totality test in Ohio

1999Strickland, supra. Appellant's second assignment of error is found to be without merit.

1999Strickland, supra. Appellant presents two additional issues which he requests that this court consider in supplement to his appellate brief, as follows: "I believe that the court errored ( sic ) when it alloud (sic) hearsay statement by Judy Creamer TRANS PAGE 105 — LINES 1 to 6.

2023Considering the totality of the factors, we conclude that the Foundation is the functional equivalent of a public office for purposes of the Public Records Act. {¶ 33} When applying the functional-equivalency test, we consider whether providing public access to the records at issue “serve[s] the policy of governmental openness that underlies the Public Records Act.” Repository, 112 Ohio St.3d 338 , 12 January Term, 2023 2006-Ohio-6713 , 859 N.E.2d 936, at ¶ 39 .

2023Considering the totality of the factors, we conclude that the Foundation is the functional equivalent of a public office for purposes of the Public Records Act. {¶ 33} When applying the functional-equivalency test, we consider whether providing public access to the records at issue “serve[s] the policy of governmental openness that underlies the Public Records Act.” Repository, 112 Ohio St.3d 338 , 12 January Term, 2023 2006-Ohio-6713 , 859 N.E.2d 936, at ¶ 39 .

2022Summit Nos. 30069, 30070, 30071, and 30072, 2022-Ohio-3023, ¶ 25 , citing App.R. 16(A)(7). {¶27} The trial court found that “the totality of the analysis supports a finding that the [C]hild’s best interest would best be served by an award of custody to Father.” Though Mother strongly disagrees with the trial court’s determinations in this matter, the crux of her argument on appeal is that the weight of the evidence demonstrated that it was in the best interest of the Child for Mother, not Father, to be named the residential parent of the Child.

2018Jackson No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5841 , 2014 WL 7477958 , ¶ 48, quoting In re Bishop , 36 Ohio App.3d 123 , 126, 521 N.E.2d 838 (5th Dist. 1987). {¶ 97} Upon consideration of the totality of the factors, and recalling that the trial court's judgment may rest upon witness demeanor and nuances that do not translate to the written record, we are unable to find that the trial court's determination to grant the Agency's motion for permanent custody of D.R. was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2018Jackson No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5841 , 2014 WL 7477958 , ¶ 48, quoting In re Bishop , 36 Ohio App.3d 123 , 126, 521 N.E.2d 838 (5th Dist. 1987). {¶ 97} Upon consideration of the totality of the factors, and recalling that the trial court's judgment may rest upon witness demeanor and nuances that do not translate to the written record, we are unable to find that the trial court's determination to grant the Agency's motion for permanent custody of D.R. was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2017Cuyahoga No. 83206, 2004-Ohio-2018 (defense counsel's failure to object to evidence of defendant's previous sexual assault of victim was reasonable trial strategy where counsel intended to discredit the victim). {¶ 80} When the majority focuses narrowly upon the single moment of a potential objection, it precludes itself the broader opportunity to perceive the totality of defense counsel's strategy during the trial.

2016It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement was voluntary. {¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106 , quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 .

2016It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement was voluntary. {¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106 , quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 .

2016It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement was voluntary. {¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106 , quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 .

2016It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement was voluntary. {¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106 , quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 .

2016When an admission is obtained from a juvenile without counsel, “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 . {¶ 42} The totality of the circumstances from which a court must determine the voluntariness of a juvenile’s statement includes not only the details of the interrogation but also the juvenile’s unique characteristics.

2016When an admission is obtained from a juvenile without counsel, “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 . {¶ 42} The totality of the circumstances from which a court must determine the voluntariness of a juvenile’s statement includes not only the details of the interrogation but also the juvenile’s unique characteristics.

2016No. 08CA8, 2009-Ohio-4540 , ¶ 17, quoting Knauer v. Keener, 143 Ohio App.3d 789 (2d Dist.2001), citing Roach v. Roach, 79 Ohio App.3d 194 (2d Dist.1992). {¶ 16} Finally, Mother complains about the trial court's last paragraph regarding parenting time, as follows: This Court FINDS that the magistrate properly considered the totality of the factors and did not abuse her discretion.

2016It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement was voluntary. {¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106 , quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 .

2016It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement was voluntary. {¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106 , quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738 , 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 .

2016No. 08CA8, 2009-Ohio-4540 , ¶ 17, quoting Knauer v. Keener, 143 Ohio App.3d 789 (2d Dist.2001), citing Roach v. Roach, 79 Ohio App.3d 194 (2d Dist.1992). {¶ 16} Finally, Mother complains about the trial court's last paragraph regarding parenting time, as follows: This Court FINDS that the magistrate properly considered the totality of the factors and did not abuse her discretion.

2006Longnecker, supra. Thus, the totality of the factors sufficiently supports the trial court's sexual predator finding. {¶ 19} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that the state had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant is a sexual predator.

2000Rights of the Child, the Parents, and the Public As noted by the Supreme Court of Washington, the law recognizes the interests of the child, the parents, and the state in a paternity action, and “[wjhere these rights come into conflict, the rights of the child should prevail,” and “[t]he best interests of the child standard does not entitle a court to presume that paternity determination is automatically in the child’s best interest.” (Emphasis sic.) McDaniels v. Carlson (1987), 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310-311 , 738 P.2d 254, 261 .

2000Rights of the Child, the Parents, and the Public As noted by the Supreme Court of Washington, the law recognizes the interests of the child, the parents, and the state in a paternity action, and “[wjhere these rights come into conflict, the rights of the child should prevail,” and “[t]he best interests of the child standard does not entitle a court to presume that paternity determination is automatically in the child’s best interest.” (Emphasis sic.) McDaniels v. Carlson (1987), 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310-311 , 738 P.2d 254, 261 .

1999Cf. Tallmadge v. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 610 (probable cause existed when there was a strong odor of alcohol, defendant admitted having "a couple" of beers, and a failure of HGN test, even without other FST's being administered); McCaig, supra, 51 Ohio App.3d at 94-95 (although none of four specific factors standing alone could arouse suspicion, they provided probable cause when viewed in their totality); State v. Gibson (Feb. 18, 1997), Highland App. No. 96CA897, unreported (probable cause existed when defendant was stopped for speeding, officer detected odor of alcohol, and office

1993However, this charge, which paraphrases the second paragraph of the syllabus of Gedra v. Dallmer (1950), 153 Ohio St. 258 , 41 O.O. 274 , 91 N.E.2d 256 , is wholly erroneous in this *683 case.

1993However, this charge, which paraphrases the second paragraph of the syllabus of Gedra v. Dallmer (1950), 153 Ohio St. 258 , 41 O.O. 274 , 91 N.E.2d 256 , is wholly erroneous in this *683 case.