attractive nuisance doctrine in Maryland

1998In Herring v. Christensen, 252 Md. 240, 241-42 , 249 A.2d 718 (1969), the Court of Appeals declined to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine to save the claim of a three-year old plaintiff who wandered onto the defendants’ unfenced premises, and was injured in a trash fire that the defendants maintained on the property.

1998In Herring v. Christensen, 252 Md. 240, 241-42 , 249 A.2d 718 (1969), the Court of Appeals declined to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine to save the claim of a three-year old plaintiff who wandered onto the defendants’ unfenced premises, and was injured in a trash fire that the defendants maintained on the property.

1995In Hensley v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 258 Md. 397 , 265 A.2d 897 (1970), we rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine where a boy swinging on a rope was injured because the boy was a trespasser or licensee on real property owned by one defendant and occupied by the other defendant.

1995In Hensley v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 258 Md. 397 , 265 A.2d 897 (1970), we rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine where a boy swinging on a rope was injured because the boy was a trespasser or licensee on real property owned by one defendant and occupied by the other defendant.

1998In Barnes v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City, 231 Md. 147 , 189 A.2d 100 (1963), the three-year old plaintiff fell into an uncovered, concrete access well located in the housing project in which he lived.

1998In Barnes v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City, 231 Md. 147 , 189 A.2d 100 (1963), the three-year old plaintiff fell into an uncovered, concrete access well located in the housing project in which he lived.

1995Co., 123 Md. 120 , 91 A. 149 (1914).

1995Co., 123 Md. 120 , 91 A. 149 (1914).

1995Where both the child and the chattel have equal rights on the realty, the attractive nuisance doctrine ought to apply, and the Court should fashion an attractive nuisance doctrine applicable only to chattels which would be similar to the Restatement Rule with the following modifications indicated in brackets. 2 Restatement (Second) Torts § 339, at 197 (1965) states: “A possessor of [land: a chattel] is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the [land chattel] if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the

1995Where both the child and the chattel have equal rights on the realty, the attractive nuisance doctrine ought to apply, and the Court should fashion an attractive nuisance doctrine applicable only to chattels which would be similar to the Restatement Rule with the following modifications indicated in brackets. 2 Restatement (Second) Torts § 339, at 197 (1965) states: “A possessor of [land: a chattel] is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the [land chattel] if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the

1995Where both the child and the chattel have equal rights on the realty, the attractive nuisance doctrine ought to apply, and the Court should fashion an attractive nuisance doctrine applicable only to chattels which would be similar to the Restatement Rule with the following modifications indicated in brackets. 2 Restatement (Second) Torts § 339, at 197 (1965) states: “A possessor of [land: a chattel] is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the [land chattel] if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the

1995Where both the child and the chattel have equal rights on the realty, the attractive nuisance doctrine ought to apply, and the Court should fashion an attractive nuisance doctrine applicable only to chattels which would be similar to the Restatement Rule with the following modifications indicated in brackets. 2 Restatement (Second) Torts § 339, at 197 (1965) states: “A possessor of [land: a chattel] is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the [land chattel] if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the

1995In Hicks v. Hitaffer, 256 Md. 659 , 261 A.2d 769 (1970), where a boy was injured by the explosion of a .22 caliber blank cartridge taken from a car parked on defendant’s property, we noted that plaintiffs did not “advocate the adoption of the attractive nuisance doctrine in any form.” 256 Md. at 666-67, 261 A.2d at 772.

1995In Hicks v. Hitaffer, 256 Md. 659 , 261 A.2d 769 (1970), where a boy was injured by the explosion of a .22 caliber blank cartridge taken from a car parked on defendant’s property, we noted that plaintiffs did not “advocate the adoption of the attractive nuisance doctrine in any form.” 256 Md. at 666-67, 261 A.2d at 772.

1971We view this argument as inapposite, since it is reminiscent of the concept of allurement, once thought to be essential to recovery in attractive nuisance cases, but now largely discredited in states which accept the attractive nuisance doctrine, McGettigan v. National Bank of Washington, 320 F. 2d 703 (C.A.

1970We are of opinion that it is not sound in principle, and that it cannot be sustained.” Id. at 451 .

1932In the Stansfield case, Judge Urner cited with approval Simonton v. Light & Power Co., 28 Tex. Civ.