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35 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kemp Ex Rel. Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Kemp, 174 N.J. at 424-25 (stating that "a theory of causation that had not yet reached general acceptance in the scientific community 'may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field'") (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. 2017Under the relaxed standard, as applicable here, the trial court assesses "the soundness of the proffered methodology and the qualifications of the expert." Kemp, supra, 174 N.J. at 426 53 A-4698-14T1 (quoting Rubanick, supra, 125 N.J. at 454 ). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Cookgreen2 sentences2014The defensive use of similar other-crimes evidence is sometimes referred to as “reverse 404(b)” evidence. *151 Under this more relaxed standard, trial courts must still determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by any of the Rule 403 factors, which are “undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury,” and “undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See Cook, supra, 179 N.J. at 567 , 847 A.2d 530 . 2014The defensive use of similar other-crimes evidence is sometimes referred to as “reverse 404(b)” evidence. *151 Under this more relaxed standard, trial courts must still determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by any of the Rule 403 factors, which are “undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury,” and “undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See Cook, supra, 179 N.J. at 567 , 847 A.2d 530 . | 2 | 3 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences1995See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S . ___, ___-___, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-97 , 125 L.Ed. 2d 469, 482-83 (1993) (federal judges must examine whether the scientific knowledge can be and has been tested, whether it has been submitted to peer review and publication, the error rate of the measuring technique and the level of acceptance in the relevant scientific community). *34 Even under the relaxed standard applicable to toxic-tort litigation, we are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in excluding Owens' testimony. 1995See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S . ___, ___-___, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-97 , 125 L.Ed. 2d 469, 482-83 (1993) (federal judges must examine whether the scientific knowledge can be and has been tested, whether it has been submitted to peer review and publication, the error rate of the measuring technique and the level of acceptance in the relevant scientific community). *34 Even under the relaxed standard applicable to toxic-tort litigation, we are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in excluding Owens' testimony. | 1 | 2 |
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp.green2 sentences2017Under the relaxed standard, as applicable here, the trial court assesses "the soundness of the proffered methodology and the qualifications of the expert." Kemp, supra, 174 N.J. at 426 53 A-4698-14T1 (quoting Rubanick, supra, 125 N.J. at 454 ). 2017Under the relaxed standard, as applicable here, the trial court assesses "the soundness of the proffered methodology and the qualifications of the expert." Kemp, supra, 174 N.J. at 426 53 A-4698-14T1 (quoting Rubanick, supra, 125 N.J. at 454 ). | 1 | 2 |
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1991Notwithstanding our more indulgent review of hospital decisions, a decision denying or revoking staff privileges merits a closer look than a decision setting the standard for the determination of those privileges. [ Id. at 249-250 , 526 A. 2d 697 , citations omitted] While neither Nanavati nor Desai dealt with rights established by the LAD, certainly the cautions expressed in Nanavati become paramount considerations in balancing the critical rights of the hospital and the equally important rights of a doctor alleging discriminatory conduct. 1991Notwithstanding our more indulgent review of hospital decisions, a decision denying or revoking staff privileges merits a closer look than a decision setting the standard for the determination of those privileges. [ Id. at 249-250 , 526 A. 2d 697 , citations omitted] While neither Nanavati nor Desai dealt with rights established by the LAD, certainly the cautions expressed in Nanavati become paramount considerations in balancing the critical rights of the hospital and the equally important rights of a doctor alleging discriminatory conduct. | 1 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2026In addressing the merits of the PCR petition, the PCR court found defendant did not satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fritzgreen1 sentence2026In addressing the merits of the PCR petition, the PCR court found defendant did not satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Ryan v. Rennygreen1 sentence2021Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 50 (2010). "[A]n abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicability departed from established policies, or rested on an 14 Our court applied a more relaxed standard focused on the underlying methodology in cases involving novel theories of causation in toxic tort cases. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munroegreen1 sentence2020State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 441 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lalamagreen1 sentence2019Although the reported New Jersey appellate decisions involving chain of custody issues have all been criminal cases, it is even clearer in an administrative proceeding that a party seeking to introduce drug test results only needs to show a "reasonable probability" that the integrity of the sample has been maintained, because a relaxed standard of admissibility of evidence applies in administrative proceedings. [In re Lalama, 343 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2003An officer must be able to "`point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from *370 those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 278 , 712 A. 2d 1096 (1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)) (alteration in original). 2003An officer must be able to "`point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from *370 those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 278 , 712 A. 2d 1096 (1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)) (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
| National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raabgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Leongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. National Medical Hospital of Monterey Park, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Zablocki v. Redhailgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Leongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Medici v. BPR Co.
green
2 sentences2026The applicant under this more relaxed standard need not satisfy the "enhanced quality of proof" set forth by the Court in [Medici, 107 N.J. at 21 ]. 2025The applicant under this more relaxed standard need not satisfy the "enhanced quality of proof" set forth by the Court in [Medici, 107 N.J. at 21 ]. | 3 | 2013–2026 |
Willie James Brown v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc.
green
2 sentences2019"The right of self-representation ... is waived if not asserted, while the right to counsel is not." Id. at 611 . 2019"The right of self-representation . . . is waived if not asserted, while the right to counsel is not." Id. at 611 . | 3 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Laurick
red
2 sentences2025We reject defendant's argument that the relaxed standard for the five-year bar and excusable neglect set forth in State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990), should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 2018A PCR petition filed in the municipal court, other than one to correct an illegal sentence, "shall not be accepted for filing more than five years after entry of the judgment or imposition of sentence sought to be attacked, unless it alleges 3 We reject defendant's additional argument that the relaxed standard for the five-year bar and excusable neglect set forth in State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990), should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. | 2 | 2018–2025 |
State v. Jahnell Weaver (069185)
green
2 sentences2019Despite this more relaxed standard, however, "trial courts must still determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by any of the Rule 403 factors, which are 'undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury,' and 'undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Weaver, 219 N.J. at 151 . 2019Despite this more relaxed standard, however, "trial courts must still determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by any of the Rule 403 factors, which are 'undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury,' and 'undue delay, waste of time, or A-0009-17T3 16 needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Weaver, 219 N.J. at 151 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Arthur
green
2 sentences2003Although the Act does not define "reasonable cause," it is akin to "reasonable suspicion," which New Jersey courts have found to be a more relaxed standard than "probable cause." State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 , 691 A. 2d 808 (1997). 2003Although the Act does not define "reasonable cause," it is akin to "reasonable suspicion," which New Jersey courts have found to be a more relaxed standard than "probable cause." State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 , 691 A. 2d 808 (1997). | 2 | 2003–2018 |
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
green
2 sentences2019Under the relaxed standard, "[a] party seeking modification . . . may meet its initial burden by showing a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Ibid. (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384 ). 2019Under the relaxed standard, "[a] party seeking modification . . . may meet its initial burden by showing a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Ibid. (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2018We have described "reasonable cause" as "a more relaxed standard than probable cause[,]" and as "akin to 'reasonable suspicion[.]' " State v. Perkins , 358 N.J. 2018Super. 151 , 159, 817 A.2d 364 (App. Div. 2003) (citing State v. Arthur , 149 N.J. 1 , 8, 691 A.2d 808 (1997) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hoefers v. Jones
green
1 sentence2017On appeal, defendant makes five principal arguments: (1) we should apply a relaxed standard of review; (2) the Family Part erred in interpreting the parties' PSA and finding that plaintiff did not have to contribute to the costs of private high school education; (3) the Family Part erred in failing to schedule an evidentiary hearing to address the alleged ambiguities in the parties' PSA; (4) the court erred in failing to address the factors identified in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982), and Hoefers 5 A-1958-15T1 v. Jones, 288 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Newburgh v. Arrigo
green
1 sentence2017On appeal, defendant makes five principal arguments: (1) we should apply a relaxed standard of review; (2) the Family Part erred in interpreting the parties' PSA and finding that plaintiff did not have to contribute to the costs of private high school education; (3) the Family Part erred in failing to schedule an evidentiary hearing to address the alleged ambiguities in the parties' PSA; (4) the court erred in failing to address the factors identified in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982), and Hoefers 5 A-1958-15T1 v. Jones, 288 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Diaz v. Cobb
green
1 sentence2016Instead, it has consistently treated them as reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions subject to a relaxed standard of review." Id. at 1330 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Grubbs v. Slothower
green
2 sentences2013That means that the applicant is required to demonstrate, to the board’s satisfaction, “that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance.” Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J.Super. 377, 389 , 913 A.2d 137 (App.Div.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Randolph, supra, 324 N.J.Super. at 417 , 735 A.2d 1166 ). 2013That means that the applicant is required to demonstrate, to the board’s satisfaction, “that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance.” Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J.Super. 377, 389 , 913 A.2d 137 (App.Div.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Randolph, supra, 324 N.J.Super. at 417 , 735 A.2d 1166 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
RANDOLPH TOWN v. Tp. of Randolph
green
2 sentences2013That means that the applicant is required to demonstrate, to the board’s satisfaction, “that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance.” Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J.Super. 377, 389 , 913 A.2d 137 (App.Div.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Randolph, supra, 324 N.J.Super. at 417 , 735 A.2d 1166 ). 2013That means that the applicant is required to demonstrate, to the board’s satisfaction, “that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance.” Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J.Super. 377, 389 , 913 A.2d 137 (App.Div.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Randolph, supra, 324 N.J.Super. at 417 , 735 A.2d 1166 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Slater
green
2 sentences2012In such eases, “courts are to exercise their discretion liberally to allow plea withdrawals.” Id. at 156 , 966 A.2d 461 . 2012In such eases, “courts are to exercise their discretion liberally to allow plea withdrawals.” Id. at 156 , 966 A.2d 461 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Greenberg v. Kimmelman
green
2 sentences2010Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567 , 494 A. 2d 294 . 2010Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567 , 494 A. 2d 294 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Citarella
green
2 sentences2003An officer must be able to "`point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from *370 those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 278 , 712 A. 2d 1096 (1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)) (alteration in original). 2003An officer must be able to "`point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from *370 those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 278 , 712 A. 2d 1096 (1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)) (alteration in original). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Fertig
green
2 sentences1997State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126 , 668 A.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10 , 617 A.2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73 , 617 A.2d 1196 (1993). 1997State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126 , 668 A.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10 , 617 A.2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73 , 617 A.2d 1196 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Spann
green
2 sentences1997State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126 , 668 A.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10 , 617 A.2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73 , 617 A.2d 1196 (1993). 1997State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126 , 668 A.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10 , 617 A.2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73 , 617 A.2d 1196 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. JQ
green
2 sentences1997State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126 , 668 A.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10 , 617 A.2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73 , 617 A.2d 1196 (1993). 1997State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126 , 668 A.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10 , 617 A.2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73 , 617 A.2d 1196 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Cameron
green
1 sentence1994Ibid. *69 One modification of the rules should be made. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hospital and Dispensary green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hospital green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Delome v. Union Barge Line Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hospital green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Barrows v. Jackson green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.