15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baker v. Tremco Inc.green2 sentences2012Common Law Alternatively, Ogden claims that Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Ind. 2006) and Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 650, 654 (Ind. 2009) established that when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an exception to the general common law rule of employment at will must be recognized. 2012Common Law Alternatively, Ogden claims that Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Ind.2006) and Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 650, 654 (Ind.2009) established that when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an ex *145 ception to the general common law rule of employment at will must be recognized. | 2 | 2 |
Cantrell v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2012Common Law Alternatively, Ogden claims that Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Ind. 2006) and Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 650, 654 (Ind. 2009) established that when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an exception to the general common law rule of employment at will must be recognized. 2012Common Law Alternatively, Ogden claims that Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Ind.2006) and Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 650, 654 (Ind.2009) established that when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an ex *145 ception to the general common law rule of employment at will must be recognized. | 2 | 2 |
Surratt v. Petrol, Inc.green2 sentences2015Whether Bingham’s “Citizen’s Arrest” of Fitzgerald was Lawful [10] “Indiana follows the general common law rule that ‘a private citizen has the right to arrest one who has committed a felony in his presence, and may even arrest one he reasonably believes to have committed a felony, so long as the felony was in fact committed.’ ” U.S. v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454, 460-61 (7th Cir.1975) (quoting Surratt v. Petrol, Inc., 160 Ind.App. 479 , 312 N.E.2d 487, 495 (1974)). 2015Whether Bingham’s “Citizen’s Arrest” of Fitzgerald was Lawful [10] “Indiana follows the general common law rule that ‘a private citizen has the right to arrest one who has committed a felony in his presence, and may even arrest one he reasonably believes to have committed a felony, so long as the felony was in fact committed.’ ” U.S. v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454, 460-61 (7th Cir.1975) (quoting Surratt v. Petrol, Inc., 160 Ind.App. 479 , 312 N.E.2d 487, 495 (1974)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Hillsman and Clinton Bushgreen1 sentence2015Whether Bingham’s “Citizen’s Arrest” of Fitzgerald was Lawful [10] “Indiana follows the general common law rule that ‘a private citizen has the right to arrest one who has committed a felony in his presence, and may even arrest one he reasonably believes to have committed a felony, so long as the felony was in fact committed.’ ” U.S. v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454, 460-61 (7th Cir.1975) (quoting Surratt v. Petrol, Inc., 160 Ind.App. 479 , 312 N.E.2d 487, 495 (1974)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Niehenkegreen2 sentences1996See, Estate of Niehenke v. Guske, 117 Wash.2d 631 , 818 P.2d 1324 (1991); Womach v. Thomas, 486 A.2d 15 (Del.Ch.1984). 1996See, Estate of Niehenke v. Guske, 117 Wash.2d 631 , 818 P.2d 1324 (1991); Womach v. Thomas, 486 A.2d 15 (Del.Ch.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Coolgreen1 sentence1996Smith v. Frantz, 59 Ind.App. 260 , 109 N.E. 407, 410 (1915) (holding that crops planted by a tenant who knew that the crops would not be ready to harvest until after the end of the lease belonged to the landlord); Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56, 58 (1864) (stating that the general common law rule is that growing crops follow title to Further, many other jurisdictions have held that growing crops are part of the realty when the land is sold or conveyed. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Frantzgreen2 sentences1996Smith v. Frantz, 59 Ind.App. 260 , 109 N.E. 407, 410 (1915) (holding that crops planted by a tenant who knew that the crops would not be ready to harvest until after the end of the lease belonged to the landlord); Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56, 58 (1864) (stating that the general common law rule is that growing crops follow title to Further, many other jurisdictions have held that growing crops are part of the realty when the land is sold or conveyed. 1996Smith v. Frantz, 59 Ind.App. 260 , 109 N.E. 407, 410 (1915) (holding that crops planted by a tenant who knew that the crops would not be ready to harvest until after the end of the lease belonged to the landlord); Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56, 58 (1864) (stating that the general common law rule is that growing crops follow title to Further, many other jurisdictions have held that growing crops are part of the realty when the land is sold or conveyed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Diffenderfer v. Scott
green
2 sentences1994According to the case of Diffenderfer, Executrix v. Scott, N.F., (1892), 5 Ind.App. 243 , 32 N.E. 87 , that general rule has the following basis: The rules of practice will not permit a party to call a witness closely connected with the adversary's cause, and from whom he has not reason to expect favorable testimony, then to assail the character of the witness by impeachment. 1994According to the case of Diffenderfer, Executrix v. Scott, N.F., (1892), 5 Ind.App. 243 , 32 N.E. 87 , that general rule has the following basis: The rules of practice will not permit a party to call a witness closely connected with the adversary's cause, and from whom he has not reason to expect favorable testimony, then to assail the character of the witness by impeachment. | 3 | 1985–1994 |
Vaughn v. Daniels Co.(West Virginia), Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Capitol argues, however, that the Indiana Supreme Court abrogated the nondelegability aspect of the five exceptions to the general common law rule in Vaughn v. Daniels Co., 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind.2006), reh'g denied. 2011Capitol argues, however, that the Indiana Supreme Court abrogated the nondelegability aspect of the five exceptions to the general common law rule in Vaughn v. Daniels Co., 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind.2006), reh’g denied. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Church Bros. Body Service, Inc. v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. of Indianapolis
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 332 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Womach v. Thomas
green
1 sentence1996See, Estate of Niehenke v. Guske, 117 Wash.2d 631 , 818 P.2d 1324 (1991); Womach v. Thomas, 486 A.2d 15 (Del.Ch.1984). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Calvary Baptist Church v. Joseph
green
1 sentence1995Calvary Baptist Church of Marion, Ind. v. Joseph (1993), Ind., 522 N.E.2d 371, 374 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Stuck v. State
green
2 sentences1980Stuck v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 291 , 286 N.E.2d 652 . 1980Stuck v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 291 , 286 N.E.2d 652 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Raplee v. City of Corning
green
1 sentence1976Although it has been held that whether a municipal corporation may be held accountable for punitive damages, in the absence of a statutory authorization, is not entirely free from doubt, Raplee v. City of Corning (1958), 176 N.Y.S. 2d 162, 165 , it appears that it is the general common-law rule that exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipal corporation. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Shoemaker v. Dowd, Warden
green
2 sentences1971C. 1971, 35-10-2-3, being Burns § 9-3304, says: “The common law rules of res ad judicata shall apply to proceedings for writs of habeas corpus in criminal matters.” In discussing res judicata and successive applications for habeas corpus, we said in Shoemaker v. Dowd (1953), 232 Ind. 602 , 115 N. E. 2d 443 : “The general common law rule as to the rule of res judicata in proceedings for writ of habeas corpus is that a decision under one writ of habeas corpus, refusing to discharge a prisoner, is not a bar to the issuance of another writ. 1971C. 1971, 35-10-2-3, being Burns § 9-3304, says: “The common law rules of res ad judicata shall apply to proceedings for writs of habeas corpus in criminal matters.” In discussing res judicata and successive applications for habeas corpus, we said in Shoemaker v. Dowd (1953), 232 Ind. 602 , 115 N. E. 2d 443 : “The general common law rule as to the rule of res judicata in proceedings for writ of habeas corpus is that a decision under one writ of habeas corpus, refusing to discharge a prisoner, is not a bar to the issuance of another writ. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Town of Argos v. Harley
green
2 sentences1970R. 207, which enunciates the common law rule governing abutting owner’s responsibility to keep sidewalks in repair, as follows: “ 'The general rule is that no common law duty rests upon the owner or occupant of premises abutting on a public street to keep the sidewalks in repair; consequently such an abutting owner is not liable for a defect in a sidewalk in front of his premises which he did not create.’ ” *511 However, Judge Crumpaeker further stated the following exception to the general common law rule: “If, however, for his own purpose, use and convenience he creates such a defect, or thr 1970R. 207, which enunciates the common law rule governing abutting owner’s responsibility to keep sidewalks in repair, as follows: “ 'The general rule is that no common law duty rests upon the owner or occupant of premises abutting on a public street to keep the sidewalks in repair; consequently such an abutting owner is not liable for a defect in a sidewalk in front of his premises which he did not create.’ ” *511 However, Judge Crumpaeker further stated the following exception to the general common law rule: “If, however, for his own purpose, use and convenience he creates such a defect, or thr | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Blakley v. Marshall
green
1 sentence1903Appeal of Sloughton, 88 Pa. St. 198; Westmoreland Coal Co.’s Appeal, supra; Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. St. 425, 34 Atl. 564 ; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. St. 371, 36 Atl. 201 , 35 L. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Marshall v. Mellon
green
1 sentence1903Appeal of Sloughton, 88 Pa. St. 198; Westmoreland Coal Co.’s Appeal, supra; Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. St. 425, 34 Atl. 564 ; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. St. 371, 36 Atl. 201 , 35 L. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.