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7 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Radke v. Union Pacific Railroad Companygreen2 sentences2013See Radke, 138 Colo. At 207, 334 P.2d at 1087 ("A license is merely a permit or a privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful.... speaking [a license] is not property or a property right[.]"). ' 142 The unit assessment rule does not apply to these memberships. 1972Radke v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 138 Colo. 189 , 334 P.2d 1077 . | 1 | 2 |
National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Companygreen1 sentence2025“Where the source of a pollutant is a point source, and the pollutant is discharged into navigable waters, the source must obtain a . . . permit limiting and controlling both the amount and type of pollutants which can be lawfully discharged.” Nat’l 2 Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (a), 1342(a). ¶4 But there are exceptions to the permit requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colorado River Water Conservation Districtgreen1 sentence1988See Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d 383 (Colo.1982) (conditional water decrees will not be granted to those who cannot show more than a speculative or conjectural future beneficial use). | 1 | 1 |
Broyles v. Fort Lyon Canal Co.green1 sentence1988The well permit requirement of section 37-92-302(2) “recognizes the special expertise of the state engineer with respect to wells and their effect on other water users by requiring that an applicant for a change of water right involving a new well apply for a well permit before seeking judicial approval of the change.” Broyles v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 638 P.2d 244, 250 (Colo.1981). 11 Since Good’s permit for well two expired before the application for a conditional water right was heard on its merits, the water court could not, under section 37-92-302(2), adjudicate the application. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of County Commissioners v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Bowen/Edwards, supra, 830 P.2d at 1054 n. 5 Therefore, in determining whether the County Regulations are in operational conflict with state statute or regulation, we will construe the County Regulations, if possible, so as to harmonize them with the applicable state statutes or regulations. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement
green
2 sentences1994Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2395 , 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992). 1994Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2395 , 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows
green
2 sentences1988In Cache La Poudre Water Users Association v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53 , 550 P.2d 288 (1976), we construed the permit requirement of section 37-92-302(2) in the context of an application for approval of a plan of augmentation. 1988In Cache La Poudre Water Users Association v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53 , 550 P.2d 288 (1976), we construed the permit requirement of section 37-92-302(2) in the context of an application for approval of a plan of augmentation. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Williams v. City and County of Denver
green
2 sentences1981Because the legitimate sweep of the Code’s time, place, manner and permit regulations is indisputably broad, see Metrome-dia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra; Williams v. City and County of Denver, supra; Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, supra, because the media of expression subject to regulation under the definitional section comprise both expressive and nonexpressive features, id., and because, in the context of an overbreadth analysis, we may consider only the Code’s potential chilling effect on ideological speech, see Bates v. Arizona State Bar, supra, and n. 7, supra, we deem the overbrea 1981Because the legitimate sweep of the Code’s time, place, manner and permit regulations is indisputably broad, see Metrome-dia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra; Williams v. City and County of Denver, supra; Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, supra, because the media of expression subject to regulation under the definitional section comprise both expressive and nonexpressive features, id., and because, in the context of an overbreadth analysis, we may consider only the Code’s potential chilling effect on ideological speech, see Bates v. Arizona State Bar, supra, and n. 7, supra, we deem the overbrea | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Parrack v. Town of Estes Park
green
2 sentences1981Because the legitimate sweep of the Code’s time, place, manner and permit regulations is indisputably broad, see Metrome-dia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra; Williams v. City and County of Denver, supra; Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, supra, because the media of expression subject to regulation under the definitional section comprise both expressive and nonexpressive features, id., and because, in the context of an overbreadth analysis, we may consider only the Code’s potential chilling effect on ideological speech, see Bates v. Arizona State Bar, supra, and n. 7, supra, we deem the overbrea 1981Because the legitimate sweep of the Code’s time, place, manner and permit regulations is indisputably broad, see Metrome-dia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra; Williams v. City and County of Denver, supra; Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, supra, because the media of expression subject to regulation under the definitional section comprise both expressive and nonexpressive features, id., and because, in the context of an overbreadth analysis, we may consider only the Code’s potential chilling effect on ideological speech, see Bates v. Arizona State Bar, supra, and n. 7, supra, we deem the overbrea | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.