9 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2020Va. 771 , 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).3 When faced with a proposed self-defense instruction, this Court noted in State v. Smith, 170 W.Va. 654,656 , 295 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1982), “the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense[.]” See State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 651 , 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980) (“Ordinarily, self-defense is not available to the aggressor who precipitates an affray without legal justification.”). 2020Va. 771 , 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).3 When faced with a proposed self-defense instruction, this Court noted in State v. Smith, 170 W.Va. 654,656 , 295 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1982), “the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense[.]” See State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 651 , 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980) (“Ordinarily, self-defense is not available to the aggressor who precipitates an affray without legal justification.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Watsongreen2 sentences2020Va. 771 , 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).3 When faced with a proposed self-defense instruction, this Court noted in State v. Smith, 170 W.Va. 654,656 , 295 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1982), “the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense[.]” See State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 651 , 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980) (“Ordinarily, self-defense is not available to the aggressor who precipitates an affray without legal justification.”). 2020Va. 771 , 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).3 When faced with a proposed self-defense instruction, this Court noted in State v. Smith, 170 W.Va. 654,656 , 295 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1982), “the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense[.]” See State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 651 , 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980) (“Ordinarily, self-defense is not available to the aggressor who precipitates an affray without legal justification.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Currygreen2 sentences2020A person “in no imminent danger from a minatory foe may not purposely confront him and then invoke self-defense for an immediate [assault].” State v. Curry, 112 W. 2000A person “in no imminent danger from a minatory foe may not purposely confront him and then invoke self-defense for an immediate [assault].” State v. Curry, 112 W.Va. 549, 551 , 165 S.E. 810, 811 (1932). | 1 | 2 |
Marquay v. Enogreen2 sentences2003Accord Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 , 662 A.2d 272, 278 (1995) (“Where, as here, civil liability for a statutory violation would represent an abrupt and sweeping departure from the general common law rule of nonliability, we would expect that if the legislature ... intended to impose civil liability it would expressly so provide.”); Freehauf v. School Board of Seminole County, 623 So.2d 761 (Fla.App., 5th Dist.1993). 2003Accord Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 , 662 A.2d 272, 278 (1995) (“Where, as here, civil liability for a statutory violation would represent an abrupt and sweeping departure from the general common law rule of nonliability, we would expect that if the legislature ... intended to impose civil liability it would expressly so provide.”); Freehauf v. School Board of Seminole County, 623 So.2d 761 (Fla.App., 5th Dist.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Naccash v. Burgergreen2 sentences1990In Syllabus Point 5 of Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537 , 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969), we formulated this general rule: “A request of a person to do certain work is only one of the elements to be considered in determining employment, other elements being compensation for such work and the power to discharge, but the most important element is the right or power of direction and control of the manner in which the work is to be performed.” This statement parallels the general common law test for determining 1990In Syllabus Point 5 of Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537 , 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969), we formulated this general rule: “A request of a person to do certain work is only one of the elements to be considered in determining employment, other elements being compensation for such work and the power to discharge, but the most important element is the right or power of direction and control of the manner in which the work is to be performed.” This statement parallels the general common law test for determining | 1 | 1 |
Lieberman v. Liebermangreen1 sentence1985E.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 1309 (D.S.C.1983); Blake v. Cruz, supra. 20 The court in Blake, 698 P.2d at 321 , after first acknowledging the general common law rule that parents are not required to support a child who has reached the age of majority or is otherwise emancipated, quoted the following statement from Lieberman v. Lieberman, 517 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Mo.App.1974): “ ‘A recognized exception occurs where the adult child is unmarried, unemanci-pated and insolvent and physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting himself. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences1982(Footnote references omitted.) Our cases recognize the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense; but we have not located a discussion about particular language that may result in forfeiture of the right to claim self-defense. 1 Courts elsewhere have seldom discussed this point; but the Supreme Court of Iowa, reversing a second-degree murder conviction, stated the rule as follows: *657 “Defamation or opprobrious epithets, not uttered for the purpose of bringing about opportunity to kill or do great bodily harm, do not constit 1982(Footnote references omitted.) Our cases recognize the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense; but we have not located a discussion about particular language that may result in forfeiture of the right to claim self-defense. 1 Courts elsewhere have seldom discussed this point; but the Supreme Court of Iowa, reversing a second-degree murder conviction, stated the rule as follows: *657 “Defamation or opprobrious epithets, not uttered for the purpose of bringing about opportunity to kill or do great bodily harm, do not constit | 1 | 1 |
State v. . Robinsongreen2 sentences1982In State v. Robinson, 213 N.C. 273, 280 , 195 S.E. 824, 829 (1938), the Court found that a trial court erred by instructing that a defendant would be at fault and could not rely on self-defense “if he used language calculated to bring on a controversy and it does so.” The Court found the proper test to be whether the language was calculated and intended to bring on a fight, and a fight did ensue. 2 State’s Instructions 4 and 5, particularly when read together, improperly describe behavior that will deprive a person of his right to assert self-defense. 1982In State v. Robinson, 213 N.C. 273, 280 , 195 S.E. 824, 829 (1938), the Court found that a trial court erred by instructing that a defendant would be at fault and could not rely on self-defense “if he used language calculated to bring on a controversy and it does so.” The Court found the proper test to be whether the language was calculated and intended to bring on a fight, and a fight did ensue. 2 State’s Instructions 4 and 5, particularly when read together, improperly describe behavior that will deprive a person of his right to assert self-defense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ames v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence2022Similarly, in Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 783 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. 2016), the mortgagors, Cindy and David Ames, filed suit when Chase Bank initiated a foreclosure sale on their property. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Collins
green
1 sentence2020Va. 771 , 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).3 When faced with a proposed self-defense instruction, this Court noted in State v. Smith, 170 W.Va. 654,656 , 295 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1982), “the general common law rule that one who is at fault or who is the physical aggressor can not rely on self-defense[.]” See State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 651 , 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980) (“Ordinarily, self-defense is not available to the aggressor who precipitates an affray without legal justification.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Freehauf v. School Bd. of Seminole Cty.
green
1 sentence2003Accord Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 , 662 A.2d 272, 278 (1995) (“Where, as here, civil liability for a statutory violation would represent an abrupt and sweeping departure from the general common law rule of nonliability, we would expect that if the legislature ... intended to impose civil liability it would expressly so provide.”); Freehauf v. School Board of Seminole County, 623 So.2d 761 (Fla.App., 5th Dist.1993). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences1995In note 17 of Miller, 194 W.Va. at 13 , 459 S.E.2d at 124 , we stated: "Of course, the general common law rule is that claim or issue preclusion only works against those who had a fair chance to contest the earlier litigation. 1995In note 17 of Miller, 194 W.Va. at 13 , 459 S.E.2d at 124 , we stated: "Of course, the general common law rule is that claim or issue preclusion only works against those who had a fair chance to contest the earlier litigation. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cardwell v. Bechtol
green
2 sentences1992“We do not think that the conclusion that these statutes are intended to abrogate judicial adoption of an exception to the general common law rule requiring parental consent to treat minors can be supported by the express terms of any of these provisions.” 724 S.W.2d at 744 . 1992Rather, that court found “no indication in any of the statutes of any intent on the part of the Legislature to establish a comprehensive statutory scheme to occupy the area of medical treatment of minors in its entirety.” Id. (emphasis supplied) The court went on to point out that the statutes where the legislature has expressly provided for only consent by the minor “do no more than provide conditional immunities from certain types of liability in specific situations (where such immunities were not otherwise clear in the law) or promote certain social purposes, such as treatment of drug abuse | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Company
green
2 sentences1990In Syllabus Point 5 of Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537 , 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969), we formulated this general rule: “A request of a person to do certain work is only one of the elements to be considered in determining employment, other elements being compensation for such work and the power to discharge, but the most important element is the right or power of direction and control of the manner in which the work is to be performed.” This statement parallels the general common law test for determining 1990In Syllabus Point 5 of Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537 , 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969), we formulated this general rule: “A request of a person to do certain work is only one of the elements to be considered in determining employment, other elements being compensation for such work and the power to discharge, but the most important element is the right or power of direction and control of the manner in which the work is to be performed.” This statement parallels the general common law test for determining | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Yates v. Mancari
green
1 sentence1990In Syllabus Point 5 of Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537 , 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969), we formulated this general rule: “A request of a person to do certain work is only one of the elements to be considered in determining employment, other elements being compensation for such work and the power to discharge, but the most important element is the right or power of direction and control of the manner in which the work is to be performed.” This statement parallels the general common law test for determining | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Yates v. Mancari
green
1 sentence1990In Syllabus Point 5 of Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537 , 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969), we formulated this general rule: “A request of a person to do certain work is only one of the elements to be considered in determining employment, other elements being compensation for such work and the power to discharge, but the most important element is the right or power of direction and control of the manner in which the work is to be performed.” This statement parallels the general common law test for determining | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Blake v. Cruz
green
2 sentences1985E.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 1309 (D.S.C.1983); Blake v. Cruz, supra. 20 The court in Blake, 698 P.2d at 321 , after first acknowledging the general common law rule that parents are not required to support a child who has reached the age of majority or is otherwise emancipated, quoted the following statement from Lieberman v. Lieberman, 517 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Mo.App.1974): “ ‘A recognized exception occurs where the adult child is unmarried, unemanci-pated and insolvent and physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting himself. 1985E.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 1309 (D.S.C.1983); Blake v. Cruz, supra. 20 The court in Blake, 698 P.2d at 321 , after first acknowledging the general common law rule that parents are not required to support a child who has reached the age of majority or is otherwise emancipated, quoted the following statement from Lieberman v. Lieberman, 517 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Mo.App.1974): “ ‘A recognized exception occurs where the adult child is unmarried, unemanci-pated and insolvent and physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting himself. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Fower v. Fower Estate Ex Rel. Redhage
green
1 sentence1985Fower v. Fower Estate, 448 S.W.2d 585 (Mo.1970). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Phillips v. United States
green
1 sentence1985E.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 1309 (D.S.C.1983); Blake v. Cruz, supra. 20 The court in Blake, 698 P.2d at 321 , after first acknowledging the general common law rule that parents are not required to support a child who has reached the age of majority or is otherwise emancipated, quoted the following statement from Lieberman v. Lieberman, 517 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Mo.App.1974): “ ‘A recognized exception occurs where the adult child is unmarried, unemanci-pated and insolvent and physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting himself. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.