adjudication hearing in California

2025(See In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 995 [“It takes little to persuade us that a young child with access to a loaded gun is at substantial risk of serious physical harm”].) In any event, the March 1, 2024 incident—which occurred less than three months before the adjudication hearing—presented such an extreme risk of danger to A.T. that little, if any, additional evidence was required to necessitate jurisdiction.

2025Governing law Section 300, subdivision (b), provides that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 12 serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A).) “The three elements of a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) are (1) neglectful conduct by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ or a ‘substan

2024The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376 , 1383–1384 overruled on other grounds in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 , 560, fn. 18; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“[t]he focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child”].) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the adjudication hearing, “[t]here must be some reason beyond

2023The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 4 continue.’” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376 , 1383–1384; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“[t]he focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child”].) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the adjudication hearing, “[t]he

2023(See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior”]; In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 899 [“prenatal use of dangerous drugs by a mother is probative of future child neglect”].) Further, Alejandro Jr. and Genevieve were “children of ‘tender years’” and, thus, “‘the finding of substance abuse [wa]s prima facie evidence of the inability of . . . [mother] to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm.’ [Citations.]” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 .) Mother contends that she had mitigat

2022With respect to a child of “tender years” like Z., who was less than two months old at the time of the adjudication hearing, a “finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a 21 parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm.” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767; accord, Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 .) The juvenile court specifically cited “the tender age of the newborn child” when making its jurisdiction findings.

1992The social study report is directly relevant to the issue to be determined by the juvenile court at the adjudication hearing.” (In re Biggs (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 337, 345 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 519 ].) The two major statutes the Malinda S. court analyzed were sections 281 and 355, along with California Rules of Court, rule 1450(c).

1992The social study report is directly relevant to the issue to be determined by the juvenile court at the adjudication hearing.” (In re Biggs (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 337, 345 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 519 ].) The two major statutes the Malinda S. court analyzed were sections 281 and 355, along with California Rules of Court, rule 1450(c).

1991(See In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727, 729 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 537 P.2d 406 ] [under Cal. Const., art.

1977(In re Edgar M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 727, 740-741 (denial of rehearing must result by means of an affirmative review of the transcript by a judge, and not by operation of law); In re Damon C., 16 Cal.3d 493, 496-497 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 546 P.2d 676 ] (judge must have transcript of counsel’s oral argument to referee); In re Randy R., 67 Cal.App.3d 41, 43-44 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 419 ] (judge erroneously applied an appellate substantial evidence standard of review instead of exercising his independent judgment on the record of the proceedings before the referee); In re Melvin S., supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 8

2014Thus, when [the department] makes a prima facie case under section 300 by proving the jurisdictional facts at the adjudication hearing, it is not improper for the court to sustain the petition; not until the disposition hearing does the court determine whether the minor should be adjudged a dependent.” (Ibid.; see also In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 .) Here, Father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings based on Mother’s conduct, and there is more than substantial evidence to support jurisdiction of the 8 children based on Mother’s conduct alone.

2014Thus, when DPSS makes a prima facie case under section 300 by proving the jurisdictional facts at the adjudication hearing, it is not improper for the court to sustain the petition; not until the disposition hearing does the court determine whether the minor should be adjudged a dependent.” (Ibid.; see also In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 .) Here, there is more than substantial evidence to support jurisdiction of the child based on Mother’s conduct alone, and Father does not dispute the allegations against Mother.

2024The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376 , 1383–1384 overruled on other grounds in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 , 560, fn. 18; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“[t]he focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child”].) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the adjudication hearing, “[t]here must be some reason beyond

2020(In re L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 848 ; In re Joaquin C., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 561 ; see In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624 .) “In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious physical harm, within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b), courts evaluate the risk that is present at the time of the adjudication hearing. ‘While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’” (In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572,

1990The social study report is directly relevant to the issue to be determined by the juvenile court at the adjudication hearing." ( In re Biggs (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 337, 345 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 519 ]; see also In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 593, 601 [ 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 ].) Accordingly, juvenile courts may review social studies prior to jurisdictional determinations under section 300. [7] At the time of the jurisdictional hearings, rule 1450(c) was designated as rule 1365(d).

1990The social study report is directly relevant to the issue to be determined by the juvenile court at the adjudication hearing." ( In re Biggs (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 337, 345 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 519 ]; see also In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 593, 601 [ 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 ].) Accordingly, juvenile courts may review social studies prior to jurisdictional determinations under section 300. [7] At the time of the jurisdictional hearings, rule 1450(c) was designated as rule 1365(d).

2025L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) Although evidence in the record also supports a contrary conclusion, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that Allen was at substantial risk of serious harm at the time of the adjudication hearing without informal supervision from DCFS.

2025L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) Although evidence in the record also supports a contrary conclusion, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that Allen was at substantial risk of serious harm at the time of the adjudication hearing without informal supervision from DCFS.

2025(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”]; In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [recognizing “denial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision” but finding that was not the case there].) As we conclude the record supports the jurisdictional finding that mother’s mental health issues placed J.P. at a substantial risk of harm, our review of whether the evidence supports a finding that mother had been diagnosed with schiz

2021(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].) The absence of domestic violence incidents during the four months preceding the adjudication hearing and removal order does not mitigate the longstanding history of domestic violence between the parents—sometimes in the presence of one or more of the children.

2024The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376 , 1383–1384 overruled on other grounds in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 , 560, fn. 18; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“[t]he focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child”].) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the adjudication hearing, “[t]here must be some reason beyond

2023The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 4 continue.’” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376 , 1383–1384; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“[t]he focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child”].) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the adjudication hearing, “[t]he

2023Children of “tender years,” like Minor, face “an inherent risk to their physical health and safety” if they are not adequately cared for or supervised (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 ), which regular, ongoing use of marijuana can inhibit.

2015(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [“question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm”].) She reasons that by the time of the adjudication hearing, the adults appreciated Alexis’ drug abuse, and as her overdose was a one-time event, “no evidence suggests Alexis would now be able to bring needles into mother’s new home.” Alexis is unable to bring needles into mother’s house now because her doing so before caused the Department to intervene to protect the children.

2025(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 .) We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the twins to testify at the adjudication hearing.

2020(See, e.g., I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 .) For example, mother asserts that her drinking was under control by the time of the adjudication hearing.

2022With respect to a child of “tender years” like Z., who was less than two months old at the time of the adjudication hearing, a “finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a 21 parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm.” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767; accord, Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 .) The juvenile court specifically cited “the tender age of the newborn child” when making its jurisdiction findings.

2020(See In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 726 [“evidence of life-impacting effects of drug use” may support finding of substance abuse problem justifying juvenile court’s intervention].) While Mother denied recent use of marijuana at the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court was free to disbelieve her testimony.9 9 Mother cites the holding of In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 , that a finding of substance abuse under Section 300(b)(1) requires evidence that (1) the parent had been diagnosed as having a substance abuse problem by a medical professional or (2) the parent has a

2020(In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 .) DCFS failed to satisfy this burden.

2013That Mother is mentally ill is not the end of the story because DCFS “has the burden of showing specifically how the minors have been or will be harmed and harm may not be presumed from the mere fact of mental illness of a parent.” (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 ].) Although the evidence supported the finding that Mother was unable to provide regular care for the minors due to her mental illness, Father has shown remarkable dedication to the minors and that he is able to protect them from any harm from Mother’s mental illness.

2015Woods, Acting P. J., and Zelon, J., concurred. 1 It is not disputed that Art was in custody at the time of the interrogation. 2 In In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 464 P.2d 127 ], our Supreme Court concluded “that the juvenile court should consider whether a child appreciates the wrongfulness of her conduct in determining whether the child should be declared a ward under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 602.” (Id. at p. 858, fn. omitted; see Pen.

1986If appellant again elects to admit the allegations, then the court shall redetermine the question of appellant’s knowledge of the wrongfulness of his act under the standard announced in Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855 , i.e., “[o]nly if the age, experience, knowledge, and conduct of the child demonstrate . . . that he has violated a criminal law should he be declared a ward of the court under section 602.” (Id. at p. 867.) The judgment is reversed; the matter is remanded for a new adjudication hearing.

1991(See In re Damon C., supra, 16 Cal.3d 493, 497 .) Respondent's request that this court review the transcript of the adjudication hearing and make an independent determination of whether a rehearing of those proceedings is warranted reflects her misunderstanding of the effect of the juvenile court's error.

1991(See In re Damon C., supra, 16 Cal.3d 493, 497 .) Respondent’s request that this court review the transcript of the adjudication hearing and make an independent determination of whether a rehearing of those proceedings is warranted reflects her misunderstanding of the effect of the juvenile court’s error.

2026“Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate 20 court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact.” (In re Katrina C., at p. 547; In re D.P., at p. 905.) We find the juvenile court was not compelled as a matter of law to apply section 355.1’s presumption—specifically because DCFS’s evidence was not “ ‘uncontradicted’ ” and “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) The

2025Our task is not “to retry the case” or to “review the record so as to recount evidence that supports [DCFS’s] position . . . with the object of reevaluating the conflicting, competing evidence and revisiting the juvenile court’s failure-of-proof conclusion.” (I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528 .) Because the evidence did not compel a finding as a matter of law that jurisdiction over R.L. was warranted, the juvenile court did not err in dismissing the petition.

2022(In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 622-624; In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 385 .) 8 In cases where a prisoner parent is involuntarily absent from adjudication hearings, the reviewing court applies a harmless error-miscarriage of justice analysis to determine whether the prisoner was prejudiced by his or her involuntary absence at the adjudication hearing.

2004(Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 213, fn. 2 , 85 P.3d at p. 8, fn. 2 .) In stating that the right also applies to jurisdictional hearings, the majority expressly concedes that the phrase "any court proceeding regarding the [Welfare and Institutions Code section 300] proceeding" (Pen.Code, § 2625, subd. (b)) "encompass[es]" more than just the adjudication hearing.

2022DCFS recommended that father receive enhancement services.2 2 Enhancement services are “‘child welfare services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to enhance the child’s relationship with that parent.’” (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 212 .) “Such ‘enhancement’ services are ‘not designed to reunify the child with that parent, but instead to enhance the child’s relationship with that parent by requiring that parent to address the issues that brought the child before the court.’” (In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636, 642, fn. 5 .) 3 At the adjudication hearing o

2021(In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 205 (Destiny D.).) Additionally, “[t]he juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’ [Citations.] . . . ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, 6 Although the minute orders for the adjudication hearing state that the juvenile court issued case plans for each child, the juvenile court’s docket does not reflect any such case plans.

2022(In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 990 (D.D.).) First, the juvenile court conducts an adjudication hearing in which it must find by a preponderance of the evidence whether or not the facts alleged in the supplemental petition are true.

2022(In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 990 .) First, the juvenile court conducts an adjudication hearing where it must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the facts alleged in the supplemental petition are true.

2021While “a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962), “here, mother preserved her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s orders by requesting a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing . . . . ‘Sufficiency of the evidence has always been viewed as a question necessarily and inherently raised in every contested tria

2020(In re L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 848 ; In re Joaquin C., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 561 ; see In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624 .) “In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious physical harm, within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b), courts evaluate the risk that is present at the time of the adjudication hearing. ‘While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’” (In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572,

2020(In re W.R., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 286-292.) 7 section 786, subdivision (e) requires the sealing of records pertaining to that petition as well.” (In re W.R., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 292 .) As S.G. notes, if it were otherwise— if a minor with an IQ of 61 who cannot attain competency despite months of effort were denied the benefits of the 2018 enactment—an equal protection issue would be presented.

2019Section 786 also requires the court to seal the records of persons whose petitions were dismissed under section 782 or that were not sustained following an adjudication hearing. (§ 786, subd. (e); see In re W.R. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 284, 290-291 .) Such persons are not required to wait until they reach age 18 to petition to seal their records under section 781; they are entitled to have their records automatically sealed under section 786.

2020All of these allegations required DCFS to prove “(1) one or more of the statutorily-specified omissions in providing care for the child . . .; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561 .) In deciding whether the third element is satisfied, “courts evaluate the risk that is present at the time of the adjudication hearing.” (In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 582 .) “‘While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under secti

2020(In re L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 848 ; In re Joaquin C., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 561 ; see In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624 .) “In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious physical harm, within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b), courts evaluate the risk that is present at the time of the adjudication hearing. ‘While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’” (In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572,