relaxed standard in Florida

2010Id.

2009In cases involving sexual battery in a familial context, “a relaxed standard of admissibility” of the collateral-crime evidence applies. 4 McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1257 (Fla. 2006).

1998See Rawls, 649 So.2d at 1353 ; cf. Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995) (recognizing the relaxed standard of admissibility of the collateral sex crime evidence for familial sexual battery cases); Barton v. State, 704 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (stating that in a familial setting, the familial relationship itself may be one of the points of similarity between the charged and collateral offenses.) Id. at D1893-1894, 717 So.2d at 94-95 .

1998See Rawls, 649 So.2d at 1353 ; cf. Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995)(recognizing the relaxed standard of admissibility of the collateral sex crime evidence for familial sexual battery cases); Barton v. State, 704 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(stating that in a familial setting, *95 the familial relationship itself may be one of the points of similarity between the charged and collateral offenses).

2002Similar Fact Evidence In admitting the testimony of the similar fact witness, Ms. Polite, the trial court found a familial context or relationship between Mr. Morman and K.T.J. and, therefore, used the relaxed standard of Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987).

1998The Florida Supreme Court in Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987), provided for a relaxed standard of admissibility in familial ' settings for similar fact evidence corroborating a victim’s testimony.

2003In Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668, 671 (Fla.1995), the court recognized that in Heuring it had "discussed a relaxed standard of admissibility for familial sexual battery cases, but [had] not specifically *1203 address[ed] the question of how similar the charged offense and the collateral sex crime must be in order for the collateral crime evidence to be admissible." The court again addressed the issue without articulating a precise standard of similarity.

1998See Rawls, 649 So.2d at 1353 ; cf. Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995)(recognizing the relaxed standard of admissibility of the collateral sex crime evidence for familial sexual battery cases); Barton v. State, 704 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(stating that in a familial setting, *95 the familial relationship itself may be one of the points of similarity between the charged and collateral offenses).

2014See Easterly, 22 So.3d at 815 (stating that even under the relaxed standard the evidence is subject to relevancy requirements and the section 90.403 balancing test, which means that the similarity of the charged offense to the collateral offenses is still important).

2010Although the law governing Williams rule evidence has been altered in the context of child sexual molestation cases, see § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2006) ("In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”); Easterly v. State, 22 So.3d 807, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“The Legislature has adopted a relaxed standard of admissibility for similar fact evidence in child

2003And there is no reason to believe that the probative value of such similar acts evidence would be "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," § 90.403, Fla. Stat., in every setting other than the context of intrafamilial sexual assault, see Morman v. State, 811 So.2d 714, 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (Altenbernd, J., concurring) (stating that if Williams rule evidence "is admissible under a relaxed standard in the family context when identity is not an issue, I am inclined to believe that it should be admissible under that same standard in most nonfamilial cases because its probati

2002Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124-25; Morman v. State, 811 So.2d 714, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

1992See, North Broward Hospital District v. Mizell, 148 So.2d 1, 4, n. 11 .

1992See, North Broward Hospital District v. Mizell, 148 So.2d 1, 4, n. 11 .

1992See generally, In the Interest of R.W., 495 So.2d 133 (Fla.1986); cf., Clark v. State, 395 So.2d 525 (Fla.1981) (applying a relaxed standard to a penal statute prohibiting the introduction of contraband into prisons, but noting the adequacy of the guidelines because the legislature specifically outlined what shall constitute contraband).

1992See generally, In the Interest of R.W., 495 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1986); cf., Clark v. State, 395 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1981) (applying a relaxed standard to a penal statute prohibiting the introduction of contraband into prisons, but noting the adequacy of the guidelines because the legislature specifically outlined what shall constitute contraband).

2019Moreover, these cases are rare because, as the court noted in Hawthorne, “in most instances the victim’s loss and the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense will be the same.” 71 Consequently, the State must prove fair market value in the majority of cases.72 Therefore, more often than not, the State is faced with the dilemma of either spending considerable time and expense to prove the value of something that was unjustly taken from the victim or allowing the victim to walk away empty-handed for a second time. 73 support, was an abuse of discretion.”); Kiefer v. State, 9

2018See § 90.404(2)(b)2. 10 the evidence of other acts of child molestation must be relevant and that the evidence “remains subject to weighing under section 90.403.”5 Id. at 1259; see also Seavey v. State, 8 So. 3d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting that under McLean, “[r]elevancy is ‘the threshold question,’ and the collateral crime’s similarity to the charged offense is helpful to determine whether the evidence is relevant”).

2016Co., 692 So. 2d 979, 982-83 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)).

2016Co., 692 So.2d 979, 982-83 (Fla. 2d DOA 1997)).

2009See McLean, 934 So.2d at 1257 ; Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 , 124 (Fla.1987); Triplett v. State, 947 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

2009See McLean, 934 So.2d at 1257 ; Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 , 124 (Fla.1987); Triplett v. State, 947 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

2004See McLean v. State, 854 So.2d 796, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). [4] But even under this relaxed standard, the circuit court still must perform its gatekeeping function under section 90.403, that is, it must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

2004See id. at 802 ; see also Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for SB 2012 (2001) Staff Analysis 4 (Apr. 18, 2001) (on file with comm.) ("However the evidence would still be subject to the s. 90.403, F.S., scrutiny of weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.").

1998In Rowland v. State, 680 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), we recognized the difficulty facing the trial courts in trying to determine on a case-by-case basis whether "alleged sex acts performed by an adult upon one child are sufficiently similar to other sex acts allegedly performed upon another child to meet the standard of admissibility." A review of several recent cases, however, may be instructive.

1997See Feller v. State, 637 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1994); Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1995).

1997We explained in that case the importance of understanding "that the difficult factual question of foreseeability for the jury in most cases is not whether it was foreseeable that injury would be caused by the act of negligence, but rather whether the defendant's act was negligent because the specific event causing harm was sufficiently foreseeable that the defendant reasonably needed to take steps to avoid or prevent the event." 656 So.2d at 176 (emphasis added). [3] Obviously, if we were to conclude that Springtree Properties, Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So.2d 164 (Fla.1997), did establish a new and

1993See, e.g., State, Dep't of Admin. v. Porter, 591 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So.2d 569, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

1993See, e.g., State, Dep't of Admin. v. Porter, 591 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So.2d 569, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

1991See for example Euline v State, 577 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (two sexual offenses involving digital, vaginal, and anal penetration of a twelve year old girlfriend of defendant’s daughter while she was visiting in defendant’s home.