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22 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1980–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio 2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio | 5 | 9 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2004The United States Supreme Court established a two-part test to assess the reasonableness of a school search conducted by school officials: Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ■ “whether the... action was justified at its inception,” [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , (1968)]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” [M] Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by 2004The United States Supreme Court established a two-part test to assess the reasonableness of a school search conducted by school officials: Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ■ “whether the... action was justified at its inception,” [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , (1968)]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” [M] Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by | 2 | 12 |
Commonwealth v. Petersongreen2 sentences2025The expectation of privacy test requires “a balancing of the societal interests involved.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. 1993) (internal citations omitted). 2025The expectation of privacy test requires “a balancing of the societal interests involved.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. 1993) (internal citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
New York v. Classgreen2 sentences2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio 2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio | 2 | 2 |
Oliver v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio 2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio | 2 | 2 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green2 sentences2004Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. [T.L.O., supra] at 341-342, 105 S.Ct. at 742-743 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 734-735 (footnotes omitted).... 2004Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. [T.L.O., supra] at 341-342, 105 S.Ct. at 742-743 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 734-735 (footnotes omitted).... | 2 | 2 |
In Re MGgreen1 sentence2021“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). -6- J-S16032-21 The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of T.B.B.green1 sentence2021“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). -6- J-S16032-21 The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lowerygreen1 sentence2020The legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test “is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring); Commonwealth v. Lowery, 451 A.2d 245, 247 (Pa. Super. 1982) (accord). -5- J-S41004-20 McNeal draws upon several facts to demonstrate that, subjectively, he believed the Galaxy 5S was still his private phone, even after the police seized it. | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Caballesgreen2 sentences2007Nevertheless, “[o]fficial conduct that does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 , 125 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842, 847 (2005) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 13 Justice Harlan’s concurring statement in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), articulated a two-fold requirement for individuals asserting Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections: [T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 2007Nevertheless, “[o]fficial conduct that does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 , 125 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842, 847 (2005) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 13 Justice Harlan’s concurring statement in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), articulated a two-fold requirement for individuals asserting Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections: [T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mancusi v. DeForte
green
2 sentences1983In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), which followed Katz , Justice Harlan, writing for six members of the Court, replaced the Jones “legitimately on the premises” test with his “reasonable expectation of privacy” rule. 9 Implicit in the DeForte decision was that the two tests were not inconsistent. 1983In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), which followed Katz , Justice Harlan, writing for six members of the Court, replaced the Jones “legitimately on the premises” test with his “reasonable expectation of privacy” rule. 9 Implicit in the DeForte decision was that the two tests were not inconsistent. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1983In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), which followed Katz , Justice Harlan, writing for six members of the Court, replaced the Jones "legitimately on the premises" test with his "reasonable expectation of privacy" rule. [9] Implicit in the DeForte decision was that the two tests were not inconsistent. *59 A qualitative change in the development of the Harlan test occurred in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). [10] The Rakas Court radically altered both the focus of the inquiry into the capacity to invoke Fourth Amendm 1983In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), which followed Katz , Justice Harlan, writing for six members of the Court, replaced the Jones "legitimately on the premises" test with his "reasonable expectation of privacy" rule. [9] Implicit in the DeForte decision was that the two tests were not inconsistent. *59 A qualitative change in the development of the Harlan test occurred in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). [10] The Rakas Court radically altered both the focus of the inquiry into the capacity to invoke Fourth Amendm | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.