attractive nuisance doctrine in Texas

1997McCoy applied the attractive nuisance doctrine to a 14-year-old boy who climbed a high-voltage electric tower by the same kind of ladder as the boy in Johns. 239 S.W. at 1106-1107 .

1997McCoy applied the attractive nuisance doctrine to a 14-year-old boy who climbed a high-voltage electric tower by the same kind of ladder as the boy in Johns. 239 S.W. at 1106-1107 .

2020In Kopplin, the parents of a seven- or eight-year-old boy who fell from a “track ride” sued the playground owner on a premises-liability theory under the doctrine of attractive nuisance. 869 S.W.2d 433 at 441 .

2020There, the court of appeals rejected the theory, holding that summary judgment on that claim was proper because the “danger of falling from playground equipment such as the track ride . . . [was] open and obvious to even a child of [the boy’s] age.” Id.

1997The court of appeals concluded that the attractive nuisance doctrine could apply in this case based on this Court's decision in Johns v. Fort Worth Power & Light Co., 30 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1930, writ ref'd).

1997The court of appeals concluded that the attractive nuisance doctrine could apply in this ease based on this Court’s decision in Johns v. Fort Worth Power & Light Co., 30 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1930, writ refd).

1954The Supreme Court in the case of Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12 , 151 S.W.2d 565 at page 566, in discussing the attractive nuisance doctrine held: “Liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine is based on the theory that the dangerous thing was so situated and maintained as to attract children from the street, or from some public place where they may be expected to be, thus raising a presumption that the parties so maintaining the nuisance should have foreseen and anticipated the injury. 45 C.J. 767 ; 30 Tex.Jur. 889. 1 In order to invoke the doctrine it is necessary that the

1954The Supreme Court in the case of Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12 , 151 S.W.2d 565 at page 566, in discussing the attractive nuisance doctrine held: “Liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine is based on the theory that the dangerous thing was so situated and maintained as to attract children from the street, or from some public place where they may be expected to be, thus raising a presumption that the parties so maintaining the nuisance should have foreseen and anticipated the injury. 45 C.J. 767 ; 30 Tex.Jur. 889. 1 In order to invoke the doctrine it is necessary that the

1939Co. v. Morgan, 92 Tex. 98, 102 , 46 S.W. 28, 29 , the court, in sustaining a general demurrer to a petition attempting to allege a cause of *127 action for negligence involving the attractive nuisance doctrine, said: “In order to state a cause of action against the defendant in a case like this, the facts alleged in the petition must show (1) a duty owed by defendant to the party injured; (2) a failure on part of defendant to exercise the degree of care required of it by law in the performance of that duty.

1939Co. v. Morgan, 92 Tex. 98, 102 , 46 S.W. 28, 29 , the court, in sustaining a general demurrer to a petition attempting to allege a cause of *127 action for negligence involving the attractive nuisance doctrine, said: “In order to state a cause of action against the defendant in a case like this, the facts alleged in the petition must show (1) a duty owed by defendant to the party injured; (2) a failure on part of defendant to exercise the degree of care required of it by law in the performance of that duty.

2019Yowell, 557 S.W.3d at 799 .

1990Banker, 146 Tex. 434 , 208 S.W.2d 843, 849 (1948, citing Prosser on Torts); Robertson, 392 S.W.2d at 579 .

1965The Court there quoted the following from Vol. 65, Negligence, p. 469, § 29 (11), C.J.S.: “ ‘While there is no definite age fixed at which a child ceases to be entitled to the protection of the attractive nuisance doctrine, the great majority of cases in which it has been applied have involved children of less than ten years of age, and it has been considered that it cannot be applied to a child of the age of fourteen or over, at least in the absence of some showing of a lack of the mental development, which, is ordinarily found in children of that age or of a very exceptional state of facts.’

1962Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465 , 271 S.W.2d 410 , supra. There is no intimation anywhere in the record that defendant acted in such manner.

1962Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465 , 271 S.W.2d 410 , supra. There is no intimation anywhere in the record that defendant acted in such manner.

1957These are Skinner v. Knickrehm, 10 Cal.App. 596 , 102 P. 947 , and Middaugh v. Waseca Canning Co., 203 Minn. 456 , 281 N.W. 818 .

1957These are Skinner v. Knickrehm, 10 Cal.App. 596 , 102 P. 947 , and Middaugh v. Waseca Canning Co., 203 Minn. 456 , 281 N.W. 818 .

1957Co., 290 S.W.2d 264 , actually went off on the proposition that the age of the boy there involved precluded him being a beneficiary of the attractive nuisance doctrine, but in that case we did indicate our view that the doctrine had no application to moving trains or vehicles.

1957These are Skinner v. Knickrehm, 10 Cal.App. 596 , 102 P. 947 , and Middaugh v. Waseca Canning Co., 203 Minn. 456 , 281 N.W. 818 .

1957These are Skinner v. Knickrehm, 10 Cal.App. 596 , 102 P. 947 , and Middaugh v. Waseca Canning Co., 203 Minn. 456 , 281 N.W. 818 .

1956Without further multiplication of authorities, we quote the following from Union Railway Co. v. Williams, 6 Cir., 187 F.2d 489 , 493: “We have not found that any court has gone so far as to require railroad companies to patrol its tracks or police its trains with a sufficient number of guards to prevent boys from attempting to board them.” It is plaintiff’s contention, however, that it is well settled law that railroad trains are such dangerous instrumentalities as come within the attractive nuisance doctrine, and he cites in support of such contention: Rinker v. Galveston-Houston Electric Rai

1956Without further multiplication of authorities, we quote the following from Union Railway Co. v. Williams, 6 Cir., 187 F.2d 489 , 493: “We have not found that any court has gone so far as to require railroad companies to patrol its tracks or police its trains with a sufficient number of guards to prevent boys from attempting to board them.” It is plaintiff’s contention, however, that it is well settled law that railroad trains are such dangerous instrumentalities as come within the attractive nuisance doctrine, and he cites in support of such contention: Rinker v. Galveston-Houston Electric Rai

1954Co., Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 261 at page 264, it is stated: “Moreover, even assuming a situation having the aspect of an attractive nuisance, the asserted dangers incident thereto were open and obvious.

1953Error is assigned to the refusal of the court to give in connection with Special Issue No. 3, its requested instruction A, which reads: "By the term `inherently dangerous,' as used in the court's charge is meant a danger infixed and indwelling and involved in the constitution or central character of the instrumentality at all times, and `inherently dangerous' does not mean danger arising from mere casual or collateral negligence on the part of others with respect thereto, under the peculiar circumstances." This definition as requested *145 has been recognized in Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo.

1953Error is assigned to the refusal of the court to give in connection with Special Issue No. 3, its requested instruction A, which reads: "By the term `inherently dangerous,' as used in the court's charge is meant a danger infixed and indwelling and involved in the constitution or central character of the instrumentality at all times, and `inherently dangerous' does not mean danger arising from mere casual or collateral negligence on the part of others with respect thereto, under the peculiar circumstances." This definition as requested *145 has been recognized in Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo.