23 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Financial Corp.green2 sentences2022See Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Fin Corp., 1998 ME 46 , 1J 15, 708 A.2d 651 (stating elements of wrongful use claim as (1) a showing that the defendants initiated, continued or procured civil proceedings without probable cause; (2) the purpose of the civil proceedings was other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceeding was based; and (3) those proceedings terminated in favor ofthe plaintiff). 2022See Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Fin Corp., 1998 ME 46 , 1J 15, 708 A.2d 651 (stating elements of wrongful use claim as (1) a showing that the defendants initiated, continued or procured civil proceedings without probable cause; (2) the purpose of the civil proceedings was other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceeding was based; and (3) those proceedings terminated in favor ofthe plaintiff). | 4 | 14 |
National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024Id. at 459 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Palmer Development Corp. v. Gordongreen2 sentences2007On such a claim Leja would have to allege and prove (1) that the counterclaim defendants brought an action against him without probable cause, (2) that this was done for a purpose other than seeking a proper adjudication of the claim, and (3) that the action was resolved in his favor. ~ Palmer Development Corp. v. Gordon, 1999 ME 22 <JI 4, 723 A.2d 881, 883 (citations omitted). 2 Indeed, Leja's vigorous and immediate defense of this action appears to refute any possibility of reliance. 3 It is questionable whether Leja's allegations satisfy the second element listed above - that the lawsuit wa 2007On such a claim Leja would have to allege and prove (1) that the counterclaim defendants brought an action against him without probable cause, (2) that this was done for a purpose other than seeking a proper adjudication of the claim, and (3) that the action was resolved in his favor. ~ Palmer Development Corp. v. Gordon, 1999 ME 22 <JI 4, 723 A.2d 881, 883 (citations omitted). 2 Indeed, Leja's vigorous and immediate defense of this action appears to refute any possibility of reliance. 3 It is questionable whether Leja's allegations satisfy the second element listed above - that the lawsuit wa | 1 | 1 |
Nadeau v. Stategreen1 sentence1998Nadeau v. State, 395 A.2d 107, 116 (Me.1978); F.D.I.C. v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F.Supp. 439 , 444 n. 1 (D.Me. 1993) (construing Maine law). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Board of Environmental Protectiongreen1 sentence1998Protection, 498 A.2d 260, 266 (Me.1985)). [¶ 6] In order to state successfully a claim for malicious prosecution (or wrongful use of civil proceedings), a plaintiff must allege that an action was instituted against him without probable cause and with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings were based and that he received a favorable termination of the proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Stategreen1 sentence1979See Doe v. State, Alaska, 487 P.2d 47, 54-55 (1971) (intake officer’s preliminary investigation superior to grand jury indictment and adequate substitute); Harvin v. United States, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 199 , 445 F.2d 675 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Guardianship of Schmidt v. Barkholtzgreen2 sentences1979See also Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 14, 9 U.L.A. 413 (1973); In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis.2d 317 , 237 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1976) (term “suitable” broad enough to include all policy considerations which should be weighed by the court in determining child custody placements, including the best interests of the minor); Creek v. Stone, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 334 , 379 F.2d 106, 111 (1967). 12 The juvenile takes nothing by his challenge to the terms “responsible” and “suitable.” V It is next urged on behalf of this juvenile that he was entitled to a jury trial at the adjudication hearing und 1979See also Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 14, 9 U.L.A. 413 (1973); In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis.2d 317 , 237 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1976) (term “suitable” broad enough to include all policy considerations which should be weighed by the court in determining child custody placements, including the best interests of the minor); Creek v. Stone, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 334 , 379 F.2d 106, 111 (1967). 12 The juvenile takes nothing by his challenge to the terms “responsible” and “suitable.” V It is next urged on behalf of this juvenile that he was entitled to a jury trial at the adjudication hearing und | 1 | 1 |
Enoch Creek, Jr. v. William J. Stonegreen2 sentences1979See also Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 14, 9 U.L.A. 413 (1973); In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis.2d 317 , 237 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1976) (term “suitable” broad enough to include all policy considerations which should be weighed by the court in determining child custody placements, including the best interests of the minor); Creek v. Stone, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 334 , 379 F.2d 106, 111 (1967). 12 The juvenile takes nothing by his challenge to the terms “responsible” and “suitable.” V It is next urged on behalf of this juvenile that he was entitled to a jury trial at the adjudication hearing und 1979See also Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 14, 9 U.L.A. 413 (1973); In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis.2d 317 , 237 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1976) (term “suitable” broad enough to include all policy considerations which should be weighed by the court in determining child custody placements, including the best interests of the minor); Creek v. Stone, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 334 , 379 F.2d 106, 111 (1967). 12 The juvenile takes nothing by his challenge to the terms “responsible” and “suitable.” V It is next urged on behalf of this juvenile that he was entitled to a jury trial at the adjudication hearing und | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patricia Leighton v. Marc G. Lowenberg et al.
green
2 sentences2026Indeed, the tort of wrongful use of civil process would require O’Brien to prove that Daniels “initiate[d], continue[d], or procure[d] civil proceedings without probable cause . . . with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based.” Leighton v. Lowenburg, 2023 ME 14, ¶ 19 , 290 A.3d 68 . 2026Indeed, the tort of wrongful use of civil process would require O’Brien to prove that Daniels “initiate[d], continue[d], or procure[d] civil proceedings without probable cause . . . with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based.” Leighton v. Lowenburg, 2023 ME 14, ¶ 19 , 290 A.3d 68 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Saunders v. Tisher
green
2 sentences2020Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94 , ,r 29, 902 A.2d 830 (citations omitted). 2020Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94 , ,r 29, 902 A.2d 830 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Federal Deposit Insurance v. S. Prawer & Co.
green
1 sentence1998Nadeau v. State, 395 A.2d 107, 116 (Me.1978); F.D.I.C. v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F.Supp. 439 , 444 n. 1 (D.Me. 1993) (construing Maine law). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Yoder v. County of Cumberland
green
1 sentence1984Procedural due process requires that the debtor be given a subsequent hearing on any honest lack of property and consequent inability to pay, new facts that “are without necessary logical relationship to the original adjudication of the requirement to pay.” 278 A.2d 379, 386-87 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Boutot v. State
green
1 sentence1981On these facts, the presiding justice found that Ware’s parole from his prior robbery sentence was never properly revoked, “there being no record of and Petitioner not being notified of a specific adjudication of a violation, nor of a specific disposition in accordance with statute and regulations promulgated by the Parole Board.” Accordingly, the Superior Court Justice ordered that the time served between December 8, 1978, and March 12, 1979, be credited toward Ware’s burglary sentence, resulting in his immediate release under Boutot v. State, Me., 380 A.2d 195 (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Shone v. State
green
1 sentence1979In Shone v. State, Me., 237 A.2d 412 (1968) our Court considered a similar challenge under the prior juvenile statutes. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Augustus E. Harvin v. United States
green
2 sentences1979See Doe v. State, Alaska, 487 P.2d 47, 54-55 (1971) (intake officer’s preliminary investigation superior to grand jury indictment and adequate substitute); Harvin v. United States, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 199 , 445 F.2d 675 (1971). 1979See Doe v. State, Alaska, 487 P.2d 47, 54-55 (1971) (intake officer’s preliminary investigation superior to grand jury indictment and adequate substitute); Harvin v. United States, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 199 , 445 F.2d 675 (1971). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.