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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2025Our "review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hayesgreen1 sentence2020As to the merits, the State contends the factors enumerated in State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 538 (2011), support the court's decision to deny defendant's motion to adjourn the trial, emphasizing defendant suffered no prejudice in view of his aggregate sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Prado Navarette v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014The State points to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ———,-, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1689-90 ; 188 L.Ed.2d 680, 688-89 (2014), where the Supreme Court held that the use of the 9-1-1 emergency system was an “indicator of veracity,” because its safeguards and features permit identification of callers. 2014The State points to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ———,-, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1689-90 ; 188 L.Ed.2d 680, 688-89 (2014), where the Supreme Court held that the use of the 9-1-1 emergency system was an “indicator of veracity,” because its safeguards and features permit identification of callers. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howerygreen1 sentence1987In support of this proposition, the State relies upon Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 , 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 667, 681-682 (1978); and State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567 (1979), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Franks v. Delawaregreen2 sentences1987In support of this proposition, the State relies upon Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 , 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 667, 681-682 (1978); and State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567 (1979), cert. den. sub nom. 1987In support of this proposition, the State relies upon Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 , 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 667, 681-682 (1978); and State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567 (1979), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Watford
green
2 sentences2011In support of that position, the State relies on a factually analogous California decision in In re Watford, 186 Cal.App.4th 684 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 522 (3d Dist.), review denied, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 10454 (2010). 3 In addition, the State contends that the doctrine of fundamental fairness is inapplicable in the present circumstances. 2011In support of that position, the State relies on a factually analogous California decision in In re Watford, 186 Cal.App.4th 684 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 522 (3d Dist.), review denied, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 10454 (2010). 3 In addition, the State contends that the doctrine of fundamental fairness is inapplicable in the present circumstances. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Hennessey v. Winslow Township
green
2 sentences2007As the Law Division judge properly noted, in order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that five elements exist: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceedi 2007As the Law Division judge properly noted, in order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that five elements exist: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceedi | 1 | 2007–2007 |
First Union National Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007As the Law Division judge properly noted, in order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that five elements exist: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceedi 2007As the Law Division judge properly noted, in order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that five elements exist: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceedi | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2001For defendant to prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, he must satisfy the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 , 80 L. 2001For defendant to prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, he must satisfy the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 , 80 L. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1974CUSTODY The State contends that the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), are not necessary when, as here, a defendant voluntarily goes to a police station upon request and gives an inculpatory statement. 1974CUSTODY The State contends that the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), are not necessary when, as here, a defendant voluntarily goes to a police station upon request and gives an inculpatory statement. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.