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28 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1892–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eckles v. State of Oregongreen2 sentences2019This use of 'standing' should be avoided because it easily confuses the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim for relief with the right to obtain the relief itself." Id. at 383-84 , 760 P.2d 846 ; see also MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG , 218 Or. 2019This use of 'standing' should be avoided because it easily confuses the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim for relief with the right to obtain the relief itself." Id. at 383-84 , 760 P.2d 846 ; see also MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG , 218 Or. | 3 | 4 |
Wroten v. Lenskegreen2 sentences1993Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint alleging gross negligence, and the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim with prejudice. 2 ORCP 21A provides, in part: “[Tjhe following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion to dismiss: * * * (8) failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim[.]” 3 A claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings must allege: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; “(2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiffs favor; “(3) The absence of proba 1993Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint alleging gross negligence, and the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim with prejudice. 2 ORCP 21A provides, in part: “[Tjhe following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion to dismiss: * * * (8) failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim[.]” 3 A claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings must allege: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; “(2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiffs favor; “(3) The absence of proba | 2 | 2 |
SPS of Oregon, Inc. v. GDH, LLCgreen2 sentences2024As to the fourth element, to establish the existence of malice, plain- tiff would need to prove “the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim.” Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2015SPS of Oregon, Inc. v. GDH, LLC, 258 Or App 210, 218 , 309 P3d 178 (2013); Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving Co., 194 Or App 219, 237-38 , 94 P3d 885 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). | 1 | 2 |
State v. J. R.green1 sentence2022Put simply, SB 562 concerned “[t]he provisions of the juvenile code relating to preadjudicative detention, namely holding a child in detention before a hearing on a petition.” Staff Measure Summary, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 562, May 26, 1989 (emphasis added); see also Brownstone Cite as 318 Or App 21 (2022) 35 Homes Condo. | 1 | 1 |
MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AGgreen2 sentences2019This use of 'standing' should be avoided because it easily confuses the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim for relief with the right to obtain the relief itself." Id. at 383-84 , 760 P.2d 846 ; see also MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG , 218 Or. 2019App. 117 , 121, 179 P.3d 675 (2008) ("The decisive issue for standing * * * is not whether a party's claims are correct but whether the party may obtain a judicial determination of their correctness."). | 1 | 1 |
Wyoming v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 US 437 , 112 S Ct 789 , 117 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (in Commerce Clause challenge brought by the State of Wyoming against Oklahoma’s statute requiring coal burning utilities to use 10 percent Oklahoma coal, Wyoming was found to have standing based on an injury in fact — falling tax revenues from coal sales — without any consideration of whether that tax effect was within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause). 7 See Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 8-9 , 588 P2d 1281 (1970) (without demonstrating how agreement affected tax liability, 2016See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 US 437 , 112 S Ct 789 , 117 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (in Commerce Clause challenge brought by the State of Wyoming against Oklahoma’s statute requiring coal burning utilities to use 10 percent Oklahoma coal, Wyoming was found to have standing based on an injury in fact — falling tax revenues from coal sales — without any consideration of whether that tax effect was within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause). 7 See Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 8-9 , 588 P2d 1281 (1970) (without demonstrating how agreement affected tax liability, | 1 | 1 |
Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital Districtgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 US 437 , 112 S Ct 789 , 117 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (in Commerce Clause challenge brought by the State of Wyoming against Oklahoma’s statute requiring coal burning utilities to use 10 percent Oklahoma coal, Wyoming was found to have standing based on an injury in fact — falling tax revenues from coal sales — without any consideration of whether that tax effect was within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause). 7 See Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 8-9 , 588 P2d 1281 (1970) (without demonstrating how agreement affected tax liability, 2016See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 US 437 , 112 S Ct 789 , 117 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (in Commerce Clause challenge brought by the State of Wyoming against Oklahoma’s statute requiring coal burning utilities to use 10 percent Oklahoma coal, Wyoming was found to have standing based on an injury in fact — falling tax revenues from coal sales — without any consideration of whether that tax effect was within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause). 7 See Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 8-9 , 588 P2d 1281 (1970) (without demonstrating how agreement affected tax liability, | 1 | 1 |
Zehner v. Village of Marshallgreen2 sentences2016See Eckles, 306 Or at 383-84 (explaining that this court uses the term “standing” to refer to the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim and that standing is logically considered prior to consideration of the merits of a claim). 5 See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 527 US _ , 134 S Ct 1377, 1388-89 , 188 L Ed 2d 392 (2014) (describing “zone of interest” test as generally applicable tool for determining who may invoke a statutory cause of action); Five Corners Family Farmers v. State of Washington, 173 Wash 2d 296, 302-03, 268 P3d 892 (2011) (“In orde 2016See Eckles, 306 Or at 383-84 (explaining that this court uses the term “standing” to refer to the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim and that standing is logically considered prior to consideration of the merits of a claim). 5 See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 527 US _ , 134 S Ct 1377, 1388-89 , 188 L Ed 2d 392 (2014) (describing “zone of interest” test as generally applicable tool for determining who may invoke a statutory cause of action); Five Corners Family Farmers v. State of Washington, 173 Wash 2d 296, 302-03, 268 P3d 892 (2011) (“In orde | 1 | 1 |
Five Corners Family Farmers v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Eckles, 306 Or at 383-84 (explaining that this court uses the term “standing” to refer to the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim and that standing is logically considered prior to consideration of the merits of a claim). 5 See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 527 US _ , 134 S Ct 1377, 1388-89 , 188 L Ed 2d 392 (2014) (describing “zone of interest” test as generally applicable tool for determining who may invoke a statutory cause of action); Five Corners Family Farmers v. State of Washington, 173 Wash 2d 296, 302-03, 268 P3d 892 (2011) (“In orde | 1 | 1 |
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.green2 sentences2016See Eckles, 306 Or at 383-84 (explaining that this court uses the term “standing” to refer to the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim and that standing is logically considered prior to consideration of the merits of a claim). 5 See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 527 US _ , 134 S Ct 1377, 1388-89 , 188 L Ed 2d 392 (2014) (describing “zone of interest” test as generally applicable tool for determining who may invoke a statutory cause of action); Five Corners Family Farmers v. State of Washington, 173 Wash 2d 296, 302-03, 268 P3d 892 (2011) (“In orde 2016See Eckles, 306 Or at 383-84 (explaining that this court uses the term “standing” to refer to the right to obtain an adjudication of a claim and that standing is logically considered prior to consideration of the merits of a claim). 5 See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 527 US _ , 134 S Ct 1377, 1388-89 , 188 L Ed 2d 392 (2014) (describing “zone of interest” test as generally applicable tool for determining who may invoke a statutory cause of action); Five Corners Family Farmers v. State of Washington, 173 Wash 2d 296, 302-03, 268 P3d 892 (2011) (“In orde | 1 | 1 |
Erlandson v. Pullengreen2 sentences2013In turn, “malice,” in the context of a wrongful-initiation claim, is “the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim.” Erlandson v. Pullen, 45 Or App 467, 477 , 608 P2d 1169 (1980). 2013In turn, “malice,” in the context of a wrongful-initiation claim, is “the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim.” Erlandson v. Pullen, 45 Or App 467, 477 , 608 P2d 1169 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Reingreen2 sentences2004Under Oregon law, the elements of a claim for wrongful initiation of a civil proceeding are as follows: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; *238 “(2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiffs favor;[ 11 ] “(3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; “(4) The existence of malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim; and “(5) Damages.” Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259-60 , 381 P2d 499 (1963); see also Perry v 2004Under Oregon law, the elements of a claim for wrongful initiation of a civil proceeding are as follows: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; *238 “(2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiffs favor;[ 11 ] “(3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; “(4) The existence of malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim; and “(5) Damages.” Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259-60 , 381 P2d 499 (1963); see also Perry v | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Whitbeckgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Rose, 277 Or at 798-99 (applying a previous version of the Restatement of Torts in analyzing a malicious prosecution action); Wroten, 114 Or App at 309 (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts, including comments, to an action for wrongfiil initiation of a civil proceeding). 7 Specifically, if Oklahoma law applies, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Robertson. | 1 | 1 |
Vazquez v. Reevesgreen2 sentences2000Accord Vasquez v. Reeves, 138 Or App 153, 156 , 907 P2d 254 (1995); Parks v. Willis, 121 Or App 72 , 74 n 3, 853 P2d 1336 (1993). 2000Accord Vasquez v. Reeves, 138 Or App 153, 156 , 907 P2d 254 (1995); Parks v. Willis, 121 Or App 72 , 74 n 3, 853 P2d 1336 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Lambert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1992See Lambert v. Sears, Roebuck, 280 Or 123, 134 , 570 P2d 357 (1977); Restatement (Second) Torts § 676, comment c (1977). 1992See Lambert v. Sears, Roebuck, 280 Or 123, 134 , 570 P2d 357 (1977); Restatement (Second) Torts § 676, comment c (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass'n
green
2 sentences2015We reach the same conclusion on the element of malice or “the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim [.]” Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259-60 , 381 P2d 499 (1963). 2015We reach the same conclusion on the element of malice or “the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim [.]” Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259-60 , 381 P2d 499 (1963). | 15 | 1971–2015 |
Parks v. Willis
green
2 sentences1995Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259 , 381 P2d 499 (1963), prescribes the elements of a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; “ (2) The termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor; “ (3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; “(4) The existence of malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim; and “(5) Damages.” Accord Parks v. Willis, 121 Or App 72 , 74 n 3, 853 P2d 1336 ( 1995Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259 , 381 P2d 499 (1963), prescribes the elements of a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; “ (2) The termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor; “ (3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; “(4) The existence of malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim; and “(5) Damages.” Accord Parks v. Willis, 121 Or App 72 , 74 n 3, 853 P2d 1336 ( | 2 | 1995–2000 |
State v. L. G. S.-S.
green
2 sentences2024S.-S., 307 Or App 208, 212 , 475 P3d 922 (2020), we reversed a supplemental judgment awarding restitution because the state failed to present restitution evidence, or even request restitution, at the adjudication hearing. 2024S.-S., 307 Or App 208, 212 , 475 P3d 922 (2020), we reversed a supplemental judgment awarding restitution because the state failed to present restitution evidence, or even request restitution, at the adjudication hearing. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. R. D. M.
green
1 sentence2024Cite as 330 Or App 692 (2024) 695 based on a finding of delinquency[.]” In that case, the state presented its restitution evidence at the disposition hear- ing, which occurred about two months after the adjudication hearing. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
MT & M Gaming, Inc. v. City of Portland
green
1 sentence2016Cite as 360 Or 544 (2016) 555 narrowing implication of the modifier “legal”: Any “interest” may qualify as long as it is “legally recognized.” The other two requirements for standing announced in Morgan are drawn from prior standing cases decided under the declaratory judgment act and are less closely tied to the statute’s wording. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Short v. Hill
green
1 sentence2015SPS of Oregon, Inc. v. GDH, LLC, 258 Or App 210, 218 , 309 P3d 178 (2013); Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving Co., 194 Or App 219, 237-38 , 94 P3d 885 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Roop v. PARKER NORTHWEST PAVING, CO.
green
2 sentences2015SPS of Oregon, Inc. v. GDH, LLC, 258 Or App 210, 218 , 309 P3d 178 (2013); Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving Co., 194 Or App 219, 237-38 , 94 P3d 885 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 2015SPS of Oregon, Inc. v. GDH, LLC, 258 Or App 210, 218 , 309 P3d 178 (2013); Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving Co., 194 Or App 219, 237-38 , 94 P3d 885 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Minor v. Adult & Family Services Division
neutral
1 sentence2011Minor, 105 Or App at 181-82 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Wieber v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 489, 220 P.3d at 82 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Ettner v. City of Medford
green
2 sentences2007The foregoing principles were applied in Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den, 328 Or 40 (1998). 2007The foregoing principles were applied in Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den, 328 Or 40 (1998). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Portland Trailer & Equipment, Inc. v. A-1 Freeman Moving & Storage, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004Under Oregon law, the elements of a claim for wrongful initiation of a civil proceeding are as follows: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; *238 “(2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiffs favor;[ 11 ] “(3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; “(4) The existence of malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim; and “(5) Damages.” Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259-60 , 381 P2d 499 (1963); see also Perry v | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bradley v. Flowers
neutral
1 sentence2004Under Oregon law, the elements of a claim for wrongful initiation of a civil proceeding are as follows: “(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; *238 “(2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiffs favor;[ 11 ] “(3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; “(4) The existence of malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim; and “(5) Damages.” Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or 255, 259-60 , 381 P2d 499 (1963); see also Perry v | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Checkley v. Boyd
green
2 sentences2004An attorney is not required or expected to prejudge his client’s claim, and although he is fully aware that its chances of success are comparatively slight, it is his responsibility to present it to the court for adjudication if his client so insists after he has explained to the client the nature of the chances.” (Citations omitted.) See also Checkley v. Boyd, 170 Or App 721, 735-37 , 14 P3d 81 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 239 (2001) (citing Restatement section 674 with approval). 5 In sum, the fact that an attorney defendant prosecuted a prior action on a client’s behalf without probable cause ca 2004An attorney is not required or expected to prejudge his client’s claim, and although he is fully aware that its chances of success are comparatively slight, it is his responsibility to present it to the court for adjudication if his client so insists after he has explained to the client the nature of the chances.” (Citations omitted.) See also Checkley v. Boyd, 170 Or App 721, 735-37 , 14 P3d 81 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 239 (2001) (citing Restatement section 674 with approval). 5 In sum, the fact that an attorney defendant prosecuted a prior action on a client’s behalf without probable cause ca | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Kent v. United States
green
1 sentence1972We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel. “9 9 9 9 9 “* * * ‘The need is even greater in the adjudication of waiver (than in a case like Shioutakon) since it contemplates the imposition of criminal sanctions.’ * * *” 383 US at 557-58 . ② That court duly entered its order transferring the hearing and disposition of the matters here involved to the Marion County Juvenile Court pursuant to ORS 419.545 and 419.547. ③ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 , 1 | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1972We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel. “9 9 9 9 9 “* * * ‘The need is even greater in the adjudication of waiver (than in a case like Shioutakon) since it contemplates the imposition of criminal sanctions.’ * * *” 383 US at 557-58 . ② That court duly entered its order transferring the hearing and disposition of the matters here involved to the Marion County Juvenile Court pursuant to ORS 419.545 and 419.547. ③ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 , 1 1972We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel. “9 9 9 9 9 “* * * ‘The need is even greater in the adjudication of waiver (than in a case like Shioutakon) since it contemplates the imposition of criminal sanctions.’ * * *” 383 US at 557-58 . ② That court duly entered its order transferring the hearing and disposition of the matters here involved to the Marion County Juvenile Court pursuant to ORS 419.545 and 419.547. ③ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 , 1 | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Wilkes v. Cornelius green | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.