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16 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. David Kemmerlinggreen2 sentences2023See also United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A factfinder could decide . . . without being clearly wrong, that the other pictures are lascivious because they are of children who are nude or partially clothed, the focus of the images is the child’s genitals or pubic area, and their purpose appears to be to elicit a sexual response from the viewer. 2023See also United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A factfinder could decide . . . without being clearly wrong, that the other pictures are lascivious because they are of children who are nude or partially clothed, the focus of the images is the child’s genitals or pubic area, and their purpose appears to be to elicit a sexual response from the viewer. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Nathaniel Blackgreen2 sentences2022The Appellate Court of Illinois reiterated that flight from police can establish reasonable suspicion in combination with other factors indicating “suspicious or illegal behavior.” Horton, 142 N.E.3d at 867 (citations omitted).13 In this case, although we reach a conclusion similar to that of courts from other 13 In United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 536, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit held that the totality of the factors considered by the trial court failed to support a conclusion that police had reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant prior to his attempted flight. 2022The Appellate Court of Illinois reiterated that flight from police can establish reasonable suspicion in combination with other factors indicating “suspicious or illegal behavior.” Horton, 142 N.E.3d at 867 (citations omitted).13 In this case, although we reach a conclusion similar to that of courts from other 13 In United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 536, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit held that the totality of the factors considered by the trial court failed to support a conclusion that police had reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant prior to his attempted flight. | 2 | 2 |
McIntyre v. Stategreen2 sentences2020As the Court of Appeals stated in McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 625 (1987): “Applying the relevant totality test to the particular facts of this case, we conclude from our independent review of the record that the trial judge could properly conclude, and did determine with sufficient clarity that the State’s proof that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights satisfied the preponderance of the evidence test.” With respect to the voluntariness of Madrid’s confession, there is a two-part test to assess voluntariness under Maryland common law: Under that test, an inculp 2011Fourth, “[a]lso to be factored into the totality test is [whether the juvenile defendant’s] statement was exculpatory and was given shortly after his [or her] arrival at the police station[.]” 309 Md. at 626 , 526 A.2d at 39 . | 1 | 3 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen2 sentences2016“In determining the constitutional adequacy of a suspect’s waiver of the Miranda rights,” we consider “the totality of the warnings.” Id. “[I]f the warnings, viewed in the totality, in any way misstate the suspect’s rights to silence and counsel, or mislead or confuse the suspect with respect to those rights, then the warnings are constitutionally infirm, rendering the purported waiver of those rights constitutionally defective and requiring suppression of any subsequent statement.” Id. at 380. 2016“In determining the constitutional adequacy of a suspect’s waiver of the Miranda rights,” we consider “the totality of the warnings.” Id. “[I]f the warnings, viewed in the totality, in any way misstate the suspect’s rights to silence and counsel, or mislead or confuse the suspect with respect to those rights, then the warnings are constitutionally infirm, rendering the purported waiver of those rights constitutionally defective and requiring suppression of any subsequent statement.” Id. at 380, 993 A.2d 25 . | 1 | 3 |
Beck v. Mangelsgreen2 sentences2002Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370 ; West v. State, 124 Md.App. 147, 157 , 720 A.2d 1253 (1998), cert. denied, 353 Md. 270 , 725 A.2d 1068 (1999). 1998Id. at 596-97, 655 A.2d at 377-78 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Hillard v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 161 (2011) (citing Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153 (1979) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 161 (2011) (citing Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153 (1979) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Rush v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda , rights have been waived.” (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, “[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an *380 attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205 , 109 S.Ct. at 2881 , 2010See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda , rights have been waived.” (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, “[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an *380 attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205 , 109 S.Ct. at 2881 , | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Powellgreen2 sentences2010See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda , rights have been waived.” (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, “[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an *380 attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205 , 109 S.Ct. at 2881 , 2010See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda , rights have been waived.” (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, “[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an *380 attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205 , 109 S.Ct. at 2881 , | 1 | 1 |
Duckworth v. Eagangreen2 sentences2010See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda , rights have been waived.” (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, “[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an *380 attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205 , 109 S.Ct. at 2881 , 2010See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda , rights have been waived.” (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, “[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an *380 attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205 , 109 S.Ct. at 2881 , | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1980We conclude that the totality of these factors, occurring as they did within a minimal time and space stricture, could well create in the mind of a cautious police officer a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot; consequently the investigatory stop of the petitioner was warranted under the Terry decision. [5] We are guided in this *605 determination by the complexity of "the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets [where] the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess." 1980We conclude that the totality of these factors, occurring as they did within a minimal time and space stricture, could well create in the mind of a cautious police officer a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot; consequently the investigatory stop of the petitioner was warranted under the Terry decision. 5 We are guided in this determination by the complexity of "the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets [where] the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess.” Terry v | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Stephen A. Knox
green
2 sentences2023Although none of these factors is alone dispositive, the totality of these factors lead us to conclude that the minor subjects were engaged in conduct—namely, the exhibition of their genitals or pubic area—which would appeal to the lascivious interest of an audience of pedophiles. 32 F.3d at 747 . 2023Although none of these factors is alone dispositive, the totality of these factors lead us to conclude that the minor subjects were engaged in conduct—namely, the exhibition of their genitals or pubic area—which would appeal to the lascivious interest of an audience of pedophiles. 32 F.3d at 747 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Perez v. State
green
1 sentence2020(Emphasis supplied.) All the court got by way of answer from the State was Perez v. State, 155 Md.App. 1 (2004), holding that the satisfaction of the prompt presentment rule is an important factor but only one of the totality of factors involved in assessing Maryland’s common law voluntariness requirement. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Luckett
green
1 sentence2016“In determining the constitutional adequacy of a suspect’s waiver of the Miranda rights,” we consider “the totality of the warnings.” Id. “[I]f the warnings, viewed in the totality, in any way misstate the suspect’s rights to silence and counsel, or mislead or confuse the suspect with respect to those rights, then the warnings are constitutionally infirm, rendering the purported waiver of those rights constitutionally defective and requiring suppression of any subsequent statement.” Id. at 380, 993 A.2d 25 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hof v. State
green
1 sentence2002Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370 ; West v. State, 124 Md.App. 147, 157 , 720 A.2d 1253 (1998), cert. denied, 353 Md. 270 , 725 A.2d 1068 (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
West v. State
green
2 sentences2002Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370 ; West v. State, 124 Md.App. 147, 157 , 720 A.2d 1253 (1998), cert. denied, 353 Md. 270 , 725 A.2d 1068 (1999). 2002Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370 ; West v. State, 124 Md.App. 147, 157 , 720 A.2d 1253 (1998), cert. denied, 353 Md. 270 , 725 A.2d 1068 (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Gullings
green
2 sentences1987E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173 , 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970. . 1987E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173 , 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970. . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lodowski v. State
yellow
2 sentences1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). 1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1987E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173 , 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970. . 1987E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173 , 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970. . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lodowski v. State
green
2 sentences1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). 1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Green v. West Virginia Department of Human Services
green
2 sentences1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). 1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Fitzgerald v. City of Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). 1987Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 671 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 , on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
O'NEIL v. State
green
2 sentences1987E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173 , 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970. . 1987E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173 , 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970. . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1987NOTES [*] COUCH, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Some courts apply the totality standard, but apparently do not include access to parents as a factor. 1987NOTES [*] COUCH, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Some courts apply the totality standard, but apparently do not include access to parents as a factor. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Fare v. Michael C.
green
2 sentences1987Indeed, while Fare rejected the notion that a request for a probation officer was a per se invocation of Miranda rights, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that under a totality analysis a juvenile’s request for a parent may constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent. 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. at 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 213 . 1987Indeed, while Fare rejected the notion that a request for a probation officer was a per se invocation of Miranda rights, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that under a totality analysis a juvenile’s request for a parent may constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent. 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. at 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 213 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Bailey v. Woel
green
2 sentences1986The proper action for a circuit court to take when such a claim is filed is to dismiss the claim.” Bailey, 302 Md. at 45 , 485 A.2d at 268 . 1986The proper action for a circuit court to take when such a claim is filed is to dismiss the claim.” Bailey, 302 Md. at 45 , 485 A.2d at 268 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Adams v. Williams
green
2 sentences1980"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L. 1980"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.