24 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1887–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2017See State v. James , 211 Conn. 555 , 560, 560 A.2d 426 (1989) ("[i]n 1848 the common law disability of parties to testify as witnesses was removed by a statute now incorporated in General Statutes § 52-145 [a]"). 2017See State v. James , 211 Conn. 555 , 560, 560 A.2d 426 (1989) ("[i]n 1848 the common law disability of parties to testify as witnesses was removed by a statute now incorporated in General Statutes § 52-145 [a]"). | 2 | 2 |
Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissionersgreen2 sentences2015See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 193 , 592 A.2d 912 (1991) (‘‘[§] 7-465 [a] effec- tively circumvented the general common law immunity of municipalities from vicarious liability for their employees’ acts’’); see also Kostyal v. Cass, supra, 163 Conn. 97 (‘‘in no event may the municipality be held liable under [§ 7-465] unless the municipal employee himself becomes obligated’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). 2015See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 193 , 592 A.2d 912 (1991) (‘‘[§] 7-465 [a] effec- tively circumvented the general common law immunity of municipalities from vicarious liability for their employees’ acts’’); see also Kostyal v. Cass, supra, 163 Conn. 97 (‘‘in no event may the municipality be held liable under [§ 7-465] unless the municipal employee himself becomes obligated’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 6 |
Fraser v. Henningergreen2 sentences2000Municipal immunity has been abrogated by § 7-465 (a) which provides that "[g]overnmental immunity shall not be a defense in any action brought under this section." "Section 7-465 (a) effectively circumvented the general common law immunity of municipalities from vicarious liability for their employees' acts by permitting injured plaintiffs to seek indemnification from a municipal employer for such acts under certain circumstances and after conformance with certain statutory requirements, but it did not bar a plaintiff from seeking redress from those employees." Sanzone v. Board of Police Commi 2000Municipal immunity has been abrogated by § 7-465 (a) which provides that "[g]overnmental immunity shall not be a defense in any action brought under this section." "Section 7-465 (a) effectively circumvented the general common law immunity of municipalities from vicarious liability for their employees' acts by permitting injured plaintiffs to seek indemnification from a municipal employer for such acts under certain circumstances and after conformance with certain statutory requirements, but it did not bar a plaintiff from seeking redress from those employees." Sanzone v. Board of Police Commi | 1 | 2 |
Light Rigging Co. v. Department of Public Utility Controlgreen2 sentences2025See Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168 , 176–77, 592 A.2d 386 (1991). 2025See Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168 , 176–77, 592 A.2d 386 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2019See State v. Wilson , supra, 199 Conn. at 437 , 513 A.2d 620 . 2019See State v. Wilson , supra, 199 Conn. at 437 , 513 A.2d 620 . | 1 | 1 |
Gandolfo v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2019See Martel [v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir. 1993)] (discussing Massachusetts common law rule); Gandolfo v. Alford, 31 Conn. Supp. 417 , 333 A.2d 65, 66 (Ct. 1975) (stating ‘that the general common-law rule is an executor or administrator of an estate can sue and be sued only in a jurisdiction in which he has been so appointed’). 2019See Martel [v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir. 1993)] (discussing Massachusetts common law rule); Gandolfo v. Alford, 31 Conn. Supp. 417 , 333 A.2d 65, 66 (Ct. 1975) (stating ‘that the general common-law rule is an executor or administrator of an estate can sue and be sued only in a jurisdiction in which he has been so appointed’). | 1 | 1 |
Scott Martel v. George F. Stafford, Administrator, Etc.green1 sentence2019See Martel [v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir. 1993)] (discussing Massachusetts common law rule); Gandolfo v. Alford, 31 Conn. Supp. 417 , 333 A.2d 65, 66 (Ct. 1975) (stating ‘that the general common-law rule is an executor or administrator of an estate can sue and be sued only in a jurisdiction in which he has been so appointed’). | 1 | 1 |
In Re EGgreen2 sentences2015See In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98 , 111, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989) (‘‘[i]f the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that the minor is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment’’); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (minor has capacity to consent to withholding of medi- cal treatment when ‘‘the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits’’ and ‘‘if he is c 2015See In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98 , 111, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989) (‘‘[i]f the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that the minor is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment’’); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (minor has capacity to consent to withholding of medi- cal treatment when ‘‘the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits’’ and ‘‘if he is c | 1 | 1 |
In Re Swangreen1 sentence2015See In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98 , 111, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989) (‘‘[i]f the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that the minor is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment’’); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (minor has capacity to consent to withholding of medi- cal treatment when ‘‘the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits’’ and ‘‘if he is c | 1 | 1 |
Cardwell v. Bechtolgreen1 sentence2015See In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98 , 111, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989) (‘‘[i]f the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that the minor is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment’’); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (minor has capacity to consent to withholding of medi- cal treatment when ‘‘the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits’’ and ‘‘if he is c | 1 | 1 |
Cronin v. Chrosniakgreen1 sentence2003Strunk v. Zoltanski, supra, 62 N.Y.2d 576 ; see also Cronin v. Chrosniak, 145 App. Div. 2d 905, 906-907, 536 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schubert v. Ivey
green
2 sentences1998"Under the general common law rule, where two or more promisors enter into an agreement with a third party for one performance, there is a presumption that the promisors are contracting jointly in absence of words of severance in the contract." Schubert v. Ivy, supra. The Restatement of Contracts, 2nd Ed. § 289 provides in part as follows: "(1) Where two or more parties to a contract promise the same performance to the promisee each is bound for the whole performance thereof whether his duty is joint, several, or joint and several. 2) Where two or more parties to a contract promise the same pe 1991"The effect of a joint obligation as distinguished from a several obligation is that each promisor is liable for the whole performance jointly assumed where . . . all three promisors are made parties and none is under any disability." Schubert v. Ivey, 158 Conn. 583 . | 2 | 1991–1998 |
Hammond v. City of Waterbury
green
2 sentences2012“The Kaplan case established a narrow exception to the general common law principle that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors.” (Emphasis in original.) Hammond v. Waterbury, 219 Conn. 569, 576 , 594 A.2d 939 (1991). ‘Kaplan impose[d] an implied obligation of indemnity on a tortfeasor whose active negligence is primarily responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, thus superseding the indemnitee’s passive negligence.” 1 (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. New Haven, 258 Conn. 56, 66 , 779 A.2d 104 (2001). “[Ijndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary lia 2012“The Kaplan case established a narrow exception to the general common law principle that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors.” (Emphasis in original.) Hammond v. Waterbury, 219 Conn. 569, 576 , 594 A.2d 939 (1991). ‘Kaplan impose[d] an implied obligation of indemnity on a tortfeasor whose active negligence is primarily responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, thus superseding the indemnitee’s passive negligence.” 1 (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. New Haven, 258 Conn. 56, 66 , 779 A.2d 104 (2001). “[Ijndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary lia | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Smith v. City of New Haven
green
2 sentences2012“The Kaplan case established a narrow exception to the general common law principle that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors.” (Emphasis in original.) Hammond v. Waterbury, 219 Conn. 569, 576 , 594 A.2d 939 (1991). ‘Kaplan impose[d] an implied obligation of indemnity on a tortfeasor whose active negligence is primarily responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, thus superseding the indemnitee’s passive negligence.” 1 (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. New Haven, 258 Conn. 56, 66 , 779 A.2d 104 (2001). “[Ijndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary lia 2012“The Kaplan case established a narrow exception to the general common law principle that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors.” (Emphasis in original.) Hammond v. Waterbury, 219 Conn. 569, 576 , 594 A.2d 939 (1991). ‘Kaplan impose[d] an implied obligation of indemnity on a tortfeasor whose active negligence is primarily responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, thus superseding the indemnitee’s passive negligence.” 1 (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. New Haven, 258 Conn. 56, 66 , 779 A.2d 104 (2001). “[Ijndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary lia | 1 | 2012–2012 |
City of Bristol v. Dickau Bus Co.
green
2 sentences2012Indemnity shifts the impact of liability from passive joint tortfeasors to active ones.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Dickau Bus Co., 63 Conn. App. 770, 773 , 779 A.2d 152 (2001). 2012Indemnity shifts the impact of liability from passive joint tortfeasors to active ones.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Dickau Bus Co., 63 Conn. App. 770, 773 , 779 A.2d 152 (2001). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Uccello v. Laudenslayer
green
2 sentences2003The Strunk court also adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal in Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975), for the idea that landlords can be held hable for off premises attacks under the general common-law rule and where the landlord has the right to remove the animal by evicting the tenant. 2003The Strunk court also adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal in Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975), for the idea that landlords can be held hable for off premises attacks under the general common-law rule and where the landlord has the right to remove the animal by evicting the tenant. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority
green
1 sentence2001The rationale for according such immunity is virtually identical to that which has long supported the general common-law doctrine of municipal immunity, to wit: that municipal officers vested with responsibility for conducting the affairs of local government on behalf of the public should not be second guessed or interfered with by the courts, and that they should be emboldened to exercise their discretion fully, wisely and courageously without fear that they will be held civilly liable for mere mistakes in the formulation or execution of public policy." See Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conm 43 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Sims v. Honda Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2000Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401 , 406 (1993). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Atkinson v. Berloni
green
1 sentence1999Because the common law cause of action relied upon by the defendant Kurland represents an exception to the general common law rule barring indemnification among joint tortfeasors; Atkinson v. Berloni , 23 Conn. App. 325 , 326 (1990); it is not controlling in situations where the parties do not enjoy the status of joint tortfeasors. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hassett v. Carroll
green
1 sentence1998Yet, despite the Court's tacit approval of the general common law presumption in Wynne v. Parsons, the Connecticut Supreme Court later held in 1905, that the presumption applies to "injuries," rather than "damages": "the damages recoverable [by the plaintiff] should . . . have been limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for those injuries which the law presumed as the natural and proximate results of the publication; Wynne v. Parsons. 57 Conn. 73 , 17 A. 362 ; such as his damaged reputation [and] his injured feelings . . ." (Emphasis added.) Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 3 | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wynne v. Parsons
green
2 sentences1998Yet, despite the Court's tacit approval of the general common law presumption in Wynne v. Parsons, the Connecticut Supreme Court later held in 1905, that the presumption applies to "injuries," rather than "damages": "the damages recoverable [by the plaintiff] should . . . have been limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for those injuries which the law presumed as the natural and proximate results of the publication; Wynne v. Parsons. 57 Conn. 73 , 17 A. 362 ; such as his damaged reputation [and] his injured feelings . . ." (Emphasis added.) Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 3 1998Yet, despite the Court's tacit approval of the general common law presumption in Wynne v. Parsons, the Connecticut Supreme Court later held in 1905, that the presumption applies to "injuries," rather than "damages": "the damages recoverable [by the plaintiff] should . . . have been limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for those injuries which the law presumed as the natural and proximate results of the publication; Wynne v. Parsons. 57 Conn. 73 , 17 A. 362 ; such as his damaged reputation [and] his injured feelings . . ." (Emphasis added.) Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 3 | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Farrand
neutral
1 sentence1974State v. Farrand, 1 Root 446 ; State v. Vincent, supra; note, 4 A.L.R.3d 874 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Vincent
green
1 sentence1974State v. Farrand, 1 Root 446 ; State v. Vincent, supra; note, 4 A.L.R.3d 874 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Nolan v. Morelli
green
2 sentences1967Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436 , 226 A.2d 383 . 1967Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436 , 226 A.2d 383 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Grant v. Allen
green
1 sentence1887The general common law rule in reference to surface water is that stated in Gould on Waters, § 267, as follows:—- “ The right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it in such maimer and for such purposes as he may see fit, either by changing the surface, or the erection of buildings or other structures thereon, is not restricted or modified by the fact that his own land is so situated with reference to that of adjoining owners, that an alteration in the mode of its improvement or occupation in any portion of it will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling on it | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.