State contends error in Oregon

2023The state also argues that it is possible that defendant chose not to object for strategic reasons.2 Relying on State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160 , 130 P3d 780 (2006), the state contends that the error is not plain in this case because the record is subject to competing infer- ences, and one available inference from the record is that defendant chose not to raise the issue.

2023The state also argues that it is possible that defendant chose not to object for strategic reasons.2 Relying on State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160 , 130 P3d 780 (2006), the state contends that the error is not plain in this case because the record is subject to competing infer- ences, and one available inference from the record is that defendant chose not to raise the issue.

2023In a subsequent memorandum of additional author- ities, defendant agrees that in Frost, “this court held that a violation of the right to be present for trial is subject to the preservation requirement.” However, she notes that Frost “also held that such an error constitutes plain error that this court should exercise its discretion to correct.” Additionally, defendant notes that in State v. Reed, 247 Or App 155, 163 , 268 P3d 756 (2011)—a case concerning the pro se defen- dant’s waiver of the right to counsel—we held that because a probation-violation hearing is a critical stage in a criminal

2023In a subsequent memorandum of additional author- ities, defendant agrees that in Frost, “this court held that a violation of the right to be present for trial is subject to the preservation requirement.” However, she notes that Frost “also held that such an error constitutes plain error that this court should exercise its discretion to correct.” Additionally, defendant notes that in State v. Reed, 247 Or App 155, 163 , 268 P3d 756 (2011)—a case concerning the pro se defen- dant’s waiver of the right to counsel—we held that because a probation-violation hearing is a critical stage in a criminal

2023In the state’s view, the requirement is an exemption for those under 18 years of age that merely recognizes the con- stitutional principle from Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 US 190 , 136 S Ct 718 , 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole would be, in almost all circum- stances, a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2023In the state’s view, the requirement is an exemption for those under 18 years of age that merely recognizes the con- stitutional principle from Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 US 190 , 136 S Ct 718 , 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole would be, in almost all circum- stances, a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2023In the state’s view, the requirement is an exemption for those under 18 years of age that merely recognizes the con- stitutional principle from Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 US 190 , 136 S Ct 718 , 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole would be, in almost all circum- stances, a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2023In the state’s view, the requirement is an exemption for those under 18 years of age that merely recognizes the con- stitutional principle from Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 US 190 , 136 S Ct 718 , 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole would be, in almost all circum- stances, a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2018We must affirm a judgment notwithstanding evidentiary error if "there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict." *169 State v. Davis , 336 Or. 19 , 33, 77 P.3d 1111 (2003) ; see also Or.

2018We must affirm a judgment notwithstanding evidentiary error if "there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict." *169 State v. Davis , 336 Or. 19 , 33, 77 P.3d 1111 (2003) ; see also Or.

2024But the state contends that the error was harmless, in light of the court’s general instruction on “sexual contact,” defining “sexual contact” as the actor touching a person’s intimate parts or having the person touch the actor’s inti- mate parts “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.” The state contends that, in light of that instruction, in finding that there was “sex- ual contact,” the jury’s guilty verdicts established that the jurors necessarily found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant touched the victim’s intimate parts with the par- ticular

2021The state concedes that the trial court’s instruction that the verdict need not be unanimous was erroneous under Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), but the state contends that the error was harmless because the verdict was unani- mous.

2021The state concedes that the trial court’s instruction that the verdict need not be unanimous was erroneous under Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), but the state contends that the error was harmless because the verdict was unani- mous.

2019App. at 88 , 188 P.3d 432 (Sercombe, J., concurring). *1229 Opposing that conclusion, the state contends that that rule can be read to allow for revocation in circumstances other than those identified in the rule, including circumstances in which the defendant has not violated the conditions of probation.

2015In light of Coverstone, 260 Or App at 716 , and that decision’s focus on both the state’s burden to establish the defendant’s ability to pay and the trial court’s affirmative duty to ensure that the statutory requirements have been satisfied before imposing attorney fees, we reject the state’s arguments.

2013The state contends that the standard for establishing jurisdiction under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) that we articulated in A F. is inconsistent with Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 316 Or 646 , 853 P2d 282 (1993).

2013The state contends that the standard for establishing jurisdiction under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) that we articulated in A F. is inconsistent with Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 316 Or 646 , 853 P2d 282 (1993).

2011Instead, relying primarily on our decision in State v. Sanchez-Alfonso, 238 Or App 160 , 241 P3d 1194 (2010), the state contends that the error was harmless: “Given that defendant did not seriously contest that the abuse occurred (he asserted only that he did not remember whether he had abused [the victim] and that, if the abuse in fact occurred, his alternate personality was responsible), there is little likelihood Dr. Purvis’s sexual-abuse diagnosis affected the verdict.

2011Instead, relying primarily on our decision in State v. Sanchez-Alfonso, 238 Or App 160 , 241 P3d 1194 (2010), the state contends that the error was harmless: “Given that defendant did not seriously contest that the abuse occurred (he asserted only that he did not remember whether he had abused [the victim] and that, if the abuse in fact occurred, his alternate personality was responsible), there is little likelihood Dr. Purvis’s sexual-abuse diagnosis affected the verdict.

2002In response to plaintiffs argument that he adequately pleaded negligence per se, the state contends that a violation of the administrative rule on which plaintiff relies provides no basis for such a claim because plaintiff is not “a member of the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute.” George v. Myers, 169 Or App 472, 478 , 10 P3d 265 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 692 (2001) (outlining what a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish negligence per se).

2002In response to plaintiffs argument that he adequately pleaded negligence per se, the state contends that a violation of the administrative rule on which plaintiff relies provides no basis for such a claim because plaintiff is not “a member of the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute.” George v. Myers, 169 Or App 472, 478 , 10 P3d 265 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 692 (2001) (outlining what a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish negligence per se).

1996State v. Hansen, 304 Or 169, 180 , 743 P2d 167 (1987).

1995State v. Farmer, 317 Or 220, 224 , 856 P2d 623 (1993).

1995State v. Farmer, 317 Or 220, 224 , 856 P2d 623 (1993).

1991State v. Russell, 231 Or 317 , 372 P2d 770 (1962).

1991State v. Russell, 231 Or 317 , 372 P2d 770 (1962).

1970The state contends that the defense of collateral estoppel, discussed in State v. George, 253 Or 458 , 455 P2d 609 (1969), would be successful if defendants were charged with possession, and, hence, the prosecutor’s argument was correct.

1970The state contends that the defense of collateral estoppel, discussed in State v. George, 253 Or 458 , 455 P2d 609 (1969), would be successful if defendants were charged with possession, and, hence, the prosecutor’s argument was correct.

1970State v. Snedeker, 3 Or App 482 , 474 P2d 770 (October 2, 1970).

1970State v. Snedeker, 3 Or App 482 , 474 P2d 770 (October 2, 1970).

1968Denton v. Davis et al., 191 Or. 646 , 233 P.2d 213 (1951). *510 The state contends that the error was not prejudicial.

1968Denton v. Davis et al., 191 Or. 646 , 233 P.2d 213 (1951). *510 The state contends that the error was not prejudicial.