relaxed standard in Maryland

2020“The stronger the facts are to show that an injury ‘arose out of employment’ the more relaxed the requirement that the injury be shown to be ‘in the course of employment’ and vice versa.” Id. a.

2015A fiduciary relationship, “by its nature, gives the confiding party the right to relax his or her vigilance to a certain extent and rely on both the good faith of the other party and that party’s duty to disclose all material facts.” Id. at 99 , 756 A.2d at 975 . 20 Nevertheless, we need not explore the application of this relaxed standard — the “fiduciary rule” — because there is no evidence that Petitioners and Borrowers were ever in a fiduciary relationship.

2015A fiduciary relationship, “by its nature, gives the confiding party the right to relax his or her vigilance to a certain extent and rely on both the good faith of the other party and that party’s duty to disclose all material facts.” Id. at 99 , 756 A.2d at 975 . 20 Nevertheless, we need not explore the application of this relaxed standard — the “fiduciary rule” — because there is no evidence that Petitioners and Borrowers were ever in a fiduciary relationship.

2011McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2636; Miller, 159 Md.App. at 135 , 858 A.2d 1025 (“A FELA suit can be successfully pursued by an employee only if there is proof of some negligence on the part of the railroad [but] the negligence that must be shown in a FELA action is but a pale reflection of common law negligence.”).

2011McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2636; Miller, 159 Md.App. at 135 , 858 A.2d 1025 (“A FELA suit can be successfully pursued by an employee only if there is proof of some negligence on the part of the railroad [but] the negligence that must be shown in a FELA action is but a pale reflection of common law negligence.”).

2007The Court relied on Hendrickson v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Md. 577 , 95 A. 153 , supra. That case also did not concern a negligence claim; the issue, nuisance, involved allegations related “to the prospective installation of a large tank, for the storage of inflammable and explosive oils, in immediate proximity to the plaintiffs houses.” Hendrickson, 126 Md. at 588 , 95 A. at 158 .

2007The Court relied on Hendrickson v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Md. 577 , 95 A. 153 , supra. That case also did not concern a negligence claim; the issue, nuisance, involved allegations related “to the prospective installation of a large tank, for the storage of inflammable and explosive oils, in immediate proximity to the plaintiffs houses.” Hendrickson, 126 Md. at 588 , 95 A. at 158 .

2005Rather, the admission of more rather than less evidence during the penalty phase increases reliability by providing full and complete information about the defendant and allowing for an individualized inquiry into the appropriate sentence for the offense.” United States v. Lee, supra, 374 F.3d at 648 .

2005Rather, the admission of more rather than less evidence during the penalty phase increases reliability by providing full and complete information about the defendant and allowing for an individualized inquiry into the appropriate sentence for the offense." United States v. Lee, supra, 374 F.3d at 648 .

1997Id. (emphasis added).

1997Id. (emphasis added).

1995The Court explained that the relaxed standard “encourages the development of shared ownership housing—generally a less costly alternative to single-dwelling ownership—by attracting buyers who prefer a stable, planned environment” and “also protects buyers who have paid a premium for condominium units in reliance on a particular restrictive scheme.” Id.

1994Because the two standards overlap so completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the mind-boggling concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant. 468 U.S. at 958-59 , 104 S.Ct. at 3444-45 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 721-722 .

1994Because the two standards overlap so completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the mind-boggling concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant. 468 U.S. at 958-59 , 104 S.Ct. at 3444-45 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 721-722 .

1975Cf. Gertz v. Welch, Inc., [418] U. S. [323], 94 S. Ct. 1997 , 41 L.

1975Cf. Gertz v. Welch, Inc., [418] U. S. [323], 94 S. Ct. 1997 , 41 L.

1966Rev. 105 (1963), and Beall v. Montgomery County, supra. Chatham comes closer to the real points in the case in its arguments, made largely in oral presentation of its case, (a) that a more liberal and relaxed standard of what is change should apply in determining applications to rezone from lower to higher residential densities than in rezoning from residential to commercial or industrial uses, and that under these relaxed and liberal standards there was sufficient evidence of change to sustain the Commissioners’ second action; and (b) that the difference between the- conditions of the first a

1966Rev. 105 (1963), and Beall v. Montgomery County, supra. Chatham comes closer to the real points in the case in its arguments, made largely in oral presentation of its case, (a) that a more liberal and relaxed standard of what is change should apply in determining applications to rezone from lower to higher residential densities than in rezoning from residential to commercial or industrial uses, and that under these relaxed and liberal standards there was sufficient evidence of change to sustain the Commissioners’ second action; and (b) that the difference between the- conditions of the first a

1966Rev. 105 (1963), and Beall v. Montgomery County, supra. Chatham comes closer to the real points in the case in its arguments, made largely in oral presentation of its case, (a) that a more liberal and relaxed standard of what is change should apply in determining applications to rezone from lower to higher residential densities than in rezoning from residential to commercial or industrial uses, and that under these relaxed and liberal standards there was sufficient evidence of change to sustain the Commissioners’ second action; and (b) that the difference between the- conditions of the first a

1966Rev. 105 (1963), and Beall v. Montgomery County, supra. Chatham comes closer to the real points in the case in its arguments, made largely in oral presentation of its case, (a) that a more liberal and relaxed standard of what is change should apply in determining applications to rezone from lower to higher residential densities than in rezoning from residential to commercial or industrial uses, and that under these relaxed and liberal standards there was sufficient evidence of change to sustain the Commissioners’ second action; and (b) that the difference between the- conditions of the first a

1966It is true .that in Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 216 Md. 442, 449 , we said that in considering whether change had occurred more liberality could be indulged in deciding whether to reclassify from one residential use to another than in a change from residential to commercial or industrial use,’ and it well may be, as Judge Macgill suggested in his first opinion, that had the Commissioners decided, on the first application that sufficient change had occurred to warrant reclassification to R-12, their action would not have been judicially overturned, but they decided there had’not been suffic

1928But this we need not decide, when a like decision may be reached under the relaxed rule applied in International Harvester Co. v. Neuhauser, supra; Wisner v. Reeside, supra; Phillips v. Taylor, supra; Automobile Brokerage Corporation v. Myers, supra; Keiner v. Commerce Trust Co., supra. There are, we think, strong equitable circumstances in this, case in support of the relief sought by the appellee.