attractive nuisance doctrine in Missouri

20 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
Crawford v. Pacific Western Mobile Estates, Inc.green moctapp · 1977 · cited in 3 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1986 2 sentences 1986Crawford clearly demonstrates that Missouri adheres to the statement that “the pool and pond cases still state the law and a landowner is not now ... required to “child proof” his premises against an obvious danger.” Crawford, supra, at 221 . 1984The existence of a dangerous condition is not enough; it must have “distracting factors [which] are sufficient to prevent the trespassing 2 child from realizing the risk.” 548 S.W.2d at 222 .	1	3
Jones v. National Supermarkets, Inc.green moctapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000Conditions of land generally are in the nature of “hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like.” Jones v. National Supermarkets, Inc. 729 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Mo.App.1987) (quoting Dixon v. General Grocery Co., 293 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo.1956)).	1	1
Wiegers ex rel. Evans v. Fitzpatrickgreen moctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000She relies heavily on Wiegers by Evans v. Fitzpatrick, 766 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo.App. 1989), which held that a metal ladder brought onto land was an artificial condition of land for purposes of the attractive nuisance doctrine.	1	1
Dixon v. General Grocery Companygreen mo · 1956 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000Conditions of land generally are in the nature of “hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like.” Jones v. National Supermarkets, Inc. 729 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Mo.App.1987) (quoting Dixon v. General Grocery Co., 293 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo.1956)).	1	1
Glastris v. Union Electric Co.green moctapp · 1976 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 1 sentence 1983Later in Glastris v. Union Electric Co., 542 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Mo.App. 1976) and in Crawford v. Pacific Western MobUe Estates, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 216, 218-219 [2] (Mo.App.1977), our courts analyzing the 1965 revision of § 339 Restatement of Torts (First), found that the revision did not produce any material changes.	1	1
Arbogast v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louisgreen mo · 1970 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 1 sentence 1983Louis, 452 S.W.2d 81, 84 [9] (Mo.1970), recommended the adoption of § 339 Restatement of Torts (First), a modification of the attractive nuisance doctrine.	1	1
Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co.green ca8 · 1951 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964 1 sentence 1964Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 8 Cir., 191 F.2d 881, 883 [2], The plaintiff claims that his petition states a cause of action under Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227 , 130 S.W.2d 623 , on the attractive nuisance doctrine.	1	1
Alligator Co. v. Duttongreen ca8 · 1940 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1961–1961 2 sentences 1961Alligator Co. v. Dutton, 8 Cir, 109 F.2d 900, 903 [1, 2]; Holifield v. Wigdor, supra [ 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ].” Plaintiff does not seek recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine but contends that the facts (which are strikingly analogous) bring the case squarely within the orbit of Alligator Co. v. Dutton, supra, on which he confidently relies. 1961Alligator Co. v. Dutton, 8 Cir, 109 F.2d 900, 903 [1, 2]; Holifield v. Wigdor, supra [ 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ].” Plaintiff does not seek recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine but contends that the facts (which are strikingly analogous) bring the case squarely within the orbit of Alligator Co. v. Dutton, supra, on which he confidently relies.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

Case	Cited	Years
Hull Ex Rel. Hull v. Gillioz green mo · 1939 2 sentences 1977In the Baker case, the Supreme Court spelled out its refusal to expand the landowner’s liability as would be required under § 339, holding: “It was pointed out in Cox v. Gros, Mo., 360 S.W.2d 691 , however, that on at least two occasions, this court has construed section 339, Restatement, Torts, as an expansion of the attractive nuisance doctrine and said that ‘this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ Patterson v. Gibson, Mo., 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 .” 1977In the Baker case, the Supreme Court spelled out its refusal to expand the landowner’s liability as would be required under § 339, holding: “It was pointed out in Cox v. Gros, Mo., 360 S.W.2d 691 , however, that on at least two occasions, this court has construed section 339, Restatement, Torts, as an expansion of the attractive nuisance doctrine and said that ‘this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ Patterson v. Gibson, Mo., 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 .”	5	1950–1977
Patterson Ex Rel. Patterson v. Gibson neutral mo · 1956 2 sentences 1977In the Baker case, the Supreme Court spelled out its refusal to expand the landowner’s liability as would be required under § 339, holding: “It was pointed out in Cox v. Gros, Mo., 360 S.W.2d 691 , however, that on at least two occasions, this court has construed section 339, Restatement, Torts, as an expansion of the attractive nuisance doctrine and said that ‘this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ Patterson v. Gibson, Mo., 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 .” 1962It was pointed out in Cox v. Gros, however, that on at least two occasions, this court has construed section 339, Restatement, Torts, as an expansion of the attractive nuisance doctrine and said that “this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.” Patterson v. Gibson, Mo., 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , 130 S.W. 2d 623, 627 .	3	1962–1977
Baker v. PRAVER AND SONS, INC green mo · 1962 2 sentences 1986The Supreme Court stated that this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ponds, water-filled quarries, and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses.” Id. at 670 . 1967Baker v. Praver & Sons, Inc., Mo., 361 S.W.2d 667 ; Winegardner v. City of St.	2	1967–1986
Holifield v. Wigdor green mo · 1951 2 sentences 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App	2	1961–1962
Mason v. City of Mt. Sterling green ky · 2003 1 sentence 2018Sterling, 122 S.W.3d 500 , 507 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 cmt. e).	1	2018–2018
Hilen v. Hays green ky · 1984 1 sentence 2018The Hayeses argue that the lower courts erroneously applied legal concepts more appropriate to a time when contributory negligence barred recovery in negligence cases, ignored comparative fault, citing KRS 2 411.182 and Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984), and misapplied the attractive nuisance doctrine.	1	2018–2018
Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Cahill green mo · 1972 2 sentences 1986While we no longer operate under the attractive nuisance doctrine, Anderson v. Cahill, 485 S.W.2d 76 (Mo.1972) the preceding discussion regarding Crawford should put to rest any doubts regarding liability in the absence of a distracting influence. 1986While we no longer operate under the attractive nuisance doctrine, Anderson v. Cahill, 485 S.W.2d 76 (Mo.1972) the preceding discussion regarding Crawford should put to rest any doubts regarding liability in the absence of a distracting influence.	1	1986–1986
McGee v. Wabash Railroad green · 1908 2 sentences 1977Co., 214 Mo. 530 , 114 S.W. 33 (1908) involved the contributory negligence of parents suing for the wrongful death of their minor son. 1977Co., 214 Mo. 530 , 114 S.W. 33 (1908) involved the contributory negligence of parents suing for the wrongful death of their minor son.	1	1977–1977
Van Alst v. Kansas City, Mo. green moctapp · 1945 2 sentences 1977In two of these cases [McFarland v. Grau, supra, and Turner v. City of Moberly, supra] the evidence clearly and unequivocally showed that the minors involved had been warned of and appreciated the danger involved; Van Alst v. Kansas City, 239 Mo. App. 346 , 186 S.W.2d 762 (1945) involved the attractive nuisance doctrine and the 14 year old minor defendant had been forbidden to go swimming in the pond in which he drowned; and, McGee v. Wabash R. 1977In two of these cases [McFarland v. Grau, supra, and Turner v. City of Moberly, supra] the evidence clearly and unequivocally showed that the minors involved had been warned of and appreciated the danger involved; Van Alst v. Kansas City, 239 Mo. App. 346 , 186 S.W.2d 762 (1945) involved the attractive nuisance doctrine and the 14 year old minor defendant had been forbidden to go swimming in the pond in which he drowned; and, McGee v. Wabash R.	1	1977–1977
McFarland v. Grau green moctapp · 1957 1 sentence 1977In two of these cases [McFarland v. Grau, supra, and Turner v. City of Moberly, supra] the evidence clearly and unequivocally showed that the minors involved had been warned of and appreciated the danger involved; Van Alst v. Kansas City, 239 Mo. App. 346 , 186 S.W.2d 762 (1945) involved the attractive nuisance doctrine and the 14 year old minor defendant had been forbidden to go swimming in the pond in which he drowned; and, McGee v. Wabash R.	1	1977–1977
Cox ex rel. Cox v. Gros neutral mo · 1962 1 sentence 1977In the Baker case, the Supreme Court spelled out its refusal to expand the landowner’s liability as would be required under § 339, holding: “It was pointed out in Cox v. Gros, Mo., 360 S.W.2d 691 , however, that on at least two occasions, this court has construed section 339, Restatement, Torts, as an expansion of the attractive nuisance doctrine and said that ‘this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ Patterson v. Gibson, Mo., 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 .”	1	1977–1977
Jensen v. Kansas City neutral moctapp · 1914 2 sentences 1976Jensen v. Kansas City, 181 Mo.App. 359 , 168 S.W. 827 (1914), can be similarly distinguished. 1976Jensen v. Kansas City, 181 Mo.App. 359 , 168 S.W. 827 (1914), can be similarly distinguished.	1	1976–1976
Witte v. Stifel neutral mo · 1895 2 sentences 1967Witte v. Stifel, 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S.W. 891 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1235 , 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 . 1967Witte v. Stifel, 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S.W. 891 ; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1235 , 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 .	1	1967–1967
King v. Solomon green mass · 1948 2 sentences 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App	1	1962–1962
State Ex Rel. W. E. Callahan Construction Co. v. Hughes green · 1941 2 sentences 1962Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209 , 159 S.W.2d 251 , and in 1956 in Patterson v. Gibson, (Mo.) 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 , it was said that section 339 was a restatement of the attractive nuisance doctrine but that “this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.” In those cases several items, conditions and circumstances were listed to which it was said the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable and it was pointed out that our cases further “limit the doctrine to situations where children’s trespasses are du 1962Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209 , 159 S.W.2d 251 , and in 1956 in Patterson v. Gibson, (Mo.) 287 S.W.2d 853, 854-856 , it was said that section 339 was a restatement of the attractive nuisance doctrine but that “this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.” In those cases several items, conditions and circumstances were listed to which it was said the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable and it was pointed out that our cases further “limit the doctrine to situations where children’s trespasses are du	1	1962–1962
Davoren v. Kansas City green · 1925 2 sentences 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App	1	1962–1962
Rallo v. Heman Construction Co. neutral mo · 1921 2 sentences 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App 1962While there may be some Inconsistency in the Missouri cases (compare in its basic theory Davoren v. Kansas City (banc 1925), 308 Mo. 513 , 273 S.W. 401 , 40 A.L.R. 473 , and all other Missouri cases), this jurisdiction is committed to the view that the attractive nuisance doctrine is not applicable to “ordinary water hazards” including ponds, water-filled quarries and pools of water in creeks and natural water courses. 8 A.L.R.2d, 1 . c. 1259, 1267; Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636 , 235 S.W.2d 564 ; Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 291 Mo. 221 , 236 S.W. 632 ; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co., Mo.App	1	1962–1962
Anderson v. Cinnamon green mo · 1955 2 sentences 1962As to another exception to the rule of non-liability, the attractive nuisance doctrine, the appellant admits that the case does not fall within that doctrine: “This plaintiff did not plead that the thing (marble) that caused his injury was the thing that attracted him onto defendant’s premises, so that exception would not be applicable here.” It is then admitted that this court has declined to adopt the views of sections 342 and 345 of the restatement — liability for known dangerous conditions to gratuitous licensees — but says that Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304 , 282 S.W.2d 445 , 55 A.L.R 1962As to another exception to the rule of non-liability, the attractive nuisance doctrine, the appellant admits that the case does not fall within that doctrine: “This plaintiff did not plead that the thing (marble) that caused his injury was the thing that attracted him onto defendant’s premises, so that exception would not be applicable here.” It is then admitted that this court has declined to adopt the views of sections 342 and 345 of the restatement — liability for known dangerous conditions to gratuitous licensees — but says that Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304 , 282 S.W.2d 445 , 55 A.L.R	1	1962–1962
Bruce ex rel. Bruce v. City of Kansas City green kan · 1929 2 sentences 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 . 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 .	1	1959–1959
Flamingo v. City of Waukesha green wis · 1952 2 sentences 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 . 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 .	1	1959–1959
Patrick v. City of Bellevue green neb · 1957 2 sentences 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 . 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 .	1	1959–1959
Moulton v. City of Fargo neutral nd · 1917 2 sentences 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 . 1959Illustrative of the general rule are the following so-called leading cases: Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13 , 276 P. 284 , 63 A.L.R. 325 ; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502 , 167 N.W. 717 , L.R.A. 1918D, 1108 ; Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219 , 55 N.W.2d 24 ; Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196 , 82 N.W.2d 274 .	1	1959–1959
Howard Ex Rel. Howard v. St. Joseph Transmission Co. green mo · 1926	1	1955–1955
Lentz v. Schuerman Building & Realty Co. green · 1949	1	1951–1951
Turner v. City of Moberly green moctapp · 1930	1	1945–1945
Railroad Co. v. Stout green scotus · 1874	1	1939–1939

Where else courts name it

IL 48 (1921–2011) TX 39 (1931–2021) LA 33 (1949–2024) FL 33 (1925–2024) OH 32 (1968–2024) CA 31 (1919–1974) KY 24 (1918–2024) MO 20 (1939–2018) AZ 19 (1935–2024) KS 18 (1912–1995) GA 17 (1962–2010) NC 17 (1937–2012) WA 16 (1947–2020) MI 16 (1931–2018) OK 15 (1916–2024) IN 15 (1950–2012) AL 15 (1929–2009) PA 15 (1932–2013) MS 15 (1924–2005) TN 15 (1931–2002) WI 14 (1948–1998) UT 12 (1953–2024) NY 11 (1938–1964) ID 10 (1950–2007) NM 9 (1952–1998) MD 9 (1932–2019) MT 7 (1952–2010) AR 7 (1926–2017) WV 6 (1932–1992) SC 6 (1965–2011) CO 6 (1937–2013) CT 6 (1921–1993) RI 6 (1992–2022) DE 6 (1949–2022) MN 5 (1951–2001) VT 5 (1911–2026) NE 5 (1975–1992) WY 4 (1950–1995) SD 3 (1938–1980) IA 3 (1916–1969) OR 3 (1929–1977) NV 2 (1935–1972) DC 2 (1945–1981) MA 2 (1991–2006) NJ 2 (1950–1996) ME 2 (1993–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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