relaxed standard in Utah

2021P. 9(c) (requiring ―fraud‖ and ―mistake‖ claims to be pled with particularity). 40 2012 UT 36 . 41 Apotex, 2012 UT 36, ¶ 27 (citation omitted). 42 Id. 15 SUWA v. SAN JUAN COUNTY Opinion of the Court that lead to a strong inference‖ that a statutory violation occurred.43 ¶43 In this case, we similarly set forth a relaxed standard for claims arising under Utah‘s Open and Public Meetings Act.44 In so doing, we note that it is likely that almost all cases seeking to enforce the Act will have arisen because the plaintiff was prevented from knowing what took place at a meeting allegedly governed by

2021P. 9(c) (requiring ―fraud‖ and ―mistake‖ claims to be pled with particularity). 40 2012 UT 36 . 41 Apotex, 2012 UT 36, ¶ 27 (citation omitted). 42 Id. 15 SUWA v. SAN JUAN COUNTY Opinion of the Court that lead to a strong inference‖ that a statutory violation occurred.43 ¶43 In this case, we similarly set forth a relaxed standard for claims arising under Utah‘s Open and Public Meetings Act.44 In so doing, we note that it is likely that almost all cases seeking to enforce the Act will have arisen because the plaintiff was prevented from knowing what took place at a meeting allegedly governed by

2016On appeal, Mother argues that by filing a petition alleging a material and substantial change of circumstances, Father waived any claim that such a change had not occurred. 'We agree. 121 Under the invited-error doe-trine, "a litigant may not induce the trial court to make a ruling and then argue on appeal that the ruling was in error." Kerr v. Salt Lake City, 2013 UT 75, ¶ 44 , 322 P.3d 669 .

2016On appeal, Mother argues that by filing a petition alleging a material and substantial change of circumstances, Father waived any claim that such a change had not occurred. 'We agree. 121 Under the invited-error doe-trine, "a litigant may not induce the trial court to make a ruling and then argue on appeal that the ruling was in error." Kerr v. Salt Lake City, 2013 UT 75, ¶ 44 , 322 P.3d 669 .

2012As discussed above, the "who, what, when, where, and how" standard is not a "straitjacket" for applying rule 9(b), Kanneganti, 565 F.3d at 190 , and the relaxed standard adopted in this opinion is more appropriate in cireumstances of alleged widespread fraud and false claims. 1 34 We do agree with some of the district court's observations, however.

2009For example, we held in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. that a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA." (citation omitted)). 31 . 549 U.S. 158 , 127 S.Ct. 799 , 166 L.Ed.2d 638 (2007). 32 .

2009For example, we held in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. that a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA." (citation omitted)). 31 . 549 U.S. 158 , 127 S.Ct. 799 , 166 L.Ed.2d 638 (2007). 32 .

1981United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

1981United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

1981In addressing this issue, we note that a more relaxed standard governs the type of evidence that may be used to establish a finding of probable cause in an affidavit than governs the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), and magistrates are not confined by strict evi-dentiary rules or restrictions on the use of common sense in finding probable cause within an affidavit.

1981In addressing this issue, we note that a more relaxed standard governs the type of evidence that may be used to establish a finding of probable cause in an affidavit than governs the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), and magistrates are not confined by strict evi-dentiary rules or restrictions on the use of common sense in finding probable cause within an affidavit.