relaxed standard in Illinois

2020In Marks, we distinguished the facts in Cohen v. Wood Brothers Steel Stamping Co., 227 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1991), which noted the existence of two lines of cases under section 2-1401; one favoring application of a strict due diligence standard, and the other favoring a more relaxed standard in the interests of justice and fairness.

1997In Cohen v. Wood Brothers Steel Stamping Co., 227 Ill.

1991(Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104 , 529 N.E.2d at 222 .) For these reasons, a relaxed standard of compliance with Rule 604(d) can no longer be accepted.

1991(Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104 , 529 N.E.2d at 222 .) For these reasons, a relaxed standard of compliance with Rule 604(d) can no longer be accepted.

2022Id. at 562 . ¶ 39 Given these goals and the language of the statute, it has been recognized that “in comparison to tort litigation at common law, ‘a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA.’ ” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 691-92 (2011) (quoting Consolidated R.

2022Id. at 562 . ¶ 38 Given these goals and the language of the statute, it has been recognized that “in comparison to tort litigation at common law, ‘a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA.’ ” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 691-92 (2011) (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1994)).

2014Moreover, as we noted above, many courts of appeals perceived Belton to establish a relaxed rule for searches incident to arrest in all contexts. [Citations.] Because Gant foreclosed such a relaxed reading of Belton, there is no plausible reason why it should be held to do so only with respect to automobile searches, rather than in any situation where the item searched is removed from the suspect’s control between the time of the arrest and the time of the search. *** [We] read Gant as refocusing our attention on a suspect’s ability (or inability) to access weapons - 33 - or destroy evidence a

2014Moreover, as we noted above, many courts of appeals perceived Belton to establish a relaxed rule for searches incident to arrest in all contexts. [Citations.] Because Gant foreclosed such a relaxed reading of Belton, there is no plausible reason why it should be held to do so only with respect to automobile searches, rather than in any situation where the item searched is removed from the suspect’s control between the time of the arrest and the time of the search. *** [We] read Gant as refocusing our attention on a suspect’s ability (or inability) to access weapons or destroy evidence at the t

2010As a result, this court will review for plain error only." Davis, 378 Ill.

2010As a result, this court will review for plain error only.” Davis, 378 Ill.

2007Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 343 ; Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85 ; Vaughn, 354 Ill.

2007Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 343 ; Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85 .

2007Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 343 ; Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85 ; Vaughn, 354 Ill.

2007Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 343 ; Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85 .

2002If we were to lessen these requirements and interpret Rule 191(a) in conformity with the more relaxed standard established in Wilson, we would be making "summary judgment impossible whenever a party has produced an expert to support its position." Merit Motors, 569 F.2d at 673 .

2002If we were to lessen these requirements and interpret Rule 191(a) in conformity with the more relaxed standard established in Wilson, we would be making “summary judgment impossible whenever a party has produced an expert to support its position.” Merit Motors, 569 F.2d at 673 .

1997Lemons, 242 Ill.App.3d at 946 , 184 Ill.Dec. 642 , 613 N.E.2d 1234 ; see also People v. Hernandez, 283 Ill.App.3d 312, 316 , 218 Ill.

1997Lemons, 242 Ill.

2025This court agreed with a Fourth District decision that “a dispositional hearing and a best- interests hearing are functional equivalents, and as such both types of hearings ‘are subject to the same relaxed standard regarding the admission of evidence—that is, the formal rules of evidence do not apply.’ ” Id. ¶ 60 (quoting In re Jay H., 395 Ill.

2020People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 25 , 91 N.E.3d 849 . ¶ 31 The cause and prejudice test is an analytical tool used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122-3 so that a claim raised in 6 a successive petition may be considered on its merits.

2020People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 25 , 91 N.E.3d 849 . ¶ 31 The cause and prejudice test is an analytical tool used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122-3 so that a claim raised in 6 a successive petition may be considered on its merits.

2020Marks, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1053 .

2019These include cases in which previously known witnesses would have been uncooperative (see People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 102 ), police records that existed prior to trial were difficult to obtain (see People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶¶ 161-62 ), and information revealed in other legal proceedings, though public, would have required great time and effort for counsel to locate (see id.).

2012Smulik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110110, ¶ 11 . ¶ 35 E.

2011Yasmine P, 328 Ill.

2001This relaxed requirement serves the amendments' stated purpose of relieving patients of the necessity of executing multiple consent forms or specifically naming each and every program or person entitled to make disclosure of alcohol or drug treatment records." 198 Ill.2d at 260 , 261 Ill.Dec. at 716 , 764 N.E.2d at 7 . *16 Without questioning the majority's view of the 1987 amendments, one wonders whether an amendment adopted for the convenience of patients should be interpreted in such a manner as to deprive the patients of the confidentiality of records that the legislature endeavored to pro

2001This relaxed requirement serves the amendments' stated purpose of relieving patients of the necessity of executing multiple consent forms or specifically naming each and every program or person entitled to make disclosure of alcohol or drug treatment records." 198 Ill.2d at 260 , 261 Ill.Dec. at 716 , 764 N.E.2d at 7 . *16 Without questioning the majority's view of the 1987 amendments, one wonders whether an amendment adopted for the convenience of patients should be interpreted in such a manner as to deprive the patients of the confidentiality of records that the legislature endeavored to pro