national standard in Texas

1987Acknowledging the diversity of the fifty states, the Miller court rejected as futile any attempt to formulate a national standard for jurors to use in considering whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would consider certain materials "prurient." Id. at 30 .

1987Acknowledging the diversity of the fifty states, the Miller court rejected as futile any attempt to formulate a national standard for jurors to use in considering whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would consider certain materials “prurient.” Id. at 30 .

2023See 40 C.F.R. § 51.160 (a)(2) (requiring procedures for determining whether construction or modification of facilities interferes with attainment of NAAQS); Luminant, 675 F.3d at 921-22 .

2015Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), this Court announced a similarly motivated rule as a minimal national requirement without suggesting that the text of the Federal Constitution required the precise measures the Court’s opinion set forth.

2010Id.

2010In all criminal trials, state and federal, the government must produce “sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of the facts to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 17 The Court explicitly rejected the “no evidence” standard 13 See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 424-26 (Cochran, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence in Texas). 14 Id. 15 Id. at 426 (collecting and discussing Texas criminal cases from 1841 forward and concluding, “Until Clewis in 1996, this Court had consistently used a single standard (although the precise phrasing varied) a

2010In all criminal trials, state and federal, the government must produce “sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of the facts to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 17 The Court explicitly rejected the “no evidence” standard 13 See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 424-26 (Cochran, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence in Texas). 14 Id. 15 Id. at 426 (collecting and discussing Texas criminal cases from 1841 forward and concluding, “Until Clewis in 1996, this Court had consistently used a single standard (although the precise phrasing varied) a

1999National did not purchase the plaintiffs claim, nor did it stand in the “unusual posture as surrogate plaintiff, co-defendant and cross-plaintiff.” See Beech Aircraft, 739 S.W.2d at 22 . *266 Likewise, Stewart bears little resemblance to the present case.

1997Id.

1997Id. at 634 .

1993By holding that National’s explanation failed to meet the standard for reasonableness in Rule 54(c), the court of appeals misapplied legal principles, and at that level committed an abuse of discretion. 4 In Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1989), we defined “reasonably explaining” in the context of Tex.R.App.P. 41(a) as follows: In Meshwert [Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383 (1977) ], we defined the phrase “reasonably explaining,” to mean “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [required] period was not deliberate or intentiona

1993By holding that National's explanation failed to meet the standard for reasonableness in Rule 54(c), the court of appeals misapplied legal principles, and at that level committed an abuse of discretion. [4] In Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1989), we defined "reasonably explaining" in the context of Tex.R.App.P. 41(a) as follows: In Meshwert [ Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383 (1977)], we defined the phrase "reasonably explaining," to mean "any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [required] period was not deliberate or intentio

1993In its opinion withdrawing its original order, the court of appeals held that National’s motion was deficient because it “failed to reasonably explain the need for an extension of time for the late filing of the statement of facts in this case.” 852 S.W.2d at 2 .

1993In its opinion withdrawing its original order, the court of appeals held that National's motion was deficient because it "failed to *60 reasonably explain the need for an extension of time for the late filing of the statement of facts in this case." 852 S.W.2d at 2 .

1993By holding that National’s explanation failed to meet the standard for reasonableness in Rule 54(c), the court of appeals misapplied legal principles, and at that level committed an abuse of discretion. 4 In Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1989), we defined “reasonably explaining” in the context of Tex.R.App.P. 41(a) as follows: In Meshwert [Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383 (1977) ], we defined the phrase “reasonably explaining,” to mean “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [required] period was not deliberate or intentiona

1993By holding that National's explanation failed to meet the standard for reasonableness in Rule 54(c), the court of appeals misapplied legal principles, and at that level committed an abuse of discretion. [4] In Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1989), we defined "reasonably explaining" in the context of Tex.R.App.P. 41(a) as follows: In Meshwert [ Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383 (1977)], we defined the phrase "reasonably explaining," to mean "any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [required] period was not deliberate or intentio

1992Fort Worth Lloyds, 246 S.W.2d at 868 ; Phennel, 789 S.W.2d at 615 ; City of Houston v. Turin City Fire Ins.

1992Fort Worth Lloyds, 246 S.W.2d at 868 ; Phennel, 789 S.W.2d at 615 ; City of Houston v. Twin City Fire Ins.

1992Fort Worth Lloyds, 246 S.W.2d at 868 ; Phennel, 789 S.W.2d at 615 ; City of Houston v. Turin City Fire Ins.

1992Fort Worth Lloyds, 246 S.W.2d at 868 ; Phennel, 789 S.W.2d at 615 ; City of Houston v. Twin City Fire Ins.

1992Yeary, 307 S.W.2d at 332 .

1992Yeary, 307 S.W.2d at 332 .

1992See McClennahan v. First Gibraltar Bank, F.S.B., 791 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1990, no writ); Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ) (Mother Hubbard clause in summary judgment does not dispose of claims not presented in motion); but see Cockrell v. Central Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 788 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, no writ). [1] To bolster its conclusion that the alleged ambiguity in the order transforms National's claim from a derivative action to an affirmative cross action, the majority relies on two summary judgment cases from this Court.