general common law rule in Ohio

1998The court based its conclusion that “the Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt a market-share theory of liability in DES cases,” id. at 1435 , on the following: (1) Ohio common law embraces the fundamental principle of tort law that a plaintiff must prove that the negligence of a particular defendant caused injury, (2) the 1988 Ohio Products Liability Act “embodies the general common law principle that a plaintiff has to prove an injury proximately caused by a particular defendant,” id. at 1432 , and (3) presuming the General Assembly was aware of the Minnich and Goldman decisions, alternative an

1998The court based its conclusion that “the Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt a market-share theory of liability in DES cases,” id. at 1435 , on the following: (1) Ohio common law embraces the fundamental principle of tort law that a plaintiff must prove that the negligence of a particular defendant caused injury, (2) the 1988 Ohio Products Liability Act “embodies the general common law principle that a plaintiff has to prove an injury proximately caused by a particular defendant,” id. at 1432 , and (3) presuming the General Assembly was aware of the Minnich and Goldman decisions, alternative an

2014But Worrell itself *454 actually rejects this argument, observing as it does that “the usual remedy in breach of contract cases for wrongful discharge is to pay the injured party the difference between any wages due under the contract from the date of discharge until the contract term expires.” Id. at 246 .

2006However, the Equilease Corp. court explained that "the requirement as to notice applies to the assignment of obligations * * * in order to create a liability flowing from the debtor to the assignee who failed to give notice." Id. {¶ 38} At least one Ohio court has followed this general common law rule that liability flows from a debtor to an assignee after a debtor has been notified of an assignment.

2006In re Bell Fuel Corp. (E.D.Pa. 1989), 99 B.R. 602 , 608 .

2000Wozniak v. Wozniak (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 400 , 412 (the general rule in conversion actions is that plaintiff is awarded interest from the time of conversion); In re Guardianship of Ollie R.

1993It was a reflex to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 248 , 8 O.O.3d 224 , 375 N.E.2d 1241 .

1993It was a reflex to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 248 , 8 O.O.3d 224 , 375 N.E.2d 1241 .

1976Hn obiter dicta, the opinion in Fairborn v. Munkus (1971), 28 Ohio St. 2d 207, 209 , reads: “The general common-law rule is that the power of a municipal police officer is limited- to the boundaries of his municipality, and that he may not, even with a warrant, make an arrest outside his territory for a misdemeanor.” See, also, State v. Vanbarg (1975), 44 Ohio Misc. 11 ; State v. Elder (1953), 67 Ohio Law Abs. 385 ; Opinions of Attorney General (1974), No. 74-094.

1976Hn obiter dicta, the opinion in Fairborn v. Munkus (1971), 28 Ohio St. 2d 207, 209 , reads: “The general common-law rule is that the power of a municipal police officer is limited- to the boundaries of his municipality, and that he may not, even with a warrant, make an arrest outside his territory for a misdemeanor.” See, also, State v. Vanbarg (1975), 44 Ohio Misc. 11 ; State v. Elder (1953), 67 Ohio Law Abs. 385 ; Opinions of Attorney General (1974), No. 74-094.

1976See Fairborn v. Munkus (1971), 28 Ohio St. 2d 207 ; also State v. Anderson (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 219 , where that statement in Fairborn is referred to as obiter dicta, indicating that the general rule is open for discussion.

1971In the case of Davis v. Shiappacossee (Fla. 1963), 155 So. 2d 365 , the Supreme Court of Florida held that the sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of a statute constituted negligence per se, and that the automobile accident which occurred while the minor was under the influence of liquor was reasonably foreseeable and the proximate result of such negligence.