totality analysis in Pennsylvania

2026Benitez, 218 A.3d at 480 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moultrie, 870 A.2d 352, 360 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation and emphasis omitted)).

2019Commonwealth v. Moultrie, 870 A.2d 352, 360 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation and emphasis omitted).

2023See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“When reviewing a trial court’s basic compliance with the requirements of Rule 121, we do not first apply a ‘totality - 15 - J-A27039-22 of the circumstances’ test … In this context we look at the totality of the relevant circumstances only after we decide the trial court has met the minimum requirements of Rule 121…”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Although the validity of a guilty plea colloquy is to be viewed under the totality of the circumstances, we may not apply a tot

2023See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“When reviewing a trial court’s basic compliance with the requirements of Rule 121, we do not first apply a ‘totality - 15 - J-A27039-22 of the circumstances’ test … In this context we look at the totality of the relevant circumstances only after we decide the trial court has met the minimum requirements of Rule 121…”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Although the validity of a guilty plea colloquy is to be viewed under the totality of the circumstances, we may not apply a tot

2018Moultrie, supra at 360 (citing Commonwealth v. Key, 789 A.2d 282, 291 (Pa.Super. 2001)).

2015Moultrie, supra at 360 (citing Commonwealth v. Key, 789 A.2d 282, 291 (Pa.Super. 2001)).

2000The court stated, "taking judicial notice that all drug dealers may be armed as in and of itself a sufficient justification for a weapons frisk clashes with the totality standard, as well as the premise that the concern for safety of the officer must arise form the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 1163.

2000The court stated, “taking judicial notice that all drug dealers may be armed as in and of itself a sufficient justification for a weapons frisk clashes with the totality standard, as well as the premise that the concern for safety of the officer must arise form the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 1163.

2025Id. at 1093 (quoting Rhodes, supra at 556 , 510 A.2d at 1226 ) (stating: “A victim’s ‘mental and physical condition[,]’ which can include lack of consciousness, is only one circumstance to be considered under the totality test for forcible compulsion”).

2023Act 10 also codified the definition of forcible compulsion in Section 3101, using language following Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 , 1226 (Pa. 1986). -9- J-S23020-23 consciousness, is only one circumstance to be considered under the totality test for forcible compulsion.

2004The Court held: “[W]e may not apply a totality analysis to a waiver of counsel colloquy.” Id. at 704 (citing Commonwealth v. Brazil, 549 Pa. 321 , 701 A.2d 216 (1997)). ¶ 20 In reviewing the Commonwealth’s arguments, the Payson Court stated: Again, instead of looking to the totality of the circumstances, under which [the Commonwealth’s] observations would be relevant, the law in this area considers only compliance with the mandated procedures.

2004The Court held: “[W]e may not apply a totality analysis to a waiver of counsel colloquy.” Id. at 704 (citing Commonwealth v. Brazil, 549 Pa. 321 , 701 A.2d 216 (1997)). ¶ 20 In reviewing the Commonwealth’s arguments, the Payson Court stated: Again, instead of looking to the totality of the circumstances, under which [the Commonwealth’s] observations would be relevant, the law in this area considers only compliance with the mandated procedures.

2000The Court then reviewed a series of Fourth Amendment cases in which it had applied a totality test, focusing most closely upon Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 , 93 S.Ct. at 2041 , in which the Court rejected the argument that a consent to search could not be valid unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request.

2000The Court then reviewed a series of Fourth Amendment cases in which it had applied a totality test, focusing most closely upon Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 , 93 S.Ct. at 2041 , in which the Court rejected the argument that a consent to search could not be valid unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request.

2023See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“When reviewing a trial court’s basic compliance with the requirements of Rule 121, we do not first apply a ‘totality - 15 - J-A27039-22 of the circumstances’ test … In this context we look at the totality of the relevant circumstances only after we decide the trial court has met the minimum requirements of Rule 121…”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Although the validity of a guilty plea colloquy is to be viewed under the totality of the circumstances, we may not apply a tot

2016“Regardless of the defendant’s prior experience with the justice system, a penetrating and comprehensive colloquy is mandated.” Id. at 124 (citation omitted). “[W]e may not apply a totality analysis to a waiver of counsel colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 1999).

2009Indeed, the Benninghoff concurrence upon which Appellant relies explicitly notes that in rendering a per curiam affirmance, this Court does “not affirm the opinion below or the rationale it expressed.” 852 A.2d at 1190 (Castille, J., concurring).

2009Instead, in keeping with the totality standard in Gates , we conclude that all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction at issue combined to establish probable cause. [12] Indeed, the Benninghoff concurrence upon which Appellant relies explicitly notes that in rendering a per curiam affirmance, this Court does "not affirm the opinion below or the rationale it expressed." 852 A.2d at 1190 (Castille, J., concurring). [1] In holding that "a police officer's experience may fairly be regarded as a relevant factor in determining probable cause," the Majority Opinion "caution[s], however, tha

2009Instead, in keeping with the totality standard in Gates , we conclude that all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction at issue combined to establish probable cause. [12] Indeed, the Benninghoff concurrence upon which Appellant relies explicitly notes that in rendering a per curiam affirmance, this Court does "not affirm the opinion below or the rationale it expressed." 852 A.2d at 1190 (Castille, J., concurring). [1] In holding that "a police officer's experience may fairly be regarded as a relevant factor in determining probable cause," the Majority Opinion "caution[s], however, tha

2005Commonwealth v. Meachum, 711 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Pa.Super.), appeal denied, 556 Pa. 689 , 727 A.2d 1119 (1998). ¶ 20 Rather than developing an argument based on these factors, appellant argues that under Youngblood a totality inquiry is inappropriate where “the identification is the product of an illegal seizure.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.

2005Unless the totality of factors indicate that the consent was the product of express or implied duress or coercion, see Acosta, supra, the mere fact that a police officer did not specifically inform an appellant that he or she could refuse the request will not in and of itself result in a determination that the subsequent search was involuntary. ¶ 19 Based upon the foregoing, we have determined that Appellant’s consent to the search of his person was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.

2005See Acosta, supra. We base our decision on the trial court’s factual findings, supported by the record, as well as on the reasoning set forth above.

2001Koehler, 558 Pa. at 371 , 737 A.2d at 245 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 704 A.2d 650, 654 (Pa.Super.1997)).

2000See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 , 334 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 1098 n. 2, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)(noting that the Court in Terry considered the myriad of situations that confront officers and the risks that inhere when an officer confronts an individual, even in a high crime area, and despite such concerns, the Court required reasonable suspicion before allowing a frisk for weapons).

2000See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 , 334 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 1098 n. 2, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)(noting that the Court in Terry considered the myriad of situations that confront officers and the risks that inhere when an officer confronts an individual, even in a high crime area, and despite such concerns, the Court required reasonable suspicion before allowing a frisk for weapons).

1981Despite repeated and vigorous dissents (by two of the Justices), the court’s reliance on the totality test continued unabated until its 1974 decision in Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 394 , 329 A.2d 286, 288 (1974).

1981Despite repeated and vigorous dissents (by two of the Justices), the court’s reliance on the totality test continued unabated until its 1974 decision in Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 394 , 329 A.2d 286, 288 (1974).