totality factors in California

2013Not only does the spousal support order cut against the express grain of subdivision (l) [Greg is already self-supporting], it is also impliedly inconsistent with subdivisions (d) [Greg has no need]; (e) [Greg has plenty of assets for his own support]; (g) [Greg has plenty of ability to engage in his own employment]; and (h) [Greg is in good health and is in the prime of life].) It is pretty clear from an examination of the totality of factors enumerated by the Legislature in section 4320 that spousal support was meant for ex-spouses like the one in Rosan, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d 885 [reversing s

2013Not only does the spousal support order cut against the express grain of subdivision (l) [Greg is already self-supporting], it is also impliedly inconsistent with subdivisions (d) [Greg has no need]; (e) [Greg has plenty of assets for his own support]; (g) [Greg has plenty of ability to engage in his own employment]; and (h) [Greg is in good health and is in the prime of life].) It is pretty clear from an examination of the totality of factors enumerated by the Legislature in section 4320 that spousal support was meant for ex-spouses like the one in Rosan, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d 885 [reversing s

2013(In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853 .) Father did not offer her any significant benefits.

2013(In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853 .) Father did not visit the children and he did not offer them any significant benefits.

2024He asserted that under Proposition 57, the court must consider the five statutory criteria and “engage in a totality analysis when determining the issue of transfer.” Notwithstanding his argument below, M.P. contends this court should exercise its discretion to address the issue because it “raises a pure and important question of law” related to a statute that “has recently changed and is still being interpreted.” 6 All further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 22 An appellate court will ordinarily not consider a matter raised for the first time on appeal, alth

2024He asserted that under Proposition 57, the court must consider the five statutory criteria and “engage in a totality analysis when determining the issue of transfer.” Notwithstanding his argument below, M.P. contends this court should exercise its discretion to address the issue because it “raises a pure and important question of law” related to a statute that “has recently changed and is still being interpreted.” 6 All further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 22 An appellate court will ordinarily not consider a matter raised for the first time on appeal, alth

2024Officer Cumberland testified that the reaching movement toward something made him nervous, given that it “could [have been] a weapon.” And in that regard, “due weight” 5 must be given to the “reasonable inferences [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043 .) The totality of these factors provided reasonable suspicion for the officers to expand the scope of their investigation.

2015(Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 .) B.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.‖]; United States v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (Wash. 2010) 229 P.3d 752, 757 ; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861 , 867–868; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today‘s opinion restates and does not disavow this court‘s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson‘s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.”]; U.S. v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (2010) 168 Wn.2d 645 [ 229 P.3d 752, 757 ]; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861, 867-868 ; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today’s opinion restates and does not disavow this court’s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson’s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.”]; U.S. v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (2010) 168 Wn.2d 645 [ 229 P.3d 752, 757 ]; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861, 867-868 ; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today’s opinion restates and does not disavow this court’s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson’s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.‖]; United States v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (Wash. 2010) 229 P.3d 752, 757 ; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861 , 867–868; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today‘s opinion restates and does not disavow this court‘s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson‘s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.”]; U.S. v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (2010) 168 Wn.2d 645 [ 229 P.3d 752, 757 ]; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861, 867-868 ; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today’s opinion restates and does not disavow this court’s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson’s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.‖]; United States v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (Wash. 2010) 229 P.3d 752, 757 ; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861 , 867–868; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today‘s opinion restates and does not disavow this court‘s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson‘s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.”]; U.S. v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (2010) 168 Wn.2d 645 [ 229 P.3d 752, 757 ]; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861, 867-868 ; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today’s opinion restates and does not disavow this court’s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson’s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.‖]; United States v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (Wash. 2010) 229 P.3d 752, 757 ; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861 , 867–868; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today‘s opinion restates and does not disavow this court‘s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson‘s first step.

2013Although the two African-Americans struck by the prosecution testified that they had been crime victims, so too did at least four non-African-Americans who ultimately served as jurors.”]; U.S. v. Hughes (8th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 101, 103 ; State v. Rhone (2010) 168 Wn.2d 645 [ 229 P.3d 752, 757 ]; Keeton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) 749 S.W.2d 861, 867-868 ; Ex parte Branch (Ala. 1987) 526 So.2d 609, 623 .) As noted, today’s opinion restates and does not disavow this court’s prohibition on comparative juror analysis at Batson’s first step.

2008(Portillo v. Aiassa, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134 .) Instead, we must examine the totality of the factors “set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ],” that are pertinent to determination of the scope of respondent’s duty.

2008(Portillo v. Aiassa, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134 .) Instead, we must examine the totality of the factors “set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ],” that are pertinent to determination of the scope of respondent’s duty.

2008(Portillo v. Aiassa, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134 .) Instead, we must examine the totality of the factors “set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ],” that are pertinent to determination of the scope of respondent’s duty.

2000Eighth, there is nothing in defendant's situation that suggests the disadvantageous change of position required for estoppel. ( City of Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, at p. 488, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 .) The totality of these factors convinces us that defendant's objections lack the force to overturn the restitution order on these grounds.

2000Eighth, there is nothing in defendant's situation that suggests the disadvantageous change of position required for estoppel. ( City of Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, at p. 488, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 .) The totality of these factors convinces us that defendant's objections lack the force to overturn the restitution order on these grounds.

1993We note Metropolitan stated (in apparent dictum) that the “presence or absence of insurance risk on the part of the employers is not alone determinative of Metropolitan's tax liability.” (Metropolitan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 656 .) We therefore clarify that our ultimate conclusion that Prudential is entitled to a refund does not turn on this factor alone but on the totality of factors we have discussed.

1988Thereafter, the People argue, defense counsel's remarks clearly anticipated a mistrial might well be granted, requesting further polling of the jurors "if the court grants a mistrial" and phrasing argument in terms of the court's judicial power "after the court declares a mistrial." The People conclude the totality of this defense conduct clearly justified the court "in believing that an order of mistrial was consented to." ( People v. Kelly, supra, 132 Cal. App. at p. 123 .) However, the circumstances upon which the People rely closely parallel those present in People v. Compton, supra, 6 Cal

1988Thereafter, the People argue, defense counsel’s remarks clearly anticipated a mistrial might well be granted, requesting further polling of the jurors “if the court grants a mistrial” and phrasing argument in terms of the court’s judicial power “after the court declares a mistrial.” The People conclude the totality of this defense conduct clearly justified the court “in believing that an order of mistrial was consented to.” (People v. Kelly, supra, 132 Cal.App. at p. 123 .) However, the circumstances upon which the People rely closely parallel those present in People v. Compton, supra, 6 Cal.3

1988Thereafter, the People argue, defense counsel's remarks clearly anticipated a mistrial might well be granted, requesting further polling of the jurors "if the court grants a mistrial" and phrasing argument in terms of the court's judicial power "after the court declares a mistrial." The People conclude the totality of this defense conduct clearly justified the court "in believing that an order of mistrial was consented to." ( People v. Kelly, supra, 132 Cal. App. at p. 123 .) However, the circumstances upon which the People rely closely parallel those present in People v. Compton, supra, 6 Cal

1988Thereafter, the People argue, defense counsel’s remarks clearly anticipated a mistrial might well be granted, requesting further polling of the jurors “if the court grants a mistrial” and phrasing argument in terms of the court’s judicial power “after the court declares a mistrial.” The People conclude the totality of this defense conduct clearly justified the court “in believing that an order of mistrial was consented to.” (People v. Kelly, supra, 132 Cal.App. at p. 123 .) However, the circumstances upon which the People rely closely parallel those present in People v. Compton, supra, 6 Cal.3

1977Rather, the totality of factors compels us to hold that the contents of the patent application were communicated “under conditions . . . impliedly precluding [their] dedication to the public” (Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., supra [ 134 F. atp. 324 ]).