State contends error in Illinois

2025See, e.g., People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22 (a postconviction proceeding -7- No. 1-23-1484 permits “inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that were not, and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal”).

2025See id. (issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited).

2024See Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613 .

2022See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010) (first step in plain-error analysis is to determine whether any error occurred). -9- 2022 IL App (2d) 200787-U ¶ 37 Defendant relies principally on Cavette.

2009See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 218 n.2, 165 L.

2009See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 218 n.2, 165 L.

2012An error is harmless "`where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the' error." (Emphasis in original.) In re E.H., 224 Ill.2d 172, 180 , 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) (quoting People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 447 , 142 Ill.Dec. 854 , 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990)). ¶ 56 The State contends that the error in admitting portions of Charles's audiotaped and handwritten statements is harmless because he made nearly verbatim statements in his sworn grand jury testimony, which was indisputably admissible under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(1) (West 2008

2012An error is harmless "`where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the' error." (Emphasis in original.) In re E.H., 224 Ill.2d 172, 180 , 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) (quoting People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 447 , 142 Ill.Dec. 854 , 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990)). ¶ 56 The State contends that the error in admitting portions of Charles's audiotaped and handwritten statements is harmless because he made nearly verbatim statements in his sworn grand jury testimony, which was indisputably admissible under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(1) (West 2008

2012An error is harmless "`where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the' error." (Emphasis in original.) In re E.H., 224 Ill.2d 172, 180 , 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) (quoting People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 447 , 142 Ill.Dec. 854 , 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990)). ¶ 56 The State contends that the error in admitting portions of Charles's audiotaped and handwritten statements is harmless because he made nearly verbatim statements in his sworn grand jury testimony, which was indisputably admissible under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(1) (West 2008

2012An error is harmless "`where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the' error." (Emphasis in original.) In re E.H., 224 Ill.2d 172, 180 , 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) (quoting People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 447 , 142 Ill.Dec. 854 , 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990)). ¶ 56 The State contends that the error in admitting portions of Charles's audiotaped and handwritten statements is harmless because he made nearly verbatim statements in his sworn grand jury testimony, which was indisputably admissible under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(1) (West 2008

2022See People v. Bochenek, 2020 IL App (2d) 170545, ¶ 67 (“Generally, even if the other-crimes evidence is erroneously admitted, it is harmless if there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”), aff’d, 2021 IL 125889, ¶ 24 ; see also People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 530 (2000) (explaining that the improper introduction of other-crimes evidence was harmless because any prejudicial effect “was overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt—most notably, his own uncontested statement” (emphasis added)). ¶ 69 Here, the State contends the error was harmless because Phillis,

2022See People v. Bochenek, 2020 IL App (2d) 170545, ¶ 67 (“Generally, even if the other-crimes evidence is erroneously admitted, it is harmless if there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”), aff’d, 2021 IL 125889, ¶ 24 ; see also People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 530 (2000) (explaining that the improper introduction of other-crimes evidence was harmless because any prejudicial effect “was overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt—most notably, his own uncontested statement” (emphasis added)). ¶ 69 Here, the State contends the error was harmless because Phillis,

2022See People v. Bochenek, 2020 IL App (2d) 170545, ¶ 67 (“Generally, even if the other-crimes evidence is erroneously admitted, it is harmless if there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”), aff’d, 2021 IL 125889, ¶ 24 ; see also People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 530 (2000) (explaining that the improper introduction of other-crimes evidence was harmless because any prejudicial effect “was overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt—most notably, his own uncontested statement” (emphasis added)). ¶ 69 Here, the State contends the error was harmless because Phillis,

2022The State contends no error occurred. ¶ 25 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v.

2022The State contends no error occurred. ¶ 25 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v.

2021People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326 (2011); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

2021People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326 (2011); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

2020The State contends defense counsel’s cross-examination was a matter of trial strategy. ¶ 37 With ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a court accords much deference to defense “counsel’s judgment and strongly presumes that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 413 , 727 N.E.2d 362, 370 (2000).

2020The State contends defense counsel’s cross-examination was a matter of trial strategy. ¶ 37 With ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a court accords much deference to defense “counsel’s judgment and strongly presumes that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 413 , 727 N.E.2d 362, 370 (2000).

2020The State contends that the defense was not available because defendant provoked the incident and A.P. was entitled to defend his property. ¶ 25 “The elements of self-defense are (1) that unlawful force is threatened against a person; (2) that the person threatened is not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm is imminent; and (4) that the use of force was necessary.” People v. White, 293 Ill.

2020“Generally, the decision whether or not to cross-examine or impeach a - 14 - witness is a matter of trial strategy which will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326 , 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997).

2020“Generally, the decision whether or not to cross-examine or impeach a - 14 - witness is a matter of trial strategy which will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326 , 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997).

2014People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 323 (1997); People v. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 502 (1986).

2014People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 323 (1997); People v. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 502 (1986).

2013“Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless intrusion into a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable unless the person consents, or unless probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the intrusion.” (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 994 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services, 537 F.3d 404, 420 (5th Cir. 2008), quoting United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Ojeda, 276 F.3d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 2002). ¶ 23 The State contends that the req

2013“Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless intrusion into a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable unless the person consents, or unless probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the intrusion.” (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 994 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services, 537 F.3d 404, 420 (5th Cir. 2008), quoting United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Ojeda, 276 F.3d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 2002). ¶ 23 The State contends that the req