attractive nuisance doctrine in Michigan

1985Although the public accommodations provisions contain an express exemption limiting protections where the prohibited acts are "otherwise permitted by law," we do not think the Legislature intended the housing provisions to be interpreted irrationally merely because they did not include such an express exemption. [5] See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and cases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra , and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1982See Taylor v Mathews, 40 Mich App 74 ; 198 NW2d 843 (1972), and Magerowski v Standard Oil Co, 274 F Supp 246 (WD Mich, 1967).

1982See Taylor v Mathews, 40 Mich App 74 ; 198 NW2d 843 (1972), and Magerowski v Standard Oil Co, 274 F Supp 246 (WD Mich, 1967).

1977It is apparent from an examination of the cases on which he relied that the trial judge premised liability upon application of the high duty of care owed to children by possessors of land under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, so-called, which was first recognized in this state in Powers v Harlow, supra. In finding for plaintiffs, the trial judge said: "It would appear to this Court that the garage in this case, like the shed in Powers , was a place where a young child would naturally enter out of curiosity and a firearm, within sight and reach would be an object to which the child would b

1977Although the Court did not expressly characterize the case as one involving the attractive nuisance doctrine, it quoted language taken from Powers v Harlow, supra. The Court affirmed the trial court’s overruling of defendant’s demurrer, noting that it is negligent to place loaded firearms within the reach of young children and that the highest degree of care is required of responsible persons having ownership or control of dangerous explosives and firearms.

1994It appears likely that the Court in Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), applied the proprietary function exception to immunity, and in Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424, 432 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), the proprietary function exception was clearly pleaded.

1994It appears likely that the Court in Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), applied the proprietary function exception to immunity, and in Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424, 432 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), the proprietary function exception was clearly pleaded.

1994It appears likely that the Court in Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), applied the proprietary function exception to immunity, and in Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424, 432 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), the proprietary function exception was clearly pleaded.

1994It appears likely that the Court in Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), applied the proprietary function exception to immunity, and in Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424, 432 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), the proprietary function exception was clearly pleaded.

1994We are aware that in Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124, 139-141 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978) (Fitzgerald, J), a plurality of the Court held that, although attractive nuisance law is essentially negligence law, attractive nuisance is an exception to governmental immunity.

1994We are aware that in Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124, 139-141 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978) (Fitzgerald, J), a plurality of the Court held that, although attractive nuisance law is essentially negligence law, attractive nuisance is an exception to governmental immunity.

1989Hadfield, supra, did not address the question whether there is an attractive nuisance exception to governmental immunity.

1989The Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 339 provides a statement of the doctrine of attractive nuisance: A possessor of land is subject to liability for *741 physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) th

1989The Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 339 provides a statement of the doctrine of attractive nuisance: A possessor of land is subject to liability for *741 physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) th

1989The Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 339 provides a statement of the doctrine of attractive nuisance: A possessor of land is subject to liability for *741 physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) th

1989The Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 339 provides a statement of the doctrine of attractive nuisance: A possessor of land is subject to liability for *741 physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) th

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1985See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra, and eases cited therein; Moning v Alfono, supra, and cases cited therein discussing special duties owed children in the context of the attractive nuisance doctrine, negligent entrustment, and sale of potentially dangerous instrumentalities; Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244, 267 ; 235 NW2d 732 (1975), Kreiner v Yezdbick, 22 Mich App 581 ; 177 NW2d 629 (1970), and Butler v Watson, 193 Mich 322, 329 ; 159 NW 507 (1916), discussing duties of landlords to those on their property.

1982The clear language of the recreational use act also precludes plaintiffs’ contention that, since the statute neither restricted nor expanded existing common-law rights and duties, Thomas v Consumers Power Co, 58 Mich App 486 ; 228 NW2d 786 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part 394 Mich 459 ; 231 NW2d 653 (1975) and, since the attractive nuisance doctrine has been an important part of the common law in Michigan, a claim of nuisance should be recognized concurrently with allegations of liability under the act.

1982The clear language of the recreational use act also precludes plaintiffs’ contention that, since the statute neither restricted nor expanded existing common-law rights and duties, Thomas v Consumers Power Co, 58 Mich App 486 ; 228 NW2d 786 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part 394 Mich 459 ; 231 NW2d 653 (1975) and, since the attractive nuisance doctrine has been an important part of the common law in Michigan, a claim of nuisance should be recognized concurrently with allegations of liability under the act.

1982The clear language of the recreational use act also precludes plaintiffs’ contention that, since the statute neither restricted nor expanded existing common-law rights and duties, Thomas v Consumers Power Co, 58 Mich App 486 ; 228 NW2d 786 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part 394 Mich 459 ; 231 NW2d 653 (1975) and, since the attractive nuisance doctrine has been an important part of the common law in Michigan, a claim of nuisance should be recognized concurrently with allegations of liability under the act.

1982The clear language of the recreational use act also precludes plaintiffs’ contention that, since the statute neither restricted nor expanded existing common-law rights and duties, Thomas v Consumers Power Co, 58 Mich App 486 ; 228 NW2d 786 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part 394 Mich 459 ; 231 NW2d 653 (1975) and, since the attractive nuisance doctrine has been an important part of the common law in Michigan, a claim of nuisance should be recognized concurrently with allegations of liability under the act.

1968See Petrak v. Cooke Contracting Company (1951), 329 Mich 564 ; Morris v. Lewis Manufacturing Company (1951), 331 Mich 252 .

1966We conclude that under the evidence in this record and under the decisions of this Court, including Lyshah and Nielsen, supra, the judgment in each case was against the clear preponderance and contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

1966We conclude that under the evidence in this record and under the decisions of this Court, including Lyshak and Nielsen, supra, the judgment in each case was against the clear preponderance and contrary to the great weight of the evidence.