twofold requirement in Hawaii

2009Additionally, we stated in In re Doe, 104 Hawai'i 403 , 91 P.3d 485 (2004), overruled on other grounds in, In re Doe, 105 Hawai'i 505 , 100 P.3d 75 (2004),—cited with approval in Perez, discussed infra,— that “[determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the ... action wasjustiñed at its inception,’ [Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-tifíed the interference in the first placel]'” 104 Hawai'i at

2009Additionally, we stated in In re Doe, 104 Hawai'i 403 , 91 P.3d 485 (2004), overruled on other grounds in, In re Doe, 105 Hawai'i 505 , 100 P.3d 75 (2004),—cited with approval in Perez, discussed infra,— that “[determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the ... action wasjustiñed at its inception,’ [Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-tifíed the interference in the first placel]'” 104 Hawai'i at

2025McMillian imparts a twofold test to determine whether an official’s conduct may result in municipal liability. 520 U.S. at 785 .

2025To hold a local government liable for an official’s conduct, a plaintiff must first establish that the official had final policymaking authority for the government “concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” Id.

2016To determine whether a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Stachler, 58 Hawai‘i at 416, 570 P.2d at 1326 .

2016To determine whether a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person ... exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring); Stachler, 58 Haw. at 416 , 570 P.2d at 1326 .

2014Relatedly, in State v. Detroy, 102 Hawai'i 13 , 72 P.3d 485 (2003), this court relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), that thermal imagers were "not in general public use,” 533 U.S. at 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , in concluding that the use of thermal imagery was a search that required a warrant.

2014Relatedly, in State v. Detroy, 102 Hawai'i 13 , 72 P.3d 485 (2003), this court relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), that thermal imagers were "not in general public use,” 533 U.S. at 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , in concluding that the use of thermal imagery was a search that required a warrant.

2014Relatedly, in State v. Detroy, 102 Hawai'i 13 , 72 P.3d 485 (2003), this court relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), that thermal imagers were "not in general public use,” 533 U.S. at 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , in concluding that the use of thermal imagery was a search that required a warrant.

2014Relatedly, in State v. Detroy, 102 Hawai'i 13 , 72 P.3d 485 (2003), this court relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), that thermal imagers were "not in general public use,” 533 U.S. at 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , in concluding that the use of thermal imagery was a search that required a warrant.

2009Additionally, we stated in In re Doe, 104 Hawai'i 403 , 91 P.3d 485 (2004), overruled on other grounds in, In re Doe, 105 Hawai'i 505 , 100 P.3d 75 (2004),—cited with approval in Perez, discussed infra,— that “[determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the ... action wasjustiñed at its inception,’ [Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-tifíed the interference in the first placel]'” 104 Hawai'i at

2009Additionally, we stated in In re Doe, 104 Hawai'i 403 , 91 P.3d 485 (2004), overruled on other grounds in, In re Doe, 105 Hawai'i 505 , 100 P.3d 75 (2004),—cited with approval in Perez, discussed infra,— that “[determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the ... action wasjustiñed at its inception,’ [Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-tifíed the interference in the first placel]'” 104 Hawai'i at

2004As stated in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 , 105 S.Ct. 733 : Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider “whether the ... action was justified at its inception,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. [1,] 20, 88 S.Ct. [1868,] 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [ (1968) ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” ibid.

2004As stated in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 , 105 S.Ct. 733 : Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider “whether the ... action was justified at its inception,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. [1,] 20, 88 S.Ct. [1868,] 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [ (1968) ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” ibid.

2004In sum, when a homeowner chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company with a short-term guest, the twofold requirement "emerging from prior decisions" has been satisfied: Both host and guest "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy"; that "expectation is one our society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.'" Id. at 109, 119 S.Ct. 469 (brackets omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2004In sum, when a homeowner chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company with a short-term guest, the twofold requirement “emerging from prior decisions” has been satisfied: Both host and guest “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; that “expectation is one our society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. at 109, 119 S.Ct. 469 (brackets omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2001The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (citing Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir.1989)); Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 (citing Tabr

2001“Rule ll’s first (objective) branch in turn has two sub-branches: whether the party or attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the facts and whether the party or attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the law (Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435 ).” Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 ; *153 see also Harrison, 132 F.R.D. at 186 .