twofold test in New York

2025In Merson v. McNally ( 90 NY2d 742 , 752—53 [1997]), the Court of Appeals dealt with the "dilemma" of "how to permit an evolving process for identification of environmental concerns and initiatives to meet those concerns yet, on the other hand, to guard against an avoidance of the EIS process through private bilateral negotiations between a developer and a [*12]lead agency when a project may have potentially significant environmental impacts which need full and open consideration." Even assuming arguendo that this framework applies here — and decidedly it does not — the Court of Appeals prescr

2025In Merson v. McNally ( 90 NY2d 742 , 752—53 [1997]), the Court of Appeals dealt with the "dilemma" of "how to permit an evolving process for identification of environmental concerns and initiatives to meet those concerns yet, on the other hand, to guard against an avoidance of the EIS process through private bilateral negotiations between a developer and a [*12]lead agency when a project may have potentially significant environmental impacts which need full and open consideration." Even assuming arguendo that this framework applies here — and decidedly it does not — the Court of Appeals prescr

2022Co. Larocca , 117 AD2d at 443 ; see Morrissey v Brewer , 408 US at 481 ; Matter of Medicon Diagnostic Labs. v Perales , 145 AD2d 167, 172 [1989], affd 74 NY2d 539 [1989]).

2022Co. Larocca , 117 AD2d at 443 ; see Morrissey v Brewer , 408 US at 481 ; Matter of Medicon Diagnostic Labs. v Perales , 145 AD2d 167, 172 [1989], affd 74 NY2d 539 [1989]).

2015The plaintiff could rely upon the legal inference that D&D and Gutierrez were negligent, as it was clear from the submissions that their garbage truck struck the van in the rear while the van was in a stopped position at the scene of the accident (see Billis v Tunjian, 120 AD3d 1168 [2014]; Amador v City of New York, 120 AD3d 526 [2014]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850, 851 [2013]; Kertesz v Jason Transp.

2015The plaintiff could rely upon the legal inference that D&D and Gutierrez were negligent, as it was clear from the submissions that their garbage truck struck the van in the rear while the van was in a stopped position at the scene of the accident (see Billis v Tunjian, 120 AD3d 1168 [2014]; Amador v City of New York, 120 AD3d 526 [2014]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850, 851 [2013]; Kertesz v Jason Transp.

1999The first requirement is that the opinion testimony “depend upon professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence” (Dougherty v Milliken, 163 NY 527, 533 ; see also, People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40, 50 ).

1986Since a low bidder does not acquire a property right in a contract (Matter of Callanan Indus. v City of Schenectady, 116 AD2d 883, 884 ; see, Eastway Constr.

1985(Pickett v Brown, supra; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Thomas J.S., 100 AD2d 119 .) (1) The United States Supreme Court has thus held unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause a one-year Statute of Limitations in Mills v Habluetzel ( 456 US 91 ) and a two-year Statute of Limitations in Pickett v Brown (supra).

1985In New York a twofold test has been adopted for determining admissibility: (1) does the opinion testimony “depend upon professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence” (Dougherty v Milliken, 163 NY 525 , 533; People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 ) and (2) is the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge sufficiently developed to permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert (see, People v Leone, 25 NY2d 511; Frye v United States, 293 F 1013, supra; McCormick, Evidence § 13 [Cleary 2d ed 1972]).

1985“Such a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears ‘an evident and substantial relation to the particular * * * interests this statute is designed to serve.’” (United States v Clark, 445 US 23, 27 .) “[Restrictions on support suits by illegitimate children ‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” (Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1, 8 .) Determination of whether the statute impermissibly discriminates between illegitimate and legitimate children and thus violates the equal protection clause, req

1985“Such a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears ‘an evident and substantial relation to the particular * * * interests this statute is designed to serve.’” (United States v Clark, 445 US 23, 27 .) “[Restrictions on support suits by illegitimate children ‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” (Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1, 8 .) Determination of whether the statute impermissibly discriminates between illegitimate and legitimate children and thus violates the equal protection clause, req

1985(Pickett v Brown, supra; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Thomas J.S., 100 AD2d 119 .) (1) The United States Supreme Court has thus held unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause a one-year Statute of Limitations in Mills v Habluetzel ( 456 US 91 ) and a two-year Statute of Limitations in Pickett v Brown (supra).

1985In New York a twofold test has been adopted for determining admissibility: (1) does the opinion testimony “depend upon professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence” (Dougherty v Milliken, 163 NY 525 , 533; People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 ) and (2) is the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge sufficiently developed to permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert (see, People v Leone, 25 NY2d 511; Frye v United States, 293 F 1013, supra; McCormick, Evidence § 13 [Cleary 2d ed 1972]).

1985The law is settled that the admissibility and bounds of expert testimony rest primarily within the sound discretion of the trial court (People v Henson, 33 NY2d 63 ).

1985(Pickett v Brown, supra; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Thomas J.S., 100 AD2d 119 .) (1) The United States Supreme Court has thus held unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause a one-year Statute of Limitations in Mills v Habluetzel ( 456 US 91 ) and a two-year Statute of Limitations in Pickett v Brown (supra).

1983As I read it, Parker (supra) requires a twofold analysis: (1) Is the defendant voluntarily absent?, and (2) Has the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to be present?

1983While admitting that there are occasions when a defendant’s conduct may imply a waiver, the existence of a constitutional right requires that the defendant, “at a minimum”, be warned of the consequences of this waiver (People v Parker, supra, p 141 ).

1982Voice spectrogram analysis has reached the standards of scientific acceptance and reliability necessary for its admissibility into evidence with ultimate consideration by the trier of facts.” In People v Collins (supra), the court concluded that the twofold test of reliability and general scientific acceptance must be applied to determine the admissibility of spectro graphic analysis for voice identification.

1981Proceeding from the proposition ( 110 Misc 2d 595, 599 , supra) that a subpoena duces tecum “can constitute an unreasonable search and seizure”, citing Boyd v United States ( 116 US 616, 622 ), 14 and applying a twofold test 15 to determine whether Tempera had an interest in the disclosure statements that was protected by the Fourth Amendment, the County Court stated its ultimate conclusion as follows (p 603): “Inasmuch as the local law created an expectation of privacy in [Tempera’s] financial statement which [he] relied upon and inasmuch as the local law created an expectation of privacy in

1981Accordingly, the subpoena must be quashed.” In the course of its analysis, the County Court ( 110 Misc 2d, at p 601 ) noted its recognition that the United States Supreme Court “has held that a person having no proprietary interest in documents belonging to a third party cannot assert the Fourth Amendment to prevent their compelled production by the third party (see United States v Miller, 425 US 435 * * * California Bankers Assn. v Schultz, 416 US 21 *** Donaldson v United States, 400 US 517 ).” However, the County Court distinguished those cases as follows (pp 601-602): “[T]he ratio decidend

1981Accordingly, the subpoena must be quashed.” In the course of its analysis, the County Court ( 110 Misc 2d, at p 601 ) noted its recognition that the United States Supreme Court “has held that a person having no proprietary interest in documents belonging to a third party cannot assert the Fourth Amendment to prevent their compelled production by the third party (see United States v Miller, 425 US 435 * * * California Bankers Assn. v Schultz, 416 US 21 *** Donaldson v United States, 400 US 517 ).” However, the County Court distinguished those cases as follows (pp 601-602): “[T]he ratio decidend

1981Accordingly, the subpoena must be quashed.” In the course of its analysis, the County Court ( 110 Misc 2d, at p 601 ) noted its recognition that the United States Supreme Court “has held that a person having no proprietary interest in documents belonging to a third party cannot assert the Fourth Amendment to prevent their compelled production by the third party (see United States v Miller, 425 US 435 * * * California Bankers Assn. v Schultz, 416 US 21 *** Donaldson v United States, 400 US 517 ).” However, the County Court distinguished those cases as follows (pp 601-602): “[T]he ratio decidend

1981Id., at 752 ; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. [293], at 302; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).” The County Court distinguished the instant case from Miller , on the ground that under the twofold test enunciated by Justice Harlan in Katz v United States (supra), Tempera has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the financial disclosure statements he filed with the board, arising out of the nondisclosure provisions of the Disclosure Law.