adjudication hearing in New Mexico

1996In Mayfield v. Mayfield, 108 N.M. 246, 249 , 771 P.2d 179, 182 (1989), this Court held that blind adherence to statutory language does not always lead to a just result, stating that it “would be loath to exalt form over substance to foreclose the adjudication of a claim on its merits.” Green Valley cites In re Pulver, 117 N.M. 329, 333-34 , 871 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 524 , 873 P.2d 270 (1994), to support its position.

1996In Mayfield v. Mayfield, 108 N.M. 246, 249 , 771 P.2d 179, 182 (1989), this Court held that blind adherence to statutory language does not always lead to a just result, stating that it “would be loath to exalt form over substance to foreclose the adjudication of a claim on its merits.” Green Valley cites In re Pulver, 117 N.M. 329, 333-34 , 871 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 524 , 873 P.2d 270 (1994), to support its position.

2023See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 36-51, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 . {4} Father’s amended memorandum in opposition asserts that Father’s trial counsel objected to the district court’s acceptance of Mr. Applegate as an ICWA expert, without referring to the record and without any description of the objection. [AMIO 7] As indicated above, we allowed appellate counsel an extension of time to listen to the audio recording of the adjudication hearing and file an amended

2023See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 36-51, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 . {4} Father’s amended memorandum in opposition asserts that Father’s trial counsel objected to the district court’s acceptance of Mr. Applegate as an ICWA expert, without referring to the record and without any description of the objection. [AMIO 7] As indicated above, we allowed appellate counsel an extension of time to listen to the audio recording of the adjudication hearing and file an amended

2023See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 36-51, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 . {4} Father’s amended memorandum in opposition asserts that Father’s trial counsel objected to the district court’s acceptance of Mr. Applegate as an ICWA expert, without referring to the record and without any description of the objection. [AMIO 7] As indicated above, we allowed appellate counsel an extension of time to listen to the audio recording of the adjudication hearing and file an amended

2023See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 36-51, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 . {4} Father’s amended memorandum in opposition asserts that Father’s trial counsel objected to the district court’s acceptance of Mr. Applegate as an ICWA expert, without referring to the record and without any description of the objection. [AMIO 7] As indicated above, we allowed appellate counsel an extension of time to listen to the audio recording of the adjudication hearing and file an amended

2023See Trevor M., 2015-NMCA-009, ¶ 11 .

2022See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the appellate court presumes that the trial court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred). {6} For these reasons, we conclude that Father’s issue is not viable, and we therefore deny the motion to amend the docketing statement.

2022See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the appellate court presumes that the trial court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred). {6} For these reasons, we conclude that Father’s issue is not viable, and we therefore deny the motion to amend the docketing statement.

2022See In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039 , ¶ 10, 121 N.M. 562 , 915 P.2d 318 (“An assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice.”); Deaton v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA- 043, ¶ 31, 135 N.M. 423 , 89 P.3d 672 (“[A]n assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice, and in the absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {9} For these reasons, we conclude that Father has failed to establish reversible error, and we affirm the district court’s abuse and neglect adjudication. {10} IT IS SO ORDERED.

2022See In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039 , ¶ 10, 121 N.M. 562 , 915 P.2d 318 (“An assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice.”); Deaton v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA- 043, ¶ 31, 135 N.M. 423 , 89 P.3d 672 (“[A]n assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice, and in the absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {9} For these reasons, we conclude that Father has failed to establish reversible error, and we affirm the district court’s abuse and neglect adjudication. {10} IT IS SO ORDERED.

2003In Stella P., this Court held that a mother was denied due process when her parental rights were terminated at a hearing that she did not attend and at which only a proffer was made of the evidence supporting the termination. 1999-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 31, 35 , 127 N.M. 699 , 986 P.2d 495 .

2003In Stella P., this Court held that a mother was denied due process when her parental rights were terminated at a hearing that she did not attend and at which only a proffer was made of the evidence supporting the termination. 1999-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 31, 35 , 127 N.M. 699 , 986 P.2d 495 .

1997See Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H. 359 , 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (1996) (stating that “malicious prosecution and abuse of process ‘have the common element of an improper purpose in the use of legal process, and there are many cases in which they overlap and either will lie’ ”) (quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 121, at 898); see also Prewitt v. Sexton, 777 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky.1989) (“What is often loosely labeled proof of ‘malice’ is more specifically defined in the Restatement as bringing the prior lawsuit ‘primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim.

1997See Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H. 359 , 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (1996) (stating that “malicious prosecution and abuse of process ‘have the common element of an improper purpose in the use of legal process, and there are many cases in which they overlap and either will lie’ ”) (quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 121, at 898); see also Prewitt v. Sexton, 777 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky.1989) (“What is often loosely labeled proof of ‘malice’ is more specifically defined in the Restatement as bringing the prior lawsuit ‘primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim.

1997See Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H. 359 , 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (1996) (stating that “malicious prosecution and abuse of process ‘have the common element of an improper purpose in the use of legal process, and there are many cases in which they overlap and either will lie’ ”) (quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 121, at 898); see also Prewitt v. Sexton, 777 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky.1989) (“What is often loosely labeled proof of ‘malice’ is more specifically defined in the Restatement as bringing the prior lawsuit ‘primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim.

1996In Mayfield v. Mayfield, 108 N.M. 246, 249 , 771 P.2d 179, 182 (1989), this Court held that blind adherence to statutory language does not always lead to a just result, stating that it “would be loath to exalt form over substance to foreclose the adjudication of a claim on its merits.” Green Valley cites In re Pulver, 117 N.M. 329, 333-34 , 871 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 524 , 873 P.2d 270 (1994), to support its position.

1996In Mayfield v. Mayfield, 108 N.M. 246, 249 , 771 P.2d 179, 182 (1989), this Court held that blind adherence to statutory language does not always lead to a just result, stating that it “would be loath to exalt form over substance to foreclose the adjudication of a claim on its merits.” Green Valley cites In re Pulver, 117 N.M. 329, 333-34 , 871 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 524 , 873 P.2d 270 (1994), to support its position.

1989See Mathieson v. Hubler, 92 N.M. 381 , 588 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App.) (actions based on the denial of a claim must be brought within the statutory time period in order to promote a speedy and efficient system for the settlement of estates), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353 , 588 P.2d 554 (1978).

1989See Mathieson v. Hubler, 92 N.M. 381 , 588 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App.) (actions based on the denial of a claim must be brought within the statutory time period in order to promote a speedy and efficient system for the settlement of estates), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353 , 588 P.2d 554 (1978).