State contends defense in Montana

2016The State contends that no rule or statute requires a district court to grant a defendant’s request for a surrebuttal argument. ¶35 Section 46-16-402, MCA, allows a court to deviate from the order of trial “[f]or good cause shown and in the discretion of the court.” See State v. Otto, 2014 MT 20, ¶ 11 , 373 Mont. 385 , 317 P.3d 810 .

2016The State contends that no rule or statute requires a district court to grant a defendant’s request for a surrebuttal argument. ¶35 Section 46-16-402, MCA, allows a court to deviate from the order of trial “[f]or good cause shown and in the discretion of the court.” See State v. Otto, 2014 MT 20, ¶ 11 , 373 Mont. 385 , 317 P.3d 810 .

2010Relying on this Court’s decision in State v. Reiner, 179 Mont. 239 , 587 P.2d 950 (1978), the State contends that an instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault need not be given where the evidence indicates that the only type of injury that would be feared was serious bodily injury.

2010Relying on this Court’s decision in State v. Reiner, 179 Mont. 239 , 587 P.2d 950 (1978), the State contends that an instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault need not be given where the evidence indicates that the only type of injury that would be feared was serious bodily injury.

2001The State cites State v. LaDue, 2001 MT 47, ¶ 28 , 304 Mont. 288, ¶ 28 , 20 P.3d 775, ¶ 28 , for the idea that “an objection concerning jurisdictional or constitutional matters must be raised before the trial court, unless specific exceptions apply under § 46-20-701(2), MCA, and if the objection is not made it will not be heard on appeal.” ¶24 Since Gypsum, the right to be present at all federal criminal proceedings has been codified at Rule 43(a), Fed.R.Crim.P.

2001The State cites State v. LaDue, 2001 MT 47, ¶ 28 , 304 Mont. 288, ¶ 28 , 20 P.3d 775, ¶ 28 , for the idea that “an objection concerning jurisdictional or constitutional matters must be raised before the trial court, unless specific exceptions apply under § 46-20-701(2), MCA, and if the objection is not made it will not be heard on appeal.” ¶24 Since Gypsum, the right to be present at all federal criminal proceedings has been codified at Rule 43(a), Fed.R.Crim.P.

2000We have previously recognized that “[o]bjections to jury instructions proposed by the opposing party serve the same functions as eviden-tiary objections.” State v. Grimes, 1999 MT 147, ¶ 39 , 295 Mont 22, ¶ 39 , 982 P.2d 1037, ¶ 39 .

2000We have previously recognized that “[o]bjections to jury instructions proposed by the opposing party serve the same functions as eviden-tiary objections.” State v. Grimes, 1999 MT 147, ¶ 39 , 295 Mont 22, ¶ 39 , 982 P.2d 1037, ¶ 39 .

2000We have previously recognized that “[o]bjections to jury instructions proposed by the opposing party serve the same functions as eviden-tiary objections.” State v. Grimes, 1999 MT 147, ¶ 39 , 295 Mont 22, ¶ 39 , 982 P.2d 1037, ¶ 39 .

1989Initially, the State contends that the defense of entrapment is not available to a defendant who denies committing the acts for which she is charged, citing State v. Kamrud (1980), 188 Mont. 100, 103-04 , 611 P.2d 188, 190 .

1989Initially, the State contends that the defense of entrapment is not available to a defendant who denies committing the acts for which she is charged, citing State v. Kamrud (1980), 188 Mont. 100, 103-04 , 611 P.2d 188, 190 .

1989See also State v. O’Donnell (1960), 138 Mont. 123 , 354 P.2d 1105 ; State v. Parr (1955), 129 Mont. 175 , 283 P.2d 1086 .

1989See also State v. O’Donnell (1960), 138 Mont. 123 , 354 P.2d 1105 ; State v. Parr (1955), 129 Mont. 175 , 283 P.2d 1086 .

1979The Montana County Attorneys Association, appearing as amicus curiae, argues that “a criminal defendant asserting the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force [should be] required to prove that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed. *71 2d 368, 375, explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause protects [an] accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (E

1979The Montana County Attorneys Association, appearing as amicus curiae, argues that “a criminal defendant asserting the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force [should be] required to prove that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed. *71 2d 368, 375, explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause protects [an] accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (E

1979The Montana County Attorneys Association, appearing as amicus curiae, argues that “a criminal defendant asserting the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force [should be] required to prove that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed. *71 2d 368, 375, explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause protects [an] accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (E

1979The Montana County Attorneys Association, appearing as amicus curiae, argues that “a criminal defendant asserting the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force [should be] required to prove that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed. *71 2d 368, 375, explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause protects [an] accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (E

1958The State contends that this presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, relying upon the cases of McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590 , 69 Pac. (2d) 597 ; and Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68 , 121 Pac. (2d) 162 .

1958The State contends that this presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, relying upon the cases of McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590 , 69 Pac. (2d) 597 ; and Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68 , 121 Pac. (2d) 162 .

1958The State contends that this presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, relying upon the cases of McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590 , 69 Pac. (2d) 597 ; and Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68 , 121 Pac. (2d) 162 .

1958The State contends that this presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, relying upon the cases of McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590 , 69 Pac. (2d) 597 ; and Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68 , 121 Pac. (2d) 162 .

1958The State contends that this presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, relying upon the cases of McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590 , 69 Pac. (2d) 597 ; and Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68 , 121 Pac. (2d) 162 .

1958The State contends that this presumption cannot be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, relying upon the cases of McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590 , 69 Pac. (2d) 597 ; and Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68 , 121 Pac. (2d) 162 .