relaxed standard in Ohio

2021State v. Riffle, 110 Ohio App.3d 554, 561 , 674 N.E.2d 1214 (9th Dist.1996). {¶ 50} Notably, appellant does not assert that the state’s evidence was insufficient on the force element.

2021State v. Riffle, 110 Ohio App.3d 554, 561 , 674 N.E.2d 1214 (9th Dist.1996). {¶ 50} Notably, appellant does not assert that the state’s evidence was insufficient on the force element.

2023But in 2015, in State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385 , 2015-Ohio-2459 , 38 N.E.3d 860 , the court appeared to embrace a more relaxed standard.

2023But in 2015, in State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385 , 2015-Ohio-2459 , 38 N.E.3d 860 , the court appeared to embrace a more relaxed standard.

2016State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56 , 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Riffle, 110 Ohio App.3d 554 , 674 N.E.2d 1214 (1996).

2009As long as it can be shown that the rape victim's will was overcome by fear or duress, the forcible element of rape can be established." Id. at 58-59 , quoting State v. Fowler (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 149 , 154 , 500 N.E.2d 390 , 395 . *Page 21 {¶ 63} Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court broadened the application of the relaxed standard announced in Eskridge to include a person in a position of authority over the child.

2017Additionally, "many courts of appeals perceived Belton to establish a relaxed rule for searches incident to arrest in all contexts." Id.

2017"Because Gant foreclosed such a relaxed reading of Belton , the Third Circuit concluded that there is no plausible reason why it should be held to do so only with respect to automobile searches, rather than in any situation where the item searched is removed from the suspect's control between the time of the arrest and the time of the search." Id.

2014Even under the more relaxed standard of review set forth in State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2014-Ohio-3177 , 16 N.E.3d 659 , the trial court made none of the required findings to impose consecutive terms. {¶5} Although the circumstances of this case indicated Love’s crimes deserved multiple punishments, because a review of the record supports Love’s assignment of error, it is sustained.

2014Even under the more relaxed standard of review set forth in State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2014-Ohio-3177 , 16 N.E.3d 659 , the trial court made none of the required findings to impose consecutive terms. {¶5} Although the circumstances of this case indicated Love’s crimes deserved multiple punishments, because a review of the record supports Love’s assignment of error, it is sustained.

2013Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 565 , 2011-Ohio-2258 , 949 N.E.2d 1 , ¶ 18, 27 (using “best available evidence” in the form of a bank appraisal of *193 personal property to determine allocation of asset purchase price to the personal property). {¶ 19} Applying the more relaxed standard — that a proposed allocation need only be “corroborated” — makes the proper inquiry a very different one.

2013Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 565 , 2011-Ohio-2258 , 949 N.E.2d 1 , ¶ 18, 27 (using “best available evidence” in the form of a bank appraisal of *193 personal property to determine allocation of asset purchase price to the personal property). {¶ 19} Applying the more relaxed standard — that a proposed allocation need only be “corroborated” — makes the proper inquiry a very different one.

2009As long as it can be shown that the rape victim's will was overcome by fear or duress, the forcible element of rape can be established." Id. at 58-59 , quoting State v. Fowler (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 149 , 154 , 500 N.E.2d 390 , 395 . *Page 21 {¶ 63} Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court broadened the application of the relaxed standard announced in Eskridge to include a person in a position of authority over the child.

2009As long as it can be shown that the rape victim's will was overcome by fear or duress, the forcible element of rape can be established." Id. at 58-59 , quoting State v. Fowler (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 149 , 154 , 500 N.E.2d 390 , 395 . *Page 21 {¶ 63} Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court broadened the application of the relaxed standard announced in Eskridge to include a person in a position of authority over the child.

2009State v. Dye (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 323 , 695 N.E.2d 763 , syllabus.

2009State v. Dye (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 323 , 695 N.E.2d 763 , syllabus.

2005State v. Baron, Cuyahoga App. No. 80712, 2002-Ohio-4588 , citing State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 425 , 700 N.E.2d 570 .

2005State v. Baron, Cuyahoga App. No. 80712, 2002-Ohio-4588 , citing State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 425 , 700 N.E.2d 570 .

2004Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d at 494 , 597 N.E.2d 107 . “[T]he use of nuclear DNA analysis as a forensic tool has been found to be scientifically reliable by the scientific community for more than a decade.” United States v. Beverly (C.A.6, 2004), 369 F.3d 516, 528 .

2004Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d at 494 , 597 N.E.2d 107 . “[T]he use of nuclear DNA analysis as a forensic tool has been found to be scientifically reliable by the scientific community for more than a decade.” United States v. Beverly (C.A.6, 2004), 369 F.3d 516, 528 .

2004Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d at 494 , 597 N.E.2d 107 . “[T]he use of nuclear DNA analysis as a forensic tool has been found to be scientifically reliable by the scientific community for more than a decade.” United States v. Beverly (C.A.6, 2004), 369 F.3d 516, 528 .

2001In a later case, however, this court relaxed the requirement that the separation agreement contain such specific language: "We do not construe Phillips to require that a separation agreement that specifically addresses life insurance must include the words `life insurance beneficiary' to effectuate the elimination of the former spouse as beneficiary." Lelux v. Chernick (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 6 , 12 .

1989Therefore, I stand firmly behind my dissent in Wilmoth, supra, at 267 , 22 OBR at 440, 490 N.E. 2d at 1248 , since I believe that the “good faith” exception has no legitimate place in either federal or Ohio constitutional jurisprudence.

1989Therefore, I stand firmly behind my dissent in Wilmoth, supra, at 267 , 22 OBR at 440, 490 N.E. 2d at 1248 , since I believe that the “good faith” exception has no legitimate place in either federal or Ohio constitutional jurisprudence.