State contends instruction in Maryland

2022A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a conviction. 5 not alerted the trial court that she intended to say ‘no objection’ in front of the jury while nevertheless preserving the suppression hearing claims.” As did the Court of Special Appeals, the State claims support for its position in Erman v. State, 49 Md.

2022A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a conviction. 5 not alerted the trial court that she intended to say ‘no objection’ in front of the jury while nevertheless preserving the suppression hearing claims.” As did the Court of Special Appeals, the State claims support for its position in Erman v. State, 49 Md.

1965Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599 .

1964Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599 .

1965Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599 .

1964Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599 .

2019First, relying on Haskins v. State , 171 Md.

2017Travis v. State, 218 Md.App. 410, 446 , 98 A.3d 281 (2014).

2017Travis v. State, 218 Md.App. 410, 446 , 98 A.3d 281 (2014).

2011Petitioner asserts that the instruction “suggests the absence-of-scientific-evidence defense is improper, requiring a curative instruction by the judge [despite the fact that] this is an appropriate defense not warranting a curative instruction.” The State contends that the instruction was properly given, stating that the instruction was a “correct statement of the law, ... applicable to the facts in this case, and it was not fairly covered by the other instructions.” According to the State, the investigative techniques instruction is justified in order to ensure that the government is not pre

2011Petitioner asserts that the instruction “suggests the absence-of-scientific-evidence defense is improper, requiring a curative instruction by the judge [despite the fact that] this is an appropriate defense not warranting a curative instruction.” The State contends that the instruction was properly given, stating that the instruction was a “correct statement of the law, ... applicable to the facts in this case, and it was not fairly covered by the other instructions.” According to the State, the investigative techniques instruction is justified in order to ensure that the government is not pre

2006The State contends that the inquiry conducted here was comparable to the inquiry and jury sentencing waiver in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648 , 790 A.2d 629 (2002) and Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77 , 622 A.2d 727 (1993), and “shows that Abeokuto, an educated man, possessed sufficient knowledge of his jury sentencing right and understood what he was doing in waiving that right.” Moreover, the State urges that, Appellant’s waiver of jury sentencing should be viewed in light of this previous waiver of jury trial.

2006The State contends that the inquiry conducted here was comparable to the inquiry and jury sentencing waiver in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648 , 790 A.2d 629 (2002) and Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77 , 622 A.2d 727 (1993), and “shows that Abeokuto, an educated man, possessed sufficient knowledge of his jury sentencing right and understood what he was doing in waiving that right.” Moreover, the State urges that, Appellant’s waiver of jury sentencing should be viewed in light of this previous waiver of jury trial.

2006The State contends that the inquiry conducted here was comparable to the inquiry and jury sentencing waiver in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648 , 790 A.2d 629 (2002) and Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77 , 622 A.2d 727 (1993), and “shows that Abeokuto, an educated man, possessed sufficient knowledge of his jury sentencing right and understood what he was doing in waiving that right.” Moreover, the State urges that, Appellant’s waiver of jury sentencing should be viewed in light of this previous waiver of jury trial.

2006The State contends that the inquiry conducted here was comparable to the inquiry and jury sentencing waiver in Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648 , 790 A.2d 629 (2002) and Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77 , 622 A.2d 727 (1993), and “shows that Abeokuto, an educated man, possessed sufficient knowledge of his jury sentencing right and understood what he was doing in waiving that right.” Moreover, the State urges that, Appellant’s waiver of jury sentencing should be viewed in light of this previous waiver of jury trial.

2005The State cites Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. *43 denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965), for the proposition that a party cannot claim on appeal that there was prejudicial error in admitting certain testimony as to which an objection was asserted if similar testimony was subsequently admitted through another witness without any objection.

2005The State cites Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. *43 denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965), for the proposition that a party cannot claim on appeal that there was prejudicial error in admitting certain testimony as to which an objection was asserted if similar testimony was subsequently admitted through another witness without any objection.

2005The State cites Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. *43 denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965), for the proposition that a party cannot claim on appeal that there was prejudicial error in admitting certain testimony as to which an objection was asserted if similar testimony was subsequently admitted through another witness without any objection.

2005The State cites Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. *43 denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965), for the proposition that a party cannot claim on appeal that there was prejudicial error in admitting certain testimony as to which an objection was asserted if similar testimony was subsequently admitted through another witness without any objection.

1992The standards by which we measure whether Thomas received assistance of counsel commensurate with the Sixth Amendment guarantee were promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1992The standards by which we measure whether Thomas received assistance of counsel commensurate with the Sixth Amendment guarantee were promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1989Since, it argues, unless a requested *411 instruction correctly states the law it need not be given, Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), and a court’s refusal to give an instruction, a portion of which is incorrect, is not reversible error, Foster, Evans, Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 317 , 503 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), the court was right, albeit for the wrong reason.

1989Since, it argues, unless a requested *411 instruction correctly states the law it need not be given, Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), and a court’s refusal to give an instruction, a portion of which is incorrect, is not reversible error, Foster, Evans, Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 317 , 503 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), the court was right, albeit for the wrong reason.

1989Since, it argues, unless a requested *411 instruction correctly states the law it need not be given, Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), and a court’s refusal to give an instruction, a portion of which is incorrect, is not reversible error, Foster, Evans, Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 317 , 503 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), the court was right, albeit for the wrong reason.

1989Since, it argues, unless a requested *411 instruction correctly states the law it need not be given, Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), and a court’s refusal to give an instruction, a portion of which is incorrect, is not reversible error, Foster, Evans, Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 317 , 503 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), the court was right, albeit for the wrong reason.

1989Since, it argues, unless a requested *411 instruction correctly states the law it need not be given, Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), and a court’s refusal to give an instruction, a portion of which is incorrect, is not reversible error, Foster, Evans, Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 317 , 503 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), the court was right, albeit for the wrong reason.

1989Since, it argues, unless a requested *411 instruction correctly states the law it need not be given, Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), and a court’s refusal to give an instruction, a portion of which is incorrect, is not reversible error, Foster, Evans, Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 317 , 503 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), the court was right, albeit for the wrong reason.

1980In other words, it is defendant’s position that only a single penalty of twenty-five years without parole or probation may be imposed. *488 Of course, in construing the statute we must observe its plain meaning and the "natural import of its language....” State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421 , 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi