32 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2021 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Braswell v. Braswellgreen2 sentences2021Our Supreme Court first recognized the public duty doctrine in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370 , 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991) (“The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals.”). 2021Our Supreme Court first recognized the public duty doctrine in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370 , 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991) (“The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals.”). | 8 | 18 |
Young v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Companygreen2 sentences2021CO. 2021-NCCOA-62 Opinion of the Court fact that . . . expenses were paid by some source collateral to the defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff’s family, by the plaintiff’s employer, or by an insurance company.” Young v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 466 , 146 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 5 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Hairston, 371 N.C. at 657 , 821 S.E.2d at 391 . ¶ 17 The collateral source rule is an exception to the general common-law principle that there should be only one recove 2021CO. 2021-NCCOA-62 Opinion of the Court fact that . . . expenses were paid by some source collateral to the defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff’s family, by the plaintiff’s employer, or by an insurance company.” Young v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 466 , 146 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 5 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Hairston, 371 N.C. at 657 , 821 S.E.2d at 391 . ¶ 17 The collateral source rule is an exception to the general common-law principle that there should be only one recove | 2 | 2 |
Cates v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2021CO. 2021-NCCOA-62 Opinion of the Court fact that . . . expenses were paid by some source collateral to the defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff’s family, by the plaintiff’s employer, or by an insurance company.” Young v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 466 , 146 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 5 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Hairston, 371 N.C. at 657 , 821 S.E.2d at 391 . ¶ 17 The collateral source rule is an exception to the general common-law principle that there should be only one recove 2021CO. 2021-NCCOA-62 Opinion of the Court fact that . . . expenses were paid by some source collateral to the defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff’s family, by the plaintiff’s employer, or by an insurance company.” Young v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 466 , 146 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 5 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Hairston, 371 N.C. at 657 , 821 S.E.2d at 391 . ¶ 17 The collateral source rule is an exception to the general common-law principle that there should be only one recove | 2 | 2 |
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Dardengreen1 sentence2008Id. at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 . 3. | 1 | 1 |
DeFusco v. Todesca Forte, Inc.green2 sentences1998See Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370 , 410 S.E.2d at 901 ; see also DeFusco v. Todesca Forte, Inc., 683 A.2d 363, 365 (R.I. 1996) (recognizing that with certain exceptions, "[t]he public duty doctrine shields the state and its political subdivisions from tort liability arising out of discretionary governmental actions that by their nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons"). 1998See Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370 , 410 S.E.2d at 901 ; see also DeFusco v. Todesca Forte, Inc., 683 A.2d 363, 365 (R.I. 1996) (recognizing that with certain exceptions, “[tjhe public duty doctrine shields the state and its political subdivisions from tort liability arising out of discretionary governmental actions that by their nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Atwoodgreen2 sentences1998He also argues that because of the penal nature of license revocation statutes, we should follow “[o]ur traditional rule ... that when the General Assembly does not specify whether guilty knowledge, or mens rea is required, the necessity of its existence will nonetheless be implied.” State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 273 , 225 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1976) (Exum, J., concurring). 1998He also argues that because of the penal nature of license revocation statutes, we should follow “[o]ur traditional rule ... that when the General Assembly does not specify whether guilty knowledge, or mens rea is required, the necessity of its existence will nonetheless be implied.” State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 273 , 225 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1976) (Exum, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2012We held that the public duty doctrine barred her claim, stating, “The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals.” Id. at 370 , 410 S.E.2d at 901 (citing Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. 2000App. 188 , 366 S.E.2d 2 (1988) and was adopted by our Supreme Court in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363 , 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991), in which the Court stated: The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals. | 7 | 1991–2012 |
Braswell v. Braswell
green
2 sentences2008Our Supreme Court specifically adopted the public duty doctrine for the first time in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363 , 410 S.E.2d 897 , reh’g denied, 330 N.C. 854 , 413 S.E.2d 550 (1991): The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals. 2008Our Supreme Court specifically adopted the public duty doctrine for the first time in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363 , 410 S.E.2d 897 , reh’g denied, 330 N.C. 854 , 413 S.E.2d 550 (1991): The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals. | 5 | 1994–2008 |
Brown v. Rhyne Floral Supply Mfg. Co.
neutral
2 sentences2012App. 188, 193 , 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 , disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834 , 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988)). 1999App. 188, 193-94 , 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 , disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834 , 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988)). | 4 | 1993–2012 |
Coleman v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2012App. 188, 193 , 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 , disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834 , 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988)). 1999App. 188, 193-94 , 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 , disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834 , 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988)). | 4 | 1993–2012 |
Hairston v. Harward
green
2 sentences2021CO. 2021-NCCOA-62 Opinion of the Court fact that . . . expenses were paid by some source collateral to the defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff’s family, by the plaintiff’s employer, or by an insurance company.” Young v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 466 , 146 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 5 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Hairston, 371 N.C. at 657 , 821 S.E.2d at 391 . ¶ 17 The collateral source rule is an exception to the general common-law principle that there should be only one recove 2021CO. 2021-NCCOA-62 Opinion of the Court fact that . . . expenses were paid by some source collateral to the defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff’s family, by the plaintiff’s employer, or by an insurance company.” Young v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 466 , 146 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 5 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Hairston, 371 N.C. at 657 , 821 S.E.2d at 391 . ¶ 17 The collateral source rule is an exception to the general common-law principle that there should be only one recove | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Garland v. . Wright
green
2 sentences1975State v. Hefner, 199 N.C. 778 , 155 S.E. 879 (1930). 1969State v. Hefner, 199 N.C. 778 , 155 S.E. 879 . | 2 | 1969–1975 |
State v. . Hefner
green
2 sentences1975State v. Hefner, 199 N.C. 778 , 155 S.E. 879 (1930). 1969State v. Hefner, 199 N.C. 778 , 155 S.E. 879 . | 2 | 1969–1975 |
Stone v. North Carolina Department of Labor
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 . 3. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lovelace v. City of Shelby
green
2 sentences2002This rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act. 351 N.C. at 460-61 , 526 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370-71 , 410 S.E.2d at 901 ). 2002This rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act. 351 N.C. at 460-61 , 526 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370-71 , 410 S.E.2d at 901 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hart v. Ivey
green
2 sentences1993The duty to others in such an instance is determined by the general common law principle that “ ‘[t]he law imposes upon every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm, and calls a violation of that duty negligence.’ ” Id. (quoting Council v. Dickerson’s, Inc., 233 N.C. 472 , 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951)). 1993The duty to others in such an instance is determined by the general common law principle that "`[t]he law imposes upon every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm, and calls a violation of that duty negligence.'" Id. (quoting Council v. Dickerson's, Inc., 233 N.C. 472 , 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951)). *98 It follows that, because no safety statute governing the present situation exists, the analysis here should follow from accepted principles of common law. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Council v. Dickerson's, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993The duty to others in such an instance is determined by the general common law principle that "`[t]he law imposes upon every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm, and calls a violation of that duty negligence.'" Id. (quoting Council v. Dickerson's, Inc., 233 N.C. 472 , 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951)). *98 It follows that, because no safety statute governing the present situation exists, the analysis here should follow from accepted principles of common law. 1993The duty to others in such an instance is determined by the general common law principle that "`[t]he law imposes upon every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm, and calls a violation of that duty negligence.'" Id. (quoting Council v. Dickerson's, Inc., 233 N.C. 472 , 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951)). *98 It follows that, because no safety statute governing the present situation exists, the analysis here should follow from accepted principles of common law. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Trammel v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Trammel, 445 U.S. 40 , 100 S.Ct. 906 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 . 1992Trammel, 445 U.S. 40 , 100 S.Ct. 906 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Crain and Denbo, Inc. v. Harris & Harris Const. Co.
green
2 sentences1988Crain, 250 N.C. at 112 , 108 S.E. 2d at 127 . 1988Crain, 250 N.C. at 112 , 108 S.E. 2d at 127 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bishop v. Wood
green
2 sentences1985Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71 , 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976). 1985Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71 , 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Smith v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1985Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71 , 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976). 1985Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71 , 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Keller
green
2 sentences1980State v. Keller, 268 N.C. 522 , 151 S.E. 2d 56 (1966). 1980State v. Keller, 268 N.C. 522 , 151 S.E. 2d 56 (1966). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.