12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bo Fancy Productions, Inc. v. Rabun County Board of Commissionersgreen2 sentences2008Although they never applied for and were never denied a permit or license for their festival, we nevertheless held that the promoters had standing, under the relaxed standard for free speech cases, to challenge, as an unconstitutional prior restraint, that *590 part of the Mass Gathering Act which required anyone who was holding a mass gathering to apply for a permit. 267 Ga. at 344 , 478 S.E.2d 373 . 2008Although they never applied for and were never denied a permit or license for their festival, we nevertheless held that the promoters had standing, under the relaxed standard for free speech cases, to challenge, as an unconstitutional prior restraint, that *590 part of the Mass Gathering Act which required anyone who was holding a mass gathering to apply for a permit. 267 Ga. at 344 , 478 S.E.2d 373 . | 1 | 2 |
Ashkouti v. City of Suwaneegreen2 sentences2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance 2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance | 1 | 2 |
Jimmie Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corporationgreen2 sentences2017Ga. 2007), aff'd Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp. , 300 Fed.Appx. 700 (11th Cir. 2008). 2017"Thus, the fact that FELA employs a relaxed standard of causation does not mean *894 that in FELA cases courts must allow expert testimony that in other contexts would be inadmissible." Id. ("admission of expert testimony is controlled-even in FELA cases-by the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert"). | 1 | 1 |
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Zeaglergreen1 sentence2016Such inconsistencies are construed favorably to a respondent to a motion for summary judgment and where there is an apparent inconsistency in any person’s testimony and statements, the matter should be submitted to the jury.”). 18 Zeagler, supra at 594 (2) (d). 9 even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.”19 Despite this relaxed standard, Norfolk Southern argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Bisnott proximately caused his own injuries. | 1 | 1 |
Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. Cobb Countygreen2 sentences2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance 2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance | 1 | 1 |
O S Advertising Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Rubingreen2 sentences2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance 2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance | 1 | 1 |
Shockley v. Fayette Countygreen2 sentences2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance 2004Outdoor Systems v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 607 (1) ( 555 SE2d 689 ) (2001) (review of revocation of a sign *503 permit by certiorari and declaratory judgment); O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 763 (3) ( 438 SE2d 907 ) (1994) (appeal from denial of variance, and declaratory judgment action with respect to constitutionality of sign ordinance), overruled to extent it required too much specificity, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 156 ( 516 SE2d 785 ) (1999); Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 491 ( 396 SE2d 883 ) (1990) (mandamus for review of denial of variance | 1 | 1 |
In Re Rivermist Homeowners Assn.green2 sentences1998“The 1966 Quiet Title Act was designed to broaden the relief available by supplementing and not supplanting the quia timet procedure. [Cit.]” In re Rivermist Homeowners Assn., 244 Ga. 515, 517 ( 260 SE2d 897 ) (1979). “[E]ven under the relaxed standard of the new law a plaintiff must assert that he holds some current record title or current prescriptive title, in order to maintain his suit.” (Emphasis in original.) In re Rivermist Homeowners Assn., supra at 518. 1998“The 1966 Quiet Title Act was designed to broaden the relief available by supplementing and not supplanting the quia timet procedure. [Cit.]” In re Rivermist Homeowners Assn., 244 Ga. 515, 517 ( 260 SE2d 897 ) (1979). “[E]ven under the relaxed standard of the new law a plaintiff must assert that he holds some current record title or current prescriptive title, in order to maintain his suit.” (Emphasis in original.) In re Rivermist Homeowners Assn., supra at 518. | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Foster v. State, 250 Ga. 269, 270 ( 297 SE2d 262 ) (1982). 1996See Foster v. State, 250 Ga. 269, 270 ( 297 SE2d 262 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Hirsh v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences1996Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 25 (2) ( 401 SE2d 530 ) (1991). 1996Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 25 (2) ( 401 SE2d 530 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Telecable of Columbus, Inc.green2 sentences1989Considering these factors, together with all other evidence of record, we are satisfied that even under the more relaxed test of Sams v. Gay, 161 Ga. App. 31 (2) ( 288 SE2d 822 ) and Smith v. Telecable &c., 142 Ga. App. 535, 536 ( 236 SE2d 523 ), the evidence in this case does not afford "a rational basis for concluding that the house would not have burned in the absence of negligence and that the [appellees were] responsible for any negligence which may in fact have occurred." (Emphasis supplied.) Sams, supra at 34 . 1989Considering these factors, together with all other evidence of record, we are satisfied that even under the more relaxed test of Sams v. Gay, 161 Ga. App. 31 (2) ( 288 SE2d 822 ) and Smith v. Telecable &c., 142 Ga. App. 535, 536 ( 236 SE2d 523 ), the evidence in this case does not afford "a rational basis for concluding that the house would not have burned in the absence of negligence and that the [appellees were] responsible for any negligence which may in fact have occurred." (Emphasis supplied.) Sams, supra at 34 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp.
green
1 sentence2017While this is a FELA case, to which a relaxed standard of causation applies, the standard of causation under FELA *511 and the standards for admission of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence are distinct issues and do not affect one another." (Citation, footnote, and punctuation omitted.) Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp. , 537 F.Supp.2d 1343 , 1352 (M.D. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fulton County v. Galberaith
green
2 sentences2008We found that appellees had "as applied" standing as well as standing to facially attack the ordinance because it effectively found all off-premises signs "presumptively illegal" and, through a regulatory scheme of exceptions to the presumption, prohibited signs based on their content. 282 Ga. at 315-17, 647 S.E.2d 24 . [5] Although we articulated a relaxed standard of standing in Galberaith , we did not apply relaxed standing in our analysis because the statute was unconstitutional "as applied" to the appellees. 2008Id. at 316 , 647 S.E.2d 24 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Honas H. Richards v. Consolidated Rail Corporation
green
1 sentence2004Richards, 330 F3d at 433 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bolton v. State
green
1 sentence1992Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sams v. Gay
green
2 sentences1989Considering these factors, together with all other evidence of record, we are satisfied that even under the more relaxed test of Sams v. Gay, 161 Ga. App. 31 (2) ( 288 SE2d 822 ) and Smith v. Telecable &c., 142 Ga. App. 535, 536 ( 236 SE2d 523 ), the evidence in this case does not afford "a rational basis for concluding that the house would not have burned in the absence of negligence and that the [appellees were] responsible for any negligence which may in fact have occurred." (Emphasis supplied.) Sams, supra at 34 . 1989Considering these factors, together with all other evidence of record, we are satisfied that even under the more relaxed test of Sams v. Gay, 161 Ga. App. 31 (2) ( 288 SE2d 822 ) and Smith v. Telecable &c., 142 Ga. App. 535, 536 ( 236 SE2d 523 ), the evidence in this case does not afford "a rational basis for concluding that the house would not have burned in the absence of negligence and that the [appellees were] responsible for any negligence which may in fact have occurred." (Emphasis supplied.) Sams, supra at 34 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley
green
2 sentences1988Triangle Publications v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179 ( 317 SE2d 534 ) (1984). 1988Triangle Publications v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179 ( 317 SE2d 534 ) (1984). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.