of the permit has reasonably relied on the expectation that the permit was issued in compliance with the Rules” and to declare that the Commissioner would “voluntarily estop [himself] from asserting the existence of a permit violation in these cases.” Id.

2022Cf. Fenwick v. City of Burlington, 167 Vt. 425, 435 (1997) (“If the zoning violation is substantial and involves conscious wrongdoing, the City is entitled to an injunction, including a mandatory injunction to remove an offending structure, as a matter of course.”); see also In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 552 (1998) (upholding Environmental Court’s order to remove a home addition built without a permit and in violation of the applicable setbacks).

2019See VWR § 6.1(a) (requiring silviculture activities to comply with acceptable management practices to be an allowed use); see also Korrow, 2018 VT 39, ¶ 22 (recognizing that deference was due to ANR’s interpretation of its own technical guidance document).

2012In its per curiam opinion, the Court noted that the landowner had alleged that the municipality's permit requirement was "irrational and wholly arbitrary" and motivated by what the circuit court had characterized as "ill will" and a "spiteful effort to `get' [the landowner] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective." Id. at 563, 564 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 (citation omitted).

2012In its per curiam opinion, the Court noted that the landowner had alleged that the municipality’s permit requirement was “irrational and wholly arbitrary” and motivated by what the circuit court had characterized as “ill will” and a “spiteful effort to ‘get’ [the landowner] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.” Id. at 563, 564 (citation omitted).

2011See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (citing Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58 (1992); Levy, 152 Vt. at 142 (1989)) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling was ultra vires.”); see also In re Tekram Partners, 2005 VT 92, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 628 (stating that courts have “‘strictly 14 enforced’ [the] exclusivity-of-remedy provision to ensure timely review of all zoning disputes, thereby assuring parties of fin

2011See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (citing Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58 (1992); Levy, 152 Vt. at 142 (1989)) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling was ultra vires.”); see also In re Tekram Partners, 2005 VT 92, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 628 (stating that courts have “‘strictly 14 enforced’ [the] exclusivity-of-remedy provision to ensure timely review of all zoning disputes, thereby assuring parties of fin

2011See In re Taft Corners Assocs., 162 Vt. 638, 639 (1994) (mem.) (citing Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58 (1992); Levy, 152 Vt. at 142 (1989)) (If a timely appeal of a decision of the zoning administrator is not taken, the trial court is barred under 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) from asserting jurisdiction “even if the administrator’s ruling was ultra vires.”); see also In re Tekram Partners, 2005 VT 92, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 628 (stating that courts have “‘strictly 14 enforced’ [the] exclusivity-of-remedy provision to ensure timely review of all zoning disputes, thereby assuring parties of fin

2007Id. § 6081(b); see In re Orzel, 145 Vt. 355, 361 , 491 A.2d 1013, 1017 (1985) (“Because a development is exempt at one time does not mean it will always be exempt.”).

2007Id. § 6081(b); see In re Orzel, 145 Vt. 355, 361 , 491 A.2d 1013, 1017 (1985) (“Because a development is exempt at one time does not mean it will always be exempt.”).

2003See, My Sister’s Place v. City of Burlington, 139 Vt. 602, 609-610 (1981), in which the permit was still denied; the City was simply held liable for damages resulting from the applicant’s reliance on the city employee’s incorrect information that a restaurant could be built in that location.