15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kelly v. Ladywood Apartmentsgreen2 sentences2012See Kelly v. Ladywood Apartments, 622 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.7 With Kelly in mind, we stated that “absent exigent circumstances…, public policy and common sense dictate that the duty to provide for a child’s safety will usually rest with the child’s parents while the child is in the parents’ 7 We explained the inapplicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Kelly as follows: The immediate presence of Kelly’s father negates all of the policy reasons for shifting the duty to care for this child from his father to Ladywood. 2012See Kelly v. Ladywood Apartments, 622 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. 7 With Kelly in mind, we stated that “absent exigent circumstances ..., public policy and common sense dictate that the duty to provide for a child’s safety will usually rest with the child’s parents while the child is in the parents’ presence.” Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d at 302 . | 5 | 6 |
Carroll Ex Rel. Carroll v. Jagoe Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2007Carroll v. Jagoe Homes, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). 2007Carroll v. Jagoe Homes, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind.Ct. | 2 | 2 |
Cunningham Ex Rel. Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc.green2 sentences2003Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. 2000The attractive nuisance doctrine applies when the problem complained of is (1) “maintained or permitted upon the property by the owner;” (2) “particularly dangerous to children, and of such a nature that they will not comprehend the danger;” and (3) “particularly attractive to children.” Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. | 2 | 2 |
Harradon v. Schlamadingergreen2 sentences2012As an adult, Kelly’s father, not Ladywood, is charged with the care of his son and with understanding and appreciating the possible danger that snow may cover objects which would obstruct a sled’s path. 12 presence.” Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d at 302 . 2012See Kelly v. Ladywood Apartments, 622 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. 7 With Kelly in mind, we stated that “absent exigent circumstances ..., public policy and common sense dictate that the duty to provide for a child’s safety will usually rest with the child’s parents while the child is in the parents’ presence.” Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d at 302 . | 1 | 2 |
Pier v. SCHULTZgreen2 sentences2008Pier v. Schultz, 243 Ind. 200, 205 , 182 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ind.1962); Morningstar v. Maynard, 798 N.E.2d 920, 922-23 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). 1971Although it was primarily concerned with a fact situation covering the attractive nuisance doctrine, in speaking of a licensee the court said: “Since it is not alleged that the instrumentality, of which appellant complains, was of such character that its presence upon the property of appellees created a condition comparable to an entrapment, and since it is not alleged that the appellees, as owners of the property, committed any positive act or exercised any positive control over the instrumentality, regardless of its character, and since it affirmatively appears from the complaint that the pe | 1 | 2 |
City of Evansville v. Bluegreen2 sentences2000In City of Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130 , 8 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1937), our supreme court declared, A swimming pool in a park, whether artificially constructed or a part of a natural pond, or lake, or stream, improved in its bathing facilities, is not per se a nuisance, and, unless there is some hidden or latent danger, the ... “attractive nuisance” doctrine does not apply. 2000In City of Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130 , 8 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1937), our supreme court declared, A swimming pool in a park, whether artificially constructed or a part of a natural pond, or lake, or stream, improved in its bathing facilities, is not per se a nuisance, and, unless there is some hidden or latent danger, the ... “attractive nuisance” doctrine does not apply. | 1 | 2 |
Morningstar v. Maynardgreen1 sentence2008Pier v. Schultz, 243 Ind. 200, 205 , 182 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ind.1962); Morningstar v. Maynard, 798 N.E.2d 920, 922-23 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Kopczynski v. Bargergreen2 sentences2008Id. at 10 . 2008Kopczynski v. Barger, 870 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Harness v. Churchmembers Life Insurance Co.green2 sentences2007Additionally, as our Supreme Court determined in Harness v. Churchmembers Life Insurance Co., 241 Ind. 672, 679 , 175 N.E.2d 132, 135 (1961): The doctrine of attractive nuisance, it has been said, is limited in its application to cases where the danger is latent, and affords no basis for a recovery where the injury complained of was produced by a peril of an obvious or patent character. 2007Additionally, as our Supreme Court determined in Harness v. Churchmembers Life Insurance Co., 241 Ind. 672, 679 , 175 N.E.2d 132, 135 (1961): The doctrine of attractive nuisance, it has been said, is limited in its application to cases where the danger is latent, and affords no basis for a recovery where the injury complained of was produced by a peril of an obvious or patent character. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Means
red
2 sentences1974The court then proceeded to analyze the various positions taken by the courts, including the concepts of last clear chance and attractive nuisance, stating: “In many of these cases to which the attractive nuisance doctrine and the doctrine of last clear chance have been applied, where children have been involved, a careful examination and scrutiny of the facts upon which they rest will disclose that such duty to observe care is not, necessarily, dependent on a contractual relation between the parties, nor does it necessarily depend on any consideration of benefit received or to be received, by 1974The court then proceeded to analyze the various positions taken by the courts, including the concepts of last clear chance and attractive nuisance, stating: "In many of the cases to which the attractive nuisance doctrine and the doctrine of last clear chance have been applied, where children have been involved, a careful examination and scrutiny of the facts upon which they rest will disclose that such duty to observe care is not, necessarily, dependent on a contractual relation between the parties; nor does it necessarily depend on any consideration of benefit received or to be received, by e | 3 | 1969–1974 |
Neal, Admr. v. Home Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 171 , 111 N.E.2d at 286 . 1997In addition, the court concluded that “[a] building under construction ordinarily does not come within the attractive nuisance rule.” Id. | 2 | 1969–1997 |
Lowden Ex Rel. Lowden v. Lowden
green
1 sentence2003Id. (citing 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability §§ 270, 273 (1990). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Drake Ex Rel. Drake v. Mitchell Community Schools
green
1 sentence2000Likewise, IRUS expressly “does not affect ... the attractive nuisance doctrine.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt
green
2 sentences1993In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt (1921), 258 U.S. 268 , 42 S.Ct. 299 , 66 L.Ed. 615 , Justice Holmes stated the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply when the child discovers the condition after he has entered upon the defendant’s property. 1993In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt (1921), 258 U.S. 268 , 42 S.Ct. 299 , 66 L.Ed. 615 , Justice Holmes stated the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply when the child discovers the condition after he has entered upon the defendant’s property. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lockridge v. Standard Oil Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Lockridge v. Standard Oil Company (1953), 124 Ind.App. 257 , 114 N.E.2d 807, 810 . 3 In the present case, the rationale underpinning the attractive nuisance doctrine has no application to the undisputed facts of this case. 1993Lockridge v. Standard Oil Company (1953), 124 Ind.App. 257 , 114 N.E.2d 807, 810 . 3 In the present case, the rationale underpinning the attractive nuisance doctrine has no application to the undisputed facts of this case. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Drew v. Lett
green
2 sentences1970Co. v. Harvey, supra.” (Our emphasis.) This court said, in Drew v. Lett (1932), 95 Ind. App. 89, 95 , 182 N. E. 547 , 549: “The questions' of the particular child’s ability to appreciate the danger, and his power to avoid it, are usually questions of fact for the jury.” In the case of Wozniczka v. McKean, supra, Judge Sharp of this court discussed the reasoning in Echevarria v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F. 2d 885 (7th Cir. 1968), in which case the plaintiff had a mental capacity of five and was playing with his brother and friend, ages eleven and fifteen, on a public playground when he st 1970Co. v. Harvey, supra.” (Our emphasis.) This court said, in Drew v. Lett (1932), 95 Ind. App. 89, 95 , 182 N. E. 547 , 549: “The questions' of the particular child’s ability to appreciate the danger, and his power to avoid it, are usually questions of fact for the jury.” In the case of Wozniczka v. McKean, supra, Judge Sharp of this court discussed the reasoning in Echevarria v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F. 2d 885 (7th Cir. 1968), in which case the plaintiff had a mental capacity of five and was playing with his brother and friend, ages eleven and fifteen, on a public playground when he st | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Jose Rivera Echevarria and Fortunato Rivera Echevarria B/n/f Jose Rivera Echevarria v. United States Steel Corporation
green
1 sentence1970Co. v. Harvey, supra.” (Our emphasis.) This court said, in Drew v. Lett (1932), 95 Ind. App. 89, 95 , 182 N. E. 547 , 549: “The questions' of the particular child’s ability to appreciate the danger, and his power to avoid it, are usually questions of fact for the jury.” In the case of Wozniczka v. McKean, supra, Judge Sharp of this court discussed the reasoning in Echevarria v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F. 2d 885 (7th Cir. 1968), in which case the plaintiff had a mental capacity of five and was playing with his brother and friend, ages eleven and fifteen, on a public playground when he st | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Witte v. Stifel
neutral
2 sentences1953Puchta v. Rothman (1950), 99 Cal. App. 2d 285 , 221 P. 2d 744 ; State v. Bealmear (1925), 149 Md. 10 , 130 A. 66 ; Witte v. Stifel (1895), 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S. W. 891 , 47 Am. 1953Puchta v. Rothman (1950), 99 Cal. App. 2d 285 , 221 P. 2d 744 ; State v. Bealmear (1925), 149 Md. 10 , 130 A. 66 ; Witte v. Stifel (1895), 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S. W. 891 , 47 Am. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
State v. Bealmear
neutral
2 sentences1953Puchta v. Rothman (1950), 99 Cal. App. 2d 285 , 221 P. 2d 744 ; State v. Bealmear (1925), 149 Md. 10 , 130 A. 66 ; Witte v. Stifel (1895), 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S. W. 891 , 47 Am. 1953Puchta v. Rothman (1950), 99 Cal. App. 2d 285 , 221 P. 2d 744 ; State v. Bealmear (1925), 149 Md. 10 , 130 A. 66 ; Witte v. Stifel (1895), 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S. W. 891 , 47 Am. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Puchta v. Rothman
green
2 sentences1953Puchta v. Rothman (1950), 99 Cal. App. 2d 285 , 221 P. 2d 744 ; State v. Bealmear (1925), 149 Md. 10 , 130 A. 66 ; Witte v. Stifel (1895), 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S. W. 891 , 47 Am. 1953Puchta v. Rothman (1950), 99 Cal. App. 2d 285 , 221 P. 2d 744 ; State v. Bealmear (1925), 149 Md. 10 , 130 A. 66 ; Witte v. Stifel (1895), 126 Mo. 295 , 28 S. W. 891 , 47 Am. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Young v. Harvey
green
1 sentence1953Co. v. Harvey, supra." ( 77 Ohio St. 235 , 83 N.E. 66 , 75, 122 Am. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Ray v. Hutchison
green
2 sentences1953Ray v. Hutchison (1933), 17 Tenn. App. 477 , 68 S. W. 2d 948, 954 . 1953Ray v. Hutchison (1933), 17 Tenn. App. 477 , 68 S. W. 2d 948, 954 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Anderson v. Reith-Riley Construction Co.
neutral
2 sentences1950Before the anomalous dicta in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co. (1942), 112 Ind. App. 170 , 44 N. E. 2d 184 , and the ubiquitous reasoning in City of Evansville v. Blue (1937), 212 Ind. 130 , 8 N. E. 2d 224 , there was no doubt that Indiana clearly permitted recovery on the doctrine. 1950Before the anomalous dicta in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co. (1942), 112 Ind. App. 170 , 44 N. E. 2d 184 , and the ubiquitous reasoning in City of Evansville v. Blue (1937), 212 Ind. 130 , 8 N. E. 2d 224 , there was no doubt that Indiana clearly permitted recovery on the doctrine. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.