national standard in Connecticut

1976The trial of this case took place before 53a-193 was amended to specify that in applying "community standards, the state of Connecticut is deemed to be the community," 1 but after the national standard test established in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , had been eradicated by Miller I.

1976The trial of this case took place before § 53a-193 was amended to specify that in applying “community standards, the state of Connecticut is deemed to be the community,” 1 but after the national standard test established in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , had been eradicated by Miller I.

2015I take no position on the Geisler question, but assume for purposes of this opinion only that, even if the majority is correct that contemporary standards of decency, standing alone, are dispositive of the question of whether the death penalty is constitutional in this state, the majority has failed to establish that this state has categorically rejected the death penalty. 15 See Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 , 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (‘‘[t]he ‘standard of decency’ that is relevant to the interpretation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Georgia [c]onstituti

2015I take no position on the Geisler question, but assume for purposes of this opinion only that, even if the majority is correct that contemporary standards of decency, standing alone, are dispositive of the question of whether the death penalty is constitutional in this state, the majority has failed to establish that this state has categorically rejected the death penalty. 15 See Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 , 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (‘‘[t]he ‘standard of decency’ that is relevant to the interpretation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Georgia [c]onstituti

1975State v. Onorato, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 438 .

1975State v. Onorato, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 438 .

1975Similarly, after certain requirements that the material be utterly lacking in social value and that a national standard rather than a community standard be used were imposed in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 , and in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , the statute was viewed as encompassing those modifications of the Roth tests.

1975Similarly, after certain requirements that the material he utterly lacking in social value and that a national standard rather than a community standard he used were imposed in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 , and in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , the statute was viewed as encompassing those modifications of the Roth tests.

2015Cf. Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 , 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (‘‘[t]he standard of decency that is relevant to the inter- pretation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Georgia [c]onstitution is the standard of the people of Georgia, not the national standard’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 661 , 664–65, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) (holding that death penalty violated state constitution on basis of contemporary standards of decency in Massachusetts);36 J.

2015Cf. Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 , 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (‘‘[t]he standard of decency that is relevant to the inter- pretation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Georgia [c]onstitution is the standard of the people of Georgia, not the national standard’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 661 , 664–65, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) (holding that death penalty violated state constitution on basis of contemporary standards of decency in Massachusetts);36 J.

2014See General Statutes § 52-184c (a); Smith v. Andrews, 289 Conn. 61, 69 , 959 A.2d 597 (2008) (Connecticut follows national standard of care).

2014See General Statutes § 52-184c (a); Smith v. Andrews, 289 Conn. 61, 69 , 959 A.2d 597 (2008) (Connecticut follows national standard of care).

2008These interrogatories make clear that the jury did not resolve: (1) whether National provided Hartford with timely notice-including the actual timing of the notice; (2) the type of notice required under the terms of the policy; (3) whether the notice provided was sufficient; (4) whether the delay in notification was reasonable; and (5) whether Hartford suffered any prejudice as a result of late notice. [11] It is unclear from the record precisely when in August Effley began working on National's claim, or the extent of the work that he performed on the claim during that month. [1] It is true,

2008These interrogatories make clear that the jury did not resolve: (1) whether National provided Hartford with timely notice-including the actual timing of the notice; (2) the type of notice required under the terms of the policy; (3) whether the notice provided was sufficient; (4) whether the delay in notification was reasonable; and (5) whether Hartford suffered any prejudice as a result of late notice. [11] It is unclear from the record precisely when in August Effley began working on National's claim, or the extent of the work that he performed on the claim during that month. [1] It is true,

2004“Proper preservation of claims for appellate review requires that the trial court [be] effectively . . . alerted to a claim of potential error while there [is] still time for the court to act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Technologies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 31 , 807 A.2d 955 (2002).

2004“Proper preservation of claims for appellate review requires that the trial court [be] effectively . . . alerted to a claim of potential error while there [is] still time for the court to act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Technologies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 31 , 807 A.2d 955 (2002).

2003Subsection (b) of § 52-184c applies only to a “defendant health care provider [who] is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist . . . .” (Emphasis added.) At the time § 52-184c was enacted, this court had, because of the increasing national uniformity in physicians’ “educational background and training,” moved from the statewide standard of care, which was reaffirmed in Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 617 , 356 A.2d 887 (1975), to a national standard, free of g

2003Subsection (b) of § 52-184c applies only to a “defendant health care provider [who] is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist . . . .” (Emphasis added.) At the time § 52-184c was enacted, this court had, because of the increasing national uniformity in physicians’ “educational background and training,” moved from the statewide standard of care, which was reaffirmed in Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 617 , 356 A.2d 887 (1975), to a national standard, free of g

2002In Pedevillano v. Bryon , 231 Conn. 265 , 268 , 648 A.2d 873 (1994), the court rejected an attempt to hold a leasing company liable when the driver of the leased vehicle was an unauthorized driver stating, "We have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability, as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further

2002In Pedevillano v. Bryon , 231 Conn. 265 , 268 , 648 A.2d 873 (1994), the court rejected an attempt to hold a leasing company liable when the driver of the leased vehicle was an unauthorized driver stating, "We have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability, as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further

2002DISCUSSION "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998).

2002DISCUSSION "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998).

1999"It is well established that [i]n ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Town of Branford, 247 Conn. 407 , 411 , 722 A.2d 271 (1999).

1999"It is well established that [i]n ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Town of Branford, 247 Conn. 407 , 411 , 722 A.2d 271 (1999).

1997Inc., 205 Conn. 694 , 535 A.2d 357 (1988).

1997Inc., 205 Conn. 694 , 535 A.2d 357 (1988).

1975After the decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, it was amended to specify a community standard, as was permitted by that decision which overruled Jacobellis in that respect.

1965“Hence we reaffirm the principle that, in ‘obscenity’ cases as in all others involving rights derived from the First Amendment guarantees of free expression, this Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 190 . “‘The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and . . . raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked e