23 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Seattle v. Mesianigreen2 sentences2008See City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454 , 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (finding statistical probability that sobriety checkpoints will intercept drug-impaired motorists inadequate to justify suspicionless investigative stops). ¶53 If drug use does not result in observable manifestations that adversely impact the school’s ability to provide a safe, orderly environment, the school’s interest in detecting drug use does not justify nonconsensual drug testing. 22 On the other hand, if drug use is an actual problem, school officials likely will have the individualized suspicion necessary to re 2008See City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454 , 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (finding statistical probability that sobriety checkpoints will intercept drug-impaired motorists inadequate to justify suspicionless investigative stops). ¶53 If drug use does not result in observable manifestations that adversely impact the school’s ability to provide a safe, orderly environment, the school’s interest in detecting drug use does not justify nonconsensual drug testing. 22 On the other hand, if drug use is an actual problem, school officials likely will have the individualized suspicion necessary to re | 2 | 2 |
State v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2008See McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d at 81 , 558 P.2d 781 . 2008See McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d at 81 . | 2 | 2 |
Frank Hoffman, Etc. v. City of Warwick, Renauld Langlois, Etc. v. City of East Providencegreen2 sentences1997Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 618 (1st Cir. 1990). 1997Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 618 (1st Cir.1990). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Atengreen2 sentences2021Instead, there are three specific requirements for establishing corpus delicti in possession with intent cases in Washington: (1) “the evidence must independently corroborate, or confirm, a defendant’s incriminating statement,” (2) the independent evidence “‘must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a[] hypothesis of innocence,’” and (3) the evidence must corroborate “not just a crime but the specific crime with which the defendant has been charged.” Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328-29 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 660 ). 2006Prima facie corroboration of a defendant’s incriminating statement exists if the independent evidence supports a “ ‘logical and reasonable inference’ of the facts sought to be proved.” Id. (quoting Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d at 796 ). ¶30 Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule used by federal courts. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Brockobgreen2 sentences2021In Cardenas-Flores, the Supreme Court also reiterated that Washington has rejected a more relaxed “trustworthiness” standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court and a majority of other states, which considers whether there is evidence supporting the trustworthiness of the defendant’s incriminating statements. 189 Wn.2d at 258. “‘Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule.’” Id. (quoting Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328 ). 2017"Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule." Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328 . | 1 | 4 |
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshallgreen2 sentences1999Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). 1999Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
Corr v. Willamette Industries, Inc.green2 sentences1994See Corr, 105 Wn.2d at 220 (refusing, in a products liability case, to hold an otherwise immune employer liable in the capacity of manufacturer); Spencer v. Seattle, 104 Wn.2d 30 , 700 P.2d 742 (1985) (expressly rejecting dual capacity and holding that the City, in its capacity as employer, was immune from suit, regardless of separate duties it owed to its employee in the capacity of a municipality). 1994See Corr, 105 Wn.2d at 220 (refusing, in a products liability case, to hold an otherwise immune employer liable in the capacity of manufacturer); Spencer v. Seattle, 104 Wn.2d 30 , 700 P.2d 742 (1985) (expressly rejecting dual capacity and holding that the City, in its capacity as employer, was immune from suit, regardless of separate duties it owed to its employee in the capacity of a municipality). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2018The trial court here reviewed each proposed, newly disclosed Microsoft PowerPoint slide and excluded some based on relevancy because some individual ^ "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . .. not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S. Ct. 2954 , 57 L. 2018The trial court here reviewed each proposed, newly disclosed Microsoft PowerPoint slide and excluded some based on relevancy because some individual ^ "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . .. not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S. Ct. 2954 , 57 L. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Vangerpen
green
2 sentences2007Prima facie corroboration of a defendant's incriminating statement exists if the independent evidence supports a "`logical and reasonable inference' of the facts sought to be proved." Id. at 656, 927 P.2d 210 (quoting Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 796 , 888 P.2d 1177 ). ¶ 30 Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule used by federal courts. 2007Prima facie corroboration of a defendant's incriminating statement exists if the independent evidence supports a "`logical and reasonable inference' of the facts sought to be proved." Id. at 656, 927 P.2d 210 (quoting Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 796 , 888 P.2d 1177 ). ¶ 30 Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule used by federal courts. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
State v. Aten
green
2 sentences2007Prima facie corroboration of a defendant's incriminating statement exists if the independent evidence supports a "`logical and reasonable inference' of the facts sought to be proved." Id. at 656, 927 P.2d 210 (quoting Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 796 , 888 P.2d 1177 ). ¶ 30 Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule used by federal courts. 2007Notably, we are among a minority of courts that has declined to adopt a more relaxed rule used by federal courts. [ Aten, 130 Wash.2d] at 662-63 [ 927 P.2d 210 ]. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Felker v. Turpin
green
2 sentences1997Although the majority relies upon statements by the United States Supreme Court in a 1963 case, more recently the Court has concluded that Congress' new restrictions on successive habeas petitions "constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice `abuse of the writ.'" [1] Felker v. Turpin, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2340 , 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (addressing Title 1 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 1997Although the majority relies upon statements by the United States Supreme Court in a 1963 case, more recently the Court has concluded that Congress' new restrictions on successive habeas petitions "constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice `abuse of the writ.'" [1] Felker v. Turpin, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2340 , 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (addressing Title 1 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill
green
1 sentence2024Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Meyer
green
2 sentences2010Instead of adopting Opper’s corroboration rule, we held: “The confession of a person charged with the commission of a crime is not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, but if there is independent proof thereof, such confession may then be considered in connection therewith and the corpus delicti established by a combination of the independent proof and the confession.” Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656 (some emphasis added) (quoting State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 763-64 , 226 P.2d 204 (1951)). 2010Instead of adopting Opper’s corroboration rule, we held: “The confession of a person charged with the commission of a crime is not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, but if there is independent proof thereof, such confession may then be considered in connection therewith and the corpus delicti established by a combination of the independent proof and the confession.” Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656 (some emphasis added) (quoting State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 763-64 , 226 P.2d 204 (1951)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Brockob
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
green
2 sentences1999Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 , 77 S.Ct. 443 , 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957): "Under [the FELA] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." The Supreme Court undoubtedly meant to refer to a "breach of a duty owed by the employer to the employee," rather than "employer negligence." As the Supreme Court itself later observed, this statement does not speak of a relaxed standard of negligence, but rather a relaxed standard of causation. 1999Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 , 77 S.Ct. 443 , 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957): "Under [the FELA] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." The Supreme Court undoubtedly meant to refer to a "breach of a duty owed by the employer to the employee," rather than "employer negligence." As the Supreme Court itself later observed, this statement does not speak of a relaxed standard of negligence, but rather a relaxed standard of causation. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lena Mullahon, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Chiquito, Deceased v. Union Pacific Railroad, a Utah Corporation
green
1 sentence1996"This relaxed standard applies to both negligence and causation determinations.” Mullahon, 64 F.3d at 1364 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Spencer v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1994See Corr, 105 Wn.2d at 220 (refusing, in a products liability case, to hold an otherwise immune employer liable in the capacity of manufacturer); Spencer v. Seattle, 104 Wn.2d 30 , 700 P.2d 742 (1985) (expressly rejecting dual capacity and holding that the City, in its capacity as employer, was immune from suit, regardless of separate duties it owed to its employee in the capacity of a municipality). 1994See Corr, 105 Wn.2d at 220 (refusing, in a products liability case, to hold an otherwise immune employer liable in the capacity of manufacturer); Spencer v. Seattle, 104 Wn.2d 30 , 700 P.2d 742 (1985) (expressly rejecting dual capacity and holding that the City, in its capacity as employer, was immune from suit, regardless of separate duties it owed to its employee in the capacity of a municipality). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.