twofold requirement in Washington

1989Ed. 2d 576 , 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in the following language: " [T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Assuming that the federal test yields no less restrictive guidelines than those required by our Const. art. 1, § 7, 2 we analyze Nalder's privacy right accordingly.

1989The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has its origins in a wiretap case, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in the following language: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.'" Assuming that the federal test yields no less restrictive guidelines than those required by our Const. art. 1, § 7, [2] we analyze Nalder's privacy right accordingly.

2013First, the court determines whether the claimed error is truly of constitutional magnitude, and second, the court must determine whether the error is “manifest.” To show that alleged error is “manifest” error, the defendant must show actual prejudice, meaning a “ ‘ “plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.” ’ ” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99 , 217 P.3d 756 , 761 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (quoting WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d at 603 )).

2013First, the court determines whether the claimed error is truly of constitutional magnitude, and second, the court must determine whether the error is “manifest.” To show that alleged error is “manifest” error, the defendant must show actual prejudice, meaning a “ ‘ “plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.” ’ ” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99 , 217 P.3d 756 , 761 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (quoting WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d at 603 )).

2013First, the court determines whether the claimed error is truly of constitutional magnitude, and second, the court must determine whether the error is “manifest.” To show that alleged error is “manifest” error, the defendant must show actual prejudice, meaning a “ ‘ “plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.” ’ ” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99 , 217 P.3d 756 , 761 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (quoting WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d at 603 )).

2013First, the court determines whether the claimed error is truly of constitutional magnitude, and second, the court must determine whether the error is “manifest.” To show that alleged error is “manifest” error, the defendant must show actual prejudice, meaning a “ ‘ “plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.” ’ ” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99 , 217 P.3d 756 , 761 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (quoting WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d at 603 )).

2013First, the court determines whether the claimed error is truly of constitutional magnitude, and second, the court must determine whether the error is “manifest.” To show that alleged error is “manifest” error, the defendant must show actual prejudice, meaning a “ ‘ “plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.” ’ ” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99 , 217 P.3d 756 , 761 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (quoting WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d at 603 )).

2007A. Did Evans have an expectation of privacy in the briefcase prior to its seizure? f 14 To establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the briefcase, Evans must satisfy a twofold test: (1) Did he “exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy by seeking to preserve something as private?” and (2) “[d]oes society recognize that expectation as reasonable?” State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 168 , 907 P.2d 319 (1995).

1994Peerson, 62 Wn.

1989Likewise, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 , the Court stated: Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the . . . action was justified at its inception," . . . second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," . . .

1986Ed. 2d 576 , 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in the following language: " [Tjhere is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" The test was elaborated upon and renamed a "legitimate expectation of privacy" test in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 58 L.

1986Ed. 2d 576 , 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in the following language: " [Tjhere is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" The test was elaborated upon and renamed a "legitimate expectation of privacy" test in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 58 L.

1983Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 358 , 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).

1983Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 358 , 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).