general common law rule in Illinois

22 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
Frances Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., Frances Wheeler v. Double K, Inc.green ca7 · 1986 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019Furthermore, the federal law exception purposely makes the mere continuation factor much more liberal by not requiring an identity of ownership because “the general common law rule of nonliability on the part of successors is too harsh to employees for application in the context of discrimination in employment, and that the traditional common law exceptions to the nonliability rule insufficiently ease the harshness.” Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986). 2019Furthermore, the federal law exception purposely makes the mere continuation factor much more liberal by not requiring an identity of ownership because "the general common law rule of nonliability on the part of successors is too harsh to employees for application in the context of discrimination in employment, and that the traditional common law exceptions to the nonliability rule insufficiently ease the harshness." Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc. , 794 F.2d 1228 , 1237 (7th Cir. 1986).	2	3
People v. Wardgreen ill · 2011 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012See Dabbs, 239 Ill.2d at 284 , 346 Ill.Dec. 484 , 940 N.E.2d 1088 ; see also People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 25 , 351 Ill.Dec. 809 , 952 N.E.2d 601 (in considering section 115-7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2006)), a statute analytically similar to section 115-20, the court observed that propensity evidence is often highly relevant and the statute provides a legislative exception to the general common law rule against admitting other crimes evidence intended to show the defendant's propensity to commit crimes). ¶ 21 Relying on subsection (b) of section 115-20, defendant argues bef 2012See Dabbs, 239 Ill.2d at 284 , 346 Ill.Dec. 484 , 940 N.E.2d 1088 ; see also People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 25 , 351 Ill.Dec. 809 , 952 N.E.2d 601 (in considering section 115-7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2006)), a statute analytically similar to section 115-20, the court observed that propensity evidence is often highly relevant and the statute provides a legislative exception to the general common law rule against admitting other crimes evidence intended to show the defendant's propensity to commit crimes). ¶ 21 Relying on subsection (b) of section 115-20, defendant argues bef	2	2
People v. Dabbsgreen ill · 2010 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012See Dabbs, 239 Ill.2d at 284 , 346 Ill.Dec. 484 , 940 N.E.2d 1088 ; see also People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 25 , 351 Ill.Dec. 809 , 952 N.E.2d 601 (in considering section 115-7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2006)), a statute analytically similar to section 115-20, the court observed that propensity evidence is often highly relevant and the statute provides a legislative exception to the general common law rule against admitting other crimes evidence intended to show the defendant's propensity to commit crimes). ¶ 21 Relying on subsection (b) of section 115-20, defendant argues bef 2012See Dabbs, 239 Ill.2d at 284 , 346 Ill.Dec. 484 , 940 N.E.2d 1088 ; see also People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 25 , 351 Ill.Dec. 809 , 952 N.E.2d 601 (in considering section 115-7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2006)), a statute analytically similar to section 115-20, the court observed that propensity evidence is often highly relevant and the statute provides a legislative exception to the general common law rule against admitting other crimes evidence intended to show the defendant's propensity to commit crimes). ¶ 21 Relying on subsection (b) of section 115-20, defendant argues bef	2	2
Clarendon Associates v. Korzengreen ill · 1973 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Knox did not involve the assessment or collection of taxes or the general common law rule that in tax cases, "equity will not assume jurisdiction to grant relief where an adequate remedy at law exists." See Clarendon Associates, 56 Ill.2d at 107 , 306 N.E.2d 299 . 2010Knox did not involve the assessment or collection of taxes or the general common law rule that in tax cases, "equity will not assume jurisdiction to grant relief where an adequate remedy at law exists." See Clarendon Associates, 56 Ill.2d at 107 , 306 N.E.2d 299 .	2	2
Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage Districtgreen ill · 1954 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage District, 4 Ill.2d 72, 78 , 122 N.E.2d 257 (1954); see also Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill.2d 101, 107 , 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973). 2010Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage District, 4 Ill.2d 72, 78 , 122 N.E.2d 257 (1954); see also Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill.2d 101, 107 , 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973).	2	2
Catalano v. Pechousgreen ill · 1980 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 168 (1980); S. Terilli, S. Splichal & E Driscol, Lowering the Bar: Privileged Court Filings as Substitutes for Press Releases in the Court of Public Opinion, 12 Comm. L. & Pol’y 143, 157-58 (2007); 1 R.	1	1
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.green ill · 1981 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986 2 sentences 1986The court in Palmateer stressed that the tort of retaliatory discharge remains an exception to the general common law rule that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any cause or for no cause. ( 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 ; see also Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525 , 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 .) Moreover, the Palmateer court reiterated that “[t]he foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy.” (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 .) The cour 1986The court in Palmateer stressed that the tort of retaliatory discharge remains an exception to the general common law rule that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any cause or for no cause. ( 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 ; see also Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525 , 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 .) Moreover, the Palmateer court reiterated that “[t]he foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy.” (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 .) The cour	1	1
Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.green ill · 1985 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986 2 sentences 1986The court in Palmateer stressed that the tort of retaliatory discharge remains an exception to the general common law rule that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any cause or for no cause. ( 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 ; see also Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525 , 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 .) Moreover, the Palmateer court reiterated that “[t]he foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy.” (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 .) The cour 1986The court in Palmateer stressed that the tort of retaliatory discharge remains an exception to the general common law rule that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any cause or for no cause. ( 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 ; see also Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525 , 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 .) Moreover, the Palmateer court reiterated that “[t]he foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy.” (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 .) The cour	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (21)

Case	Cited	Years
People v. McCarthy green ill · 1989 2 sentences 2012Murder is not any of those offenses, and defendant therefore asserts that a prior conviction for domestic battery is not admissible in a murder prosecution. ¶ 22 The State in response submits that defendant's interpretation of section 115-20 is contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent because it effectively eliminates from subsection (a) the phrase "types of offenses." In the alternative, the State argues that any error in the admission of the prior domestic battery conviction for propensity purposes was harmless given that the conviction would have been admissible in any event to 2012Murder is not any of those offenses, and defendant therefore asserts that a prior conviction for domestic battery is not admissible in a murder prosecution. ¶ 22 The State in response submits that defendant's interpretation of section 115-20 is contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent because it effectively eliminates from subsection (a) the phrase "types of offenses." In the alternative, the State argues that any error in the admission of the prior domestic battery conviction for propensity purposes was harmless given that the conviction would have been admissible in any event to	2	2012–2012
Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital green illappct · 2009 2 sentences 2011The court saw "no cause why a different set of rules should apply here, in a nondissolution proceeding." Id. ¶ 55 We do see a reason to apply a specific statutory rule in the context of a dissolution and a general common law rule in the context of determining damages for a common law tort. 2011The court saw “no cause why a different set of rules should apply here, in a nondissolution proceeding.” Id. ¶ 55 We do see a reason to apply a specific statutory rule in the context of a dissolution and a general common law rule in the context of determining damages for a common law tort.	2	2011–2011
Rodriguez v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. green illappct · 1992 2 sentences 1997As to trespassers, however, the Premises Liability Act reaffirmed the general common law rule that no duty of reasonable care is owed a trespasser except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him. 740 ILCS 130/3 (West 1992); Lee, 152 Ill. 2d 432 , 605 N.E.2d 493 ; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955); Rodriguez, 228 Ill. 1997As to trespassers, however, the Premises Liability Act reaffirmed the general common law rule that no duty of reasonable care is owed a trespasser except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him. 740 ILCS 130/3 (West 1992); Lee , 152 Ill. 2d 432 , 605 N.E.2d 493 ; Kahn v. James Burton Co. , 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955); Rodriguez , 228 Ill.	2	1997–1997
Kahn v. James Burton Co. green ill · 1955 2 sentences 1997As to trespassers, however, the Premises Liability Act reaffirmed the general common law rule that no duty of reasonable care is owed a trespasser except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him. 740 ILCS 130/3 (West 1992); Lee, 152 Ill. 2d 432 , 605 N.E.2d 493 ; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955); Rodriguez, 228 Ill. 1997As to trespassers, however, the Premises Liability Act reaffirmed the general common law rule that no duty of reasonable care is owed a trespasser except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him. 740 ILCS 130/3 (West 1992); Lee, 152 Ill. 2d 432 , 605 N.E.2d 493 ; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955); Rodriguez, 228 Ill.	2	1997–1997
Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority green ill · 1992 2 sentences 1997As to trespassers, however, the Premises Liability Act reaffirmed the general common law rule that no duty of reasonable care is owed a trespasser except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him. 740 ILCS 130/3 (West 1992); Lee, 152 Ill. 2d 432 , 605 N.E.2d 493 ; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955); Rodriguez, 228 Ill. 1997As to trespassers, however, the Premises Liability Act reaffirmed the general common law rule that no duty of reasonable care is owed a trespasser except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him. 740 ILCS 130/3 (West 1992); Lee, 152 Ill. 2d 432 , 605 N.E.2d 493 ; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955); Rodriguez, 228 Ill.	2	1997–1997
Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman green scotus · 1908 2 sentences 1993This rule was outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman (1908), 208 U.S. 360 , 52 L. 1993This rule was outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman (1908), 208 U.S. 360 , 52 L.	1	1993–1993
United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc. green scotus · 1987 2 sentences 1989(United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. (1987), 484 U.S. 29, 42 , 98 L. 1989(United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. (1987), 484 U.S. 29, 42 , 98 L.	1	1989–1989
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State green ill · 1988 2 sentences 1989(American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Department of Mental Health (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 246, 260 , 529 N.E.2d 534 .) A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award on public policy ground is an application of the general common-law principle that a court may decline to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy, a doctrine which is rooted in the notion that a court will not aid one that bases a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. 1989(American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Department of Mental Health (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 246, 260 , 529 N.E.2d 534 .) A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award on public policy ground is an application of the general common-law principle that a court may decline to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy, a doctrine which is rooted in the notion that a court will not aid one that bases a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.	1	1989–1989
Peck v. Peck green ill · 1959 2 sentences 1980Peck v. Peck (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 268 , 157 N.E.2d 249 ; Bellow v. Bellow (1976), 40 Ill. 1980Peck v. Peck (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 268 , 157 N.E.2d 249 ; Bellow v. Bellow (1976), 40 Ill.	1	1980–1980
Bellow v. Bellow neutral illappct · 1976 1 sentence 1980Peck v. Peck (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 268 , 157 N.E.2d 249 ; Bellow v. Bellow (1976), 40 Ill.	1	1980–1980
Taylor v. City of Berwyn neutral illappct · 1938 1 sentence 1977(See People v. Carnivale.) The sole exception to this rule arises when the officer is engaged in “hot” or “fresh pursuit.” (Krug v. Ward, 77 Ill. 603 ; Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 297 Ill.	1	1977–1977
Krug v. Ward green · 1875 1 sentence 1977(See People v. Carnivale.) The sole exception to this rule arises when the officer is engaged in “hot” or “fresh pursuit.” (Krug v. Ward, 77 Ill. 603 ; Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 297 Ill.	1	1977–1977
Walsh v. United States Tent & Awning Co. neutral illappct · 1910 2 sentences 1976(Annot., 118 A.L.R. 1338 , 1344, (1939).) Thus, as stated in Walsh v. United States Tent & Awning Co., 153 Ill. 1976(Annot., 118 A.L.R. 1338 , 1344, (1939).) Thus, as stated in Walsh v. United States Tent & Awning Co., 153 Ill.	1	1976–1976
Strader v. Board of Education green ill · 1953 1 sentence 1964(Strader v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 610, 614 ; City of Watseka v. Wilson, 11 Ill.2d 265, 267 ; In re Estate of Webster, 21 Ill.2d 54, 56 .) In its amended answer in this case, the union asserted that the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement “is unenforceable and violates the Constitution of the State of Illinois.” In its objections to the master’s report, it objected to “the failure of the Master to find that a general agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable in accordance with the Illinois common law.” Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1961, I	1	1964–1964
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Rice green ill · 1960 1 sentence 1964(Strader v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 610, 614 ; City of Watseka v. Wilson, 11 Ill.2d 265, 267 ; In re Estate of Webster, 21 Ill.2d 54, 56 .) In its amended answer in this case, the union asserted that the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement “is unenforceable and violates the Constitution of the State of Illinois.” In its objections to the master’s report, it objected to “the failure of the Master to find that a general agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable in accordance with the Illinois common law.” Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1961, I	1	1964–1964
City of Watseka v. Wilson neutral ill · 1957 1 sentence 1964(Strader v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 610, 614 ; City of Watseka v. Wilson, 11 Ill.2d 265, 267 ; In re Estate of Webster, 21 Ill.2d 54, 56 .) In its amended answer in this case, the union asserted that the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement “is unenforceable and violates the Constitution of the State of Illinois.” In its objections to the master’s report, it objected to “the failure of the Master to find that a general agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable in accordance with the Illinois common law.” Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1961, I	1	1964–1964
White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek green ill · 1921 1 sentence 1964Decisions so holding had referred to such agreements as attempts “to divest the courts of their jurisdiction” and had held them “invalid because contrary to public policy.” (White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 245 ; Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152 .) Section 1 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill.	1	1964–1964
Cocalis v. Nazlides green ill · 1923 1 sentence 1964Decisions so holding had referred to such agreements as attempts “to divest the courts of their jurisdiction” and had held them “invalid because contrary to public policy.” (White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 245 ; Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152 .) Section 1 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill.	1	1964–1964
Hackett v. Trustees of Schools neutral ill · 1947 1 sentence 1951In Hackett v. Trustees of Schools, 398 Ill. 27 , we held that where the grantor in a deed to school trustees placed in the deed an option to repurchase the land when it ceased to be used for school purposes, the trustees had the right to sell and remove the buildings therefrom after the school site had been abandoned and that the option of the purchaser did not include the buildings.	1	1951–1951
Gray v. Shinn green ill · 1920 1 sentence 1920In Gray v. Shinn, supra, the reversion was created by William H.	1	1920–1920
Harrison v. Weatherby neutral · 1899 1 sentence 1909(Harrison v. Weatherby, 180 Ill. 418 ; Peet v. Peet, 229 id. 341.) This rule applies to wills, and it is necessary, under the general common law rule, that the will conform to the laws of the State both in its execution and proof of the same, in order to affect the title to real estate situated in such State.	1	1909–1909

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (5) IL § 740 ILCS 160/5 (3) IL § 740 ILCS 160/6 (3) IL § 775 ILCS 5/1-101 (3) USC § 29u.s.c.151 (3) USC § 42u.s.c.2000e (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 99 (1912–2026) TX 72 (1934–2025) NY 38 (1854–2026) NC 32 (1969–2021) TN 24 (1912–2025) WA 24 (1952–2025) CT 24 (1887–2025) IL 22 (1909–2019) MN 19 (1967–2026) MO 16 (1900–2023) UT 16 (1987–2020) IN 15 (1903–2015) NJ 14 (1965–2021) MI 13 (1965–2025) MD 12 (1988–2024) PA 12 (1947–2024) AZ 11 (1969–2023) OH 11 (1971–2018) FL 11 (1958–2021) OR 10 (1975–2019) AR 9 (1938–2015) MA 9 (1932–2008) WV 9 (1982–2022) WI 9 (1882–2004) GA 8 (1902–2020) AL 8 (1968–2018) NM 8 (1998–2023) IA 7 (1902–2012) DE 7 (1927–2019) OK 7 (1992–2014) MT 6 (1969–2024) NH 6 (1881–2018) AK 5 (1977–2022) KS 5 (1984–2021) CO 5 (1978–2019) VT 4 (1980–2021) MS 4 (1986–1999) SC 4 (1984–2023) VA 4 (1987–2018) HI 4 (1971–2017) ND 3 (1992–2015) RI 3 (1992–2004) ID 3 (1986–2012) ME 3 (2005–2017) LA 2 (1908–1975) NE 2 (1922–1956) WY 2 (2004–2015) KY 2 (1929–1959)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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