72 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Curtis v. Gibbsgreen2 sentences2024“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974). 2024“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974). | 19 | 27 |
In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.green2 sentences2024Applicable Law “The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” Id. at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding). 2018Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” (quoting Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974))); Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305-06 (Tex. 1986) (“[W]hen a suit is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, that court is entitled to proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a suit subsequently filed in another court of this state.”); In re Henry, 274 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. | 7 | 9 |
Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Districtgreen2 sentences2022Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. 1993); Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560 , 563 n.2 (Tex. 1991). 1995The general common law rule in Texas is that “the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974); Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex.1993); Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560 , 563 n. 2 (Tex.1991). | 2 | 2 |
Bockelmann v. Marynickgreen2 sentences2010The general common law rule provides that “[a] tenant who remains in possession of the premises after termination of the lease occupies ‘wrongfully’ and is said to have a tenancy at sufferance.” Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.1990). 2010The general common law rule provides that "[a] tenant who remains in possession of the premises after termination of the lease occupies `wrongfully' and is said to have a tenancy at sufferance." Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.1990). | 2 | 2 |
Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Associates, Inc. v. Kiddgreen2 sentences2004See e.g., Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). 2004See e.g., Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). | 2 | 2 |
Cleveland v. Wardgreen2 sentences2013“As a rule, when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other cases should abate.” Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex.2001); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974) (“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.”), citing Cleveland, v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1 , 285 S.W. 1063 (1926). 2013“As a rule, when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other cases should abate.” Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex.2001); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974) (“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.”), citing Cleveland, v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1 , 285 S.W. 1063 (1926). | 1 | 13 |
Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Pressgreen2 sentences1986Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. 1962). 1973The general common law rule is to disallow attorney’s fees in the absence of a contract to the contrary, Van Zandt, supra. Consequently a statute that creates a liability unknown to the common law will be strictly construed. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Simsgreen2 sentences2024Applicable Law “The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” Id. at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding). 2024“Where two actions involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction should retain such jurisdiction, undisturbed by the interference of another court, and dispose of the controversy.” In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 303 . | 1 | 1 |
Michael Lee Wyrick A/K/A Mike Wyrick and Gregory Michael Ruhnke A/K/A Greg Ruhnke v. Business Bank of Texas, N. A.green1 sentence2024“The dominant jurisdiction analysis is applicable, however, only when multiple suits are inherently interrelated and venue is proper in each county.” Wyrick v. Business Bank of Tex., N.A., 577 S.W.3d 336, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing In re Red Dot Bldg. | 1 | 1 |
Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd.green1 sentence2023See Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Henry v. McMichaelgreen1 sentence2018Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” (quoting Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974))); Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305-06 (Tex. 1986) (“[W]hen a suit is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, that court is entitled to proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a suit subsequently filed in another court of this state.”); In re Henry, 274 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. | 1 | 1 |
Gannon v. Paynegreen1 sentence2018Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” (quoting Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974))); Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305-06 (Tex. 1986) (“[W]hen a suit is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, that court is entitled to proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a suit subsequently filed in another court of this state.”); In re Henry, 274 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Puiggreen1 sentence2017In re Puig , 351 S.W.3d 301 , 305 (Tex. 2011) ("When the jurisdiction of a county court sitting in probate and a district court are concurrent, the issue is one of dominant jurisdiction.") The Texas Supreme Court explains dominant jurisdiction this way: The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Packergreen1 sentence2016See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). 6 ANALYSIS A. Principles of Dominant Jurisdiction “The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” In re J.B. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Home Management, Inc. v. Peavygreen1 sentence2013“Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court.” Texas Home Mgmt, Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2002) Chapter 95 codified the general common-law rule that “an owner or occupier does not have a duty to see that an independent contractor performs work in a safe manner.” Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985); see TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Del Riogreen1 sentence2013“As a rule, when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other cases should abate.” Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex.2001); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974) (“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.”), citing Cleveland, v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1 , 285 S.W. 1063 (1926). | 1 | 1 |
Quick v. City of Austingreen1 sentence2013Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 128 (Tex. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Redinger v. Living, Inc.green1 sentence2013“Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court.” Texas Home Mgmt, Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2002) Chapter 95 codified the general common-law rule that “an owner or occupier does not have a duty to see that an independent contractor performs work in a safe manner.” Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985); see TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Clawson v. Millardgreen1 sentence2013However, “the mere physical filing of the petition is insufficient to deprive a court in which the same suit is subsequently filed of active jurisdiction.” See Clawson v. Millard, 934 S.W.2d 899, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.green2 sentences2011Additionally, Dugger can claim no vested right in the general common law rule to defeat that policy. “[N]o one has any vested or property interest in the rules of the common law, and therefore no one is deprived of a constitutional right by their change through legislative enactment.” Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 561 (1916) (upholding constitutionality of workers’ compensation act). 20 Dugger argues section 93.001 applies only “to those civil actions for damages for personal injury or death in which the sole cause of the damages was either (1) the claimant’s 2011Additionally, Dugger can claim no vested right in the general common law rule to defeat that policy. “[N]o one has any vested or property interest in the rules of the common law, and therefore no one is deprived of a constitutional right by their change through legislative enactment.” Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 561 (1916) (upholding constitutionality of workers’ compensation act). 20 Dugger argues section 93.001 applies only “to those civil actions for damages for personal injury or death in which the sole cause of the damages was either (1) the claimant’s | 1 | 1 |
| Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers and Contractors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hardy v. McCorklegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garza-Vale v. Kwieciengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Price v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Lee Lillard
green
2 sentences1995Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1 , 285 S.W. 1063 (1926), Ex parte Lillard, 159 Tex. 18 , 314 S.W.2d 800 (1958). 1995Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1 , 285 S.W. 1063 (1926), Ex parte Lillard, 159 Tex. 18 , 314 S.W.2d 800 (1958). | 9 | 1974–1995 |
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Elmore & Stahl
green
2 sentences1980In discussing the general common law rule regarding carrier liability, 1 our Supreme Court said in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Elmore & Stahl, 368 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1963) affirmed, 377 U.S. 134 , 84 S.Ct. 1142 , 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964): A shipper of goods by common carrier makes a prima facie case of carrier liability by showing that the shipment was in good condition when delivered to the carrier at place of origin and in damaged condition when delivered by the carrier at destination. 1974In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 368 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Sup.963), at page 101 the court said: “Under the general common law rule, a shipper of goods by common carrier makes a prima facie case of carrier liability by showing that the shipment was in good condition when delivered to the carrier at place of origin and in damaged condition when delivered by the carrier at destination. | 5 | 1963–1980 |
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Id. (citing RESTATEMENT SECOND , Agency § 275, cmt. b; § 268, cmt. d (1958)). 2011Id. (citing Restatement Second, Agency § 275, cmt. b; § 268, cmt. d (1958)). | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Mower v. Boyer
green
2 sentences2022Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. 1993); Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560 , 563 n.2 (Tex. 1991). 1995The general common law rule in Texas is that “the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974); Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex.1993); Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560 , 563 n. 2 (Tex.1991). | 2 | 1995–2022 |
Capehart v. State
green
2 sentences2008"The general common law rule in Texas is that 'the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.'" Capehart, 257 S.W.3d at 815 ; see Miles, 915 S.W.2d at 138; Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263 , 267 2 (Tex. 1974). 2008"The general common law rule in Texas is that 'the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.'" Capehart , 257 S.W.3d at 815 ; see Miles , 915 S.W.2d at 138; Curtis v. Gibbs , 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Elmore & Stahl
green
2 sentences1980In discussing the general common law rule regarding carrier liability, 1 our Supreme Court said in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Elmore & Stahl, 368 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1963) affirmed, 377 U.S. 134 , 84 S.Ct. 1142 , 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964): A shipper of goods by common carrier makes a prima facie case of carrier liability by showing that the shipment was in good condition when delivered to the carrier at place of origin and in damaged condition when delivered by the carrier at destination. 1980In discussing the general common law rule regarding carrier liability, 1 our Supreme Court said in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Elmore & Stahl, 368 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1963) affirmed, 377 U.S. 134 , 84 S.Ct. 1142 , 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964): A shipper of goods by common carrier makes a prima facie case of carrier liability by showing that the shipment was in good condition when delivered to the carrier at place of origin and in damaged condition when delivered by the carrier at destination. | 2 | 1964–1980 |
Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Berry-Helfand
green
1 sentence2025While it is true that an accrual date prescribed by statute governs over the general rule that a cause of action accrues and statutes of limitations begin to run when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy, Southwestern Energy Prod., 491 S.W.3d at 721 , when construing the statutorily prescribed “termination” date consistently with the parties’ intent as expressed in the Contract and Bond, the only reasonable conclusion is that which aligns with the general common-law rule of accrual: that the parties intended the Contract to survive the Contractor’s defa | 1 | 2025–2025 |
JCB, Incorporated v. Horsburgh & Scott Company
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 243 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 804–07. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy
green
1 sentence2015Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 , 853–54 (Tex. 2002). instance, as opposed to the legislative prerogative of whether and how it is waived.3 While the general common-law rule is that immunity shields government and its agents from suit and liability in the first instance, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized some exceptions to that rule, and Lawson illustrates one of those. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Miles v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Brown Foundation Repair & Consulting, Inc. v. Friendly Chevrolet Co. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Carlock v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Isenhower v. Bell green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Southern States Life Insurance Company v. Newlon green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Schonrock v. Taylor green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Wheeler v. Glazer green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Smith v. Bifano green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Succession of Reiss neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Odell v. Lutz green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Veazey v. Stewart green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Flannery v. Sharp green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| George v. Hesse green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Turner v. Turner green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| City of Victoria v. Schott green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Kennedy v. Upshaw green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.