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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Floyd Long & Alonzo Ferrell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Young, 305 A.3d at 436 (quoting Long v. United States, 156 A.3d 698, 707 (D.C. 2017)). 2026Young, 305 A.3d at 436 (quoting Long v. United States, 156 A.3d 698, 707 (D.C. 2017)). | 2 | 2 |
Neil v. Biggersgreen2 sentences2026This court has previously adopted the five-factor totality test set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) to determine the reliability of an identification: (1) the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime, (2) the degree of attention the witness paid to the perpetrator, (3) the accuracy of any prior descriptions of the perpetrator provided by the witness, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification, and (5) the lapse in time between the crime and the identification procedure. 2026This court has previously adopted the five-factor totality test set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) to determine the reliability of an identification: (1) the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime, (2) the degree of attention the witness paid to the perpetrator, (3) the accuracy of any prior descriptions of the perpetrator provided by the witness, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification, and (5) the lapse in time between the crime and the identification procedure. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Bellamygreen1 sentence2025See (Donald) Jones v. United States, 391 A.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C. 1978) (“The fact that the officer encountered the two men during the early morning hours in an area where there had been robberies and drug trafficking certainly did not [alone] provide a basis for the ‘seizure.’”); see also United States v. Bellamy, 619 A.2d 515, 522 (D.C. 1993) (explaining that the late hour at which an interaction occurs is more relevant to an officer’s “potential vulnerability” (and therefore the reasonableness of a frisk for weapons) than it is to “the intent of the suspect”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See (Donald) Jones v. United States, 391 A.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C. 1978) (“The fact that the officer encountered the two men during the early morning hours in an area where there had been robberies and drug trafficking certainly did not [alone] provide a basis for the ‘seizure.’”); see also United States v. Bellamy, 619 A.2d 515, 522 (D.C. 1993) (explaining that the late hour at which an interaction occurs is more relevant to an officer’s “potential vulnerability” (and therefore the reasonableness of a frisk for weapons) than it is to “the intent of the suspect”). | 1 | 1 |
Easton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990Easton states the test that must be applied: a modus operandi that is not unique does not provide a basis for mutual admissibility. 533 A.2d at 908 ; see id. at 907 . 1990Easton states the test that must be applied: a modus operandi that is not unique does not provide a basis for mutual admissibility. 533 A.2d at 908 ; see id. at 907 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gryce v. Lavine
green
1 sentence1998In Gryce, supra, we took note of Rule 5.6(a) and its possible relevance to the interpretation of a partnership agreement so as to avoid any possible infringement of the rule. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Debose v. Ramada Renaissance Hotel
green
1 sentence1998We further observe that very recently, in Debose v. Ramada Renaissance Hotel, 710 A.2d 880 (D.C.1998), we reversed a trial court’s denial of a motion under Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(1) to reinstate a complaint dismissed for failure to timely file proof of service. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bartley v. United States
green
2 sentences1990Although our cases have not precisely defined when the totality of circumstances rises to the level required for mutual admissibility, the totality standard goes no further than Bartley, supra, 530 A.2d at 695-96 . 1990Although our cases have not precisely defined when the totality of circumstances rises to the level required for mutual admissibility, the totality standard goes no further than Bartley, supra, 530 A.2d at 695-96 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.